IPsec

This document describes a YANG module for the management of IP Traffic Flow Security (IP-TFS) additions to Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) and IPsec.

This document describes managed objects for the management of IP Traffic Flow Security additions to Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) and IPsec. This document provides a read-only version of the objects defined in the YANG module for the same purpose, which is in "A YANG Data Model for IP Traffic Flow Security" (RFC 9348).

The United States Government has published the National Security Agency's Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite, which defines cryptographic algorithm policy for national security applications. This document specifies the conventions for using the United States National Security Agency's CNSA Suite algorithms in Internet Protocol Security (IPsec). It applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of all components of US National Security Systems (described in NIST Special Publication 800-59) that employ IPsec. This document is also appropriate for all other US Government systems that process high-value information. It is made publicly available for use by developers and operators of these and any other system deployments.

This document describes how to provide IPsec-based flow protection (integrity and confidentiality) by means of an Interface to Network Security Function (I2NSF) Controller. It considers two main well-known scenarios in IPsec: gateway-to-gateway and host-to-host. The service described in this document allows the configuration and monitoring of IPsec Security Associations (IPsec SAs) from an I2NSF Controller to one or several flow-based Network Security Functions (NSFs) that rely on IPsec to protect data traffic.

This document focuses on the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface by providing YANG data models for configuring the IPsec databases, namely Security Policy Database (SPD), Security Association Database (SAD), Peer Authorization Database (PAD), and Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2). This allows IPsec SA establishment with minimal intervention by the network administrator. This document defines three YANG modules, but it does not define any new protocol.

Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Control Plane should ideally be self-managing and be as independent as possible of configuration. This document defines such a plane and calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane", with the primary use as a control plane for autonomic functions. It also serves as a "virtual out-of-band channel" for Operations, Administration, and Management (OAM) communications over a network that provides automatically configured, hop-by-hop authenticated and encrypted communications via automatically configured IPv6 even when the network is not configured or is misconfigured.

RFC 3723 specifies IPsec requirements for block storage protocols over IP (e.g., Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI)) based on IPsec v2 (RFC 2401 and related RFCs); those requirements have subsequently been applied to remote direct data placement protocols, e.g., the Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMAP). This document updates RFC 3723's IPsec requirements to IPsec v3 (RFC 4301 and related RFCs) and makes some changes to required algorithms based on developments in cryptography since RFC 3723 was published.

This document is a report from the IRTF Host Identity Protocol (HIP) research group documenting the collective experiences and lessons learned from studies, related experimentation, and designs completed by the research group. The document summarizes implications of adding HIP to host protocol stacks, Internet infrastructure, and applications. The perspective of a network operator, as well as a list of HIP experiments, are presented as well. Portions of this report may be relevant also to other network overlay-based architectures or to attempts to deploy alternative networking architectures. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

This document presents an alternate method to do the anti-replay checks and updates for IP Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP). The method defined in this document obviates the need for bit shifting and it reduces the number of times an anti-replay window is adjusted. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

The United States Government has published guidelines for "NSA Suite B Cryptography" dated July, 2005, which defines cryptographic algorithm policy for national security applications. This document specifies the conventions for using Suite B cryptography in IP Security (IPsec).

Since many of the Suite B algorithms are used in other environments, the majority of the conventions needed for the Suite B algorithms are already specified in other documents. This document references the source of these conventions, with some relevant detail repeated to aid developers who choose to support Suite B. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

This document updates the security considerations for the MD5 message digest algorithm. It also updates the security considerations for HMAC-MD5. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

This document redefines how the explicit congestion notification (ECN) field of the IP header should be constructed on entry to and exit from any IP-in-IP tunnel. On encapsulation, it updates RFC 3168 to bring all IP-in-IP tunnels (v4 or v6) into line with RFC 4301 IPsec ECN processing. On decapsulation, it updates both RFC 3168 and RFC 4301 to add new behaviours for previously unused combinations of inner and outer headers. The new rules ensure the ECN field is correctly propagated across a tunnel whether it is used to signal one or two severity levels of congestion; whereas before, only one severity level was supported. Tunnel endpoints can be updated in any order without affecting pre-existing uses of the ECN field, thus ensuring backward compatibility. Nonetheless, operators wanting to support two severity levels (e.g., for pre-congestion notification -- PCN) can require compliance with this new specification. A thorough analysis of the reasoning for these changes and the implications is included. In the unlikely event that the new rules do not meet a specific need, RFC 4774 gives guidance on designing alternate ECN semantics, and this document extends that to include tunnelling issues. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

IP Security (IPsec) provides various security services for IP traffic. However, the benefits of IPsec come at the cost of increased overhead. This document outlines a framework for integrating Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec). By compressing the inner headers of IP packets, ROHCoIPsec proposes to reduce the amount of overhead associated with the transmission of traffic over IPsec Security Associations (SAs). This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

Integrating Robust Header Compression (ROHC) with IPsec (ROHCoIPsec) offers the combined benefits of IP security services and efficient bandwidth utilization. However, in order to integrate ROHC with IPsec, extensions to the Security Policy Database (SPD) and Security Association Database (SAD) are required. This document describes the IPsec extensions required to support ROHCoIPsec. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This specification defines a profile for the use of X.509 Attribute Certificates in Internet Protocols. Attribute certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic applications requiring broad interoperability as well as limited special purpose requirements. The profile places emphasis on attribute certificate support for Internet electronic mail, IPsec, and WWW security applications. This document obsoletes RFC 3281. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document specifies, abstractly, how to interface applications and transport protocols with IPsec so as to create "channels" by latching "connections" (packet flows) to certain IPsec Security Association (SA) parameters for the lifetime of the connections. Connection latching is layered on top of IPsec and does not modify the underlying IPsec architecture.

Connection latching can be used to protect applications against accidentally exposing live packet flows to unintended peers, whether as the result of a reconfiguration of IPsec or as the result of using weak peer identity to peer address associations. Weak association of peer ID and peer addresses is at the core of Better Than Nothing Security (BTNS); thus, connection latching can add a significant measure of protection to BTNS IPsec nodes.

Finally, the availability of IPsec channels will make it possible to use channel binding to IPsec channels. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes the use of the Camellia block cipher algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, Counter (CTR) mode, and Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode as additional, optional-to- implement Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) mechanisms to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, and connectionless integrity. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

The Security Considerations sections of many Internet Drafts say, in effect, "just use IPsec". While this is sometimes correct, more often it will leave users without real, interoperable security mechanisms. This memo offers some guidance on when IPsec Version 2 should and should not be specified. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.

The Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol describes security services for traffic at the IP layer. That architecture primarily defines services for Internet Protocol (IP) unicast packets. This document describes how the IPsec security services are applied to IP multicast packets. These extensions are relevant only for an IPsec implementation that supports multicast. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

The Internet network security protocol suite, IPsec, requires authentication, usually of network-layer entities, to enable access control and provide security services. This authentication can be based on mechanisms such as pre-shared symmetric keys, certificates with associated asymmetric keys, or the use of Kerberos (via Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK)). The need to deploy authentication information and its associated identities can be a significant obstacle to the use of IPsec.

This document explains the rationale for extending the Internet network security protocol suite to enable use of IPsec security services without authentication. These extensions are intended to protect communication, providing "better-than-nothing security" (BTNS). The extensions may be used on their own (this use is called Stand-Alone BTNS, or SAB) or may be used to provide network-layer security that can be authenticated by higher layers in the protocol stack (this use is called Channel-Bound BTNS, or CBB). The document also explains situations for which use of SAB and/or CBB extensions are applicable. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document outlines a solution for the Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4) and IPsec coexistence problem for enterprise users. The solution consists of an applicability statement for using Mobile IPv4 and IPsec for session mobility in corporate remote access scenarios, and a required mechanism for detecting the trusted internal network securely. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document gives guidance on securing manually configured IPv6-in- IPv4 tunnels using IPsec in transport mode. No additional protocol extensions are described beyond those available with the IPsec framework. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This specification describes the use of Hashed Message Authentication Mode (HMAC) in conjunction with the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms in IPsec. These algorithms may be used as the basis for data origin authentication and integrity verification mechanisms for the Authentication Header (AH), Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE), and IKEv2 protocols, and also as Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) for IKE and IKEv2. Truncated output lengths are specified for the authentication-related variants, with the corresponding algorithms designated as HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256. The PRF variants are not truncated, and are called PRF-HMAC-SHA-256, PRF-HMAC-SHA-384, and PRF-HMAC-SHA-512. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document defines a Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2) Management Information Base (MIB) module for configuring the security policy database of a device implementing the IPsec protocol. The policy-based packet filtering and the corresponding execution of actions described in this document are of a more general nature than for IPsec configuration alone, such as for configuration of a firewall. This MIB module is designed to be extensible with other enterprise or standards-based defined packet filters and actions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This informational document describes and identifies the requirements for transactions to handle Public Key Certificate (PKC) lifecycle transactions between Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) Virtual Private Network (VPN) Systems using Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (versions 1 and 2) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Systems. These requirements are designed to meet the needs of enterprise-scale IPsec VPN deployments. It is intended that a standards track profile of a management protocol will be created to address many of these requirements. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recently specified the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC), which is equivalent to the One-Key CBC-MAC1 (OMAC1) algorithm submitted by Iwata and Kurosawa. OMAC1 efficiently reduces the key size of Extended Cipher Block Chaining mode (XCBC). This memo specifies the use of CMAC mode as an authentication mechanism of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the Authentication Header (AH) protocols. This new algorithm is named AES-CMAC-96. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

IPsec is specified as the means of securing signaling messages between the Mobile Node and Home Agent for Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6). MIPv6 signaling messages that are secured include the Binding Updates and Acknowledgement messages used for managing the bindings between a Mobile Node and its Home Agent. This document proposes an alternate method for securing MIPv6 signaling messages between Mobile Nodes and Home Agents. The alternate method defined here consists of a MIPv6-specific mobility message authentication option that can be added to MIPv6 signaling messages. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document describes a new resource record for the Domain Name System (DNS). This record may be used to store public keys for use in IP security (IPsec) systems. The record also includes provisions for indicating what system should be contacted when an IPsec tunnel is established with the entity in question.

This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #4 of the KEY Resource Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC 3445. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

IPsec can secure the links of a multihop network to protect communication between trusted components, e.g., for a secure virtual network (VN), overlay, or virtual private network (VPN). Virtual links established by IPsec tunnel mode can conflict with routing and forwarding inside VNs because IP routing depends on references to interfaces and next-hop IP addresses. The IPsec tunnel mode specification is ambiguous on this issue, so even compliant implementations cannot be trusted to avoid conflicts. An alternative to tunnel mode uses non-IPsec IPIP encapsulation together with IPsec transport mode, which we call IIPtran. IPIP encapsulation occurs as a separate initial step, as the result of a forwarding lookup of the VN packet. IPsec transport mode processes the resulting (tunneled) IP packet with an SA determined through a security association database (SAD) match on the tunnel header. IIPtran supports dynamic routing inside the VN without changes to the current IPsec architecture. IIPtran demonstrates how to configure any compliant IPsec implementation to avoid the aforementioned conflicts. IIPtran is also compared to several alternative mechanisms for VN routing and their respective impact on IPsec, routing, policy enforcement, and interactions with the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). This memo provides information for the Internet community.

Mobile IPv6 uses IPsec to protect signaling between the home agent and the mobile node. Mobile IPv6 base document defines the main requirements these nodes must follow. This document discusses these requirements in more depth, illustrates the used packet formats, describes suitable configuration procedures, and shows how implementations can process the packets in the right order. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes known incompatibilities between Network Address Translation (NAT) and IPsec, and describes the requirements for addressing them. Perhaps the most common use of IPsec is in providing virtual private networking capabilities. One very popular use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) is to provide telecommuter access to the corporate Intranet. Today, NATs are widely deployed in home gateways, as well as in other locations likely to be used by telecommuters, such as hotels. The result is that IPsec-NAT incompatibilities have become a major barrier in the deployment of IPsec in one of its principal uses. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, with an explicit Initialization Vector (IV), as a confidentiality mechanism within the context of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).

A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a key-dependent one way hash function. One popular way to construct a MAC algorithm is to use a block cipher in conjunction with the Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC) mode of operation. The classic CBC-MAC algorithm, while secure for messages of a pre-selected fixed length, has been shown to be insecure across messages of varying lengths such as the type found in typical IP datagrams. This memo specifies the use of AES in CBC mode with a set of extensions to overcome this limitation. This new algorithm is named AES-XCBC-MAC-96. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes the problem space and solution requirements for developing an IP Security Policy (IPSP) configuration and management framework. The IPSP architecture provides a scalable, decentralized framework for managing, discovering and negotiating the host and network security policies that govern access, authorization, authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, and other IP Security properties. This document highlights such architectural components and presents their functional requirements. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This memo explores the requirements for host configuration in IPsec tunnel mode, and describes how the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) may be leveraged for configuration. In many remote access scenarios, a mechanism for making the remote host appear to be present on the local corporate network is quite useful. This may be accomplished by assigning the host a "virtual" address from the corporate network, and then tunneling traffic via IPsec from the host's ISP-assigned address to the corporate security gateway. In IPv4, DHCP provides for such remote host configuration. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

IPsec offers much promise as a secure remote access mechanism. However, there are a number of differing remote access scenarios, each having some shared and some unique requirements. A thorough understanding of these requirements is necessary in order to effectively evaluate the suitability of a specific set of mechanisms for any particular remote access scenario. This document enumerates the requirements for a number of common remote access scenarios. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document discusses how L2TP (Layer Two Tunneling Protocol) may utilize IPsec to provide for tunnel authentication, privacy protection, integrity checking and replay protection. Both the voluntary and compulsory tunneling cases are discussed. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document proposes mechanisms that enable Realm Specific IP (RSIP) to handle end-to-end IPsec (IP Security). This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.

This document describes a security model by which tunnel-mode IPsec security can be architected on NAT devices. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This document presents extensions to Version 1 of RSVP. These extensions permit support of individual data flows using RFC 1826, IP Authentication Header (AH) or RFC 1827, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes a keyed-MD5 transform to be used in conjunction with the IP Authentication Header [RFC-1826]. The particular transform is based on [HMAC-MD5]. An option is also specified to guard against replay attacks. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind

This document describes the use of keyed MD5 with the IP Authentication Header. [STANDARDS-TRACK]