HMAC
HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code)
Within this page
HMAC RFCs (34)
RFC 9053: CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms
Informational- J. Schaad
- August 2022
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052).
This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152.
Abstract
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052).
This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152.
RFC 9150: TLS 1.3 Authentication and Integrity-Only Cipher Suites
Informational- N. Cam-Winget
- J. Visoky
- April 2022
- Independent Stream publication
Abstract
This document defines the use of cipher suites for TLS 1.3 based on Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Using these cipher suites provides server and, optionally, mutual authentication and data authenticity, but not data confidentiality. Cipher suites with these properties are not of general applicability, but there are use cases, specifically in Internet of Things (IoT) and constrained environments, that do not require confidentiality of exchanged messages while still requiring integrity protection, server authentication, and optional client authentication. This document gives examples of such use cases, with the caveat that prior to using these integrity-only cipher suites, a threat model for the situation at hand is needed, and a threat analysis must be performed within that model to determine whether the use of integrity-only cipher suites is appropriate. The approach described in this document is not endorsed by the IETF and does not have IETF consensus, but it is presented here to enable interoperable implementation of a reduced-security mechanism that provides authentication and message integrity without supporting confidentiality.
Abstract
This document defines the use of cipher suites for TLS 1.3 based on Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Using these cipher suites provides server and, optionally, mutual authentication and data authenticity, but not data confidentiality. Cipher suites with these properties are not of general applicability, but there are use cases, specifically in Internet of Things (IoT) and constrained environments, that do not require confidentiality of exchanged messages while still requiring integrity protection, server authentication, and optional client authentication. This document gives examples of such use cases, with the caveat that prior to using these integrity-only cipher suites, a threat model for the situation at hand is needed, and a threat analysis must be performed within that model to determine whether the use of integrity-only cipher suites is appropriate. The approach described in this document is not endorsed by the IETF and does not have IETF consensus, but it is presented here to enable interoperable implementation of a reduced-security mechanism that provides authentication and message integrity without supporting confidentiality.
RFC 8619: Algorithm Identifiers for the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
Proposed Standard- R. Housley
- June 2019
- IETF publication
Abstract
RFC 5869 specifies the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) algorithm. This document assigns algorithm identifiers to the HKDF algorithm when used with three common one-way hash functions.
Abstract
RFC 5869 specifies the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) algorithm. This document assigns algorithm identifiers to the HKDF algorithm when used with three common one-way hash functions.
RFC 8009: AES Encryption with HMAC-SHA2 for Kerberos 5
Informational- M. Jenkins
- M. Peck
- K. Burgin
- October 2016
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This document specifies two encryption types and two corresponding checksum types for Kerberos 5. The new types use AES in CTS mode (CBC mode with ciphertext stealing) for confidentiality and HMAC with a SHA-2 hash for integrity.
Abstract
This document specifies two encryption types and two corresponding checksum types for Kerberos 5. The new types use AES in CTS mode (CBC mode with ciphertext stealing) for confidentiality and HMAC with a SHA-2 hash for integrity.
RFC 7860: HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols in User-Based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3
Proposed Standard- J. Merkle
- M. Lochter
- April 2016
- IETF publication
- Operations and Management Area
Abstract
This document specifies several authentication protocols based on the SHA-2 hash functions for the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3 defined in RFC 3414. It obsoletes RFC 7630, in which the MIB MODULE-IDENTITY value was incorrectly specified.
Abstract
This document specifies several authentication protocols based on the SHA-2 hash functions for the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3 defined in RFC 3414. It obsoletes RFC 7630, in which the MIB MODULE-IDENTITY value was incorrectly specified.
RFC 7836: Guidelines on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012
Informational- S. Smyshlyaev
- E. Alekseev
- I. Oshkin
- V. Popov
- S. Leontiev
- V. Podobaev
- D. Belyavsky
- March 2016
- Independent Stream publication
Abstract
The purpose of this document is to make the specifications of the cryptographic algorithms defined by the Russian national standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 available to the Internet community for their implementation in the cryptographic protocols based on the accompanying algorithms.
These specifications define the pseudorandom functions, the key agreement algorithm based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm and a hash function, the parameters of elliptic curves, the key derivation functions, and the key export functions.
Abstract
The purpose of this document is to make the specifications of the cryptographic algorithms defined by the Russian national standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 available to the Internet community for their implementation in the cryptographic protocols based on the accompanying algorithms.
These specifications define the pseudorandom functions, the key agreement algorithm based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm and a hash function, the parameters of elliptic curves, the key derivation functions, and the key export functions.
RFC 7630: HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols in the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3
Proposed Standard- J. Merkle
- M. Lochter
- October 2015
- IETF publication
- Operations and Management Area
Abstract
This memo specifies new HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols for the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3 defined in RFC 3414.
- Obsoleted by RFC 7860
Abstract
This memo specifies new HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols for the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3 defined in RFC 3414.
RFC 7298: Babel Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) Cryptographic Authentication
Experimental- D. Ovsienko
- July 2014
- Independent Stream publication
Abstract
This document describes a cryptographic authentication mechanism for the Babel routing protocol. This document updates RFC 6126. The mechanism allocates two new TLV types for the authentication data, uses Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), and is both optional and backward compatible.
- Obsoleted by RFC 8967
Abstract
This document describes a cryptographic authentication mechanism for the Babel routing protocol. This document updates RFC 6126. The mechanism allocates two new TLV types for the authentication data, uses Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), and is both optional and backward compatible.
RFC 6649: BCP 179: Deprecate DES, RC4-HMAC-EXP, and Other Weak Cryptographic Algorithms in Kerberos
Best Current Practice- L. Hornquist Astrand
- T. Yu
- July 2012
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
The Kerberos 5 network authentication protocol, originally specified in RFC 1510, can use the Data Encryption Standard (DES) for encryption. Almost 30 years after first publishing DES, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finally withdrew the standard in 2005, reflecting a long-established consensus that DES is insufficiently secure. By 2008, commercial hardware costing less than USD 15,000 could break DES keys in less than a day on average. DES is long past its sell-by date. Accordingly, this document updates RFC 1964, RFC 4120, RFC 4121, and RFC 4757 to deprecate the use of DES, RC4-HMAC-EXP, and other weak cryptographic algorithms in Kerberos. Because RFC 1510 (obsoleted by RFC 4120) supports only DES, this document recommends the reclassification of RFC 1510 as Historic. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
Abstract
The Kerberos 5 network authentication protocol, originally specified in RFC 1510, can use the Data Encryption Standard (DES) for encryption. Almost 30 years after first publishing DES, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finally withdrew the standard in 2005, reflecting a long-established consensus that DES is insufficiently secure. By 2008, commercial hardware costing less than USD 15,000 could break DES keys in less than a day on average. DES is long past its sell-by date. Accordingly, this document updates RFC 1964, RFC 4120, RFC 4121, and RFC 4757 to deprecate the use of DES, RC4-HMAC-EXP, and other weak cryptographic algorithms in Kerberos. Because RFC 1510 (obsoleted by RFC 4120) supports only DES, this document recommends the reclassification of RFC 1510 as Historic. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
RFC 6268: Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
Informational- J. Schaad
- S. Turner
- July 2011
- IETF publication
Abstract
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normative version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
Abstract
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normative version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)
Informational- D. Eastlake 3rd
- T. Hansen
- May 2011
- IETF publication
Abstract
Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS
Abstract
Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS
RFC 6151: Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms
Informational- S. Turner
- L. Chen
- March 2011
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document updates the security considerations for the MD5 message digest algorithm. It also updates the security considerations for HMAC-MD5. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
Abstract
This document updates the security considerations for the MD5 message digest algorithm. It also updates the security considerations for HMAC-MD5. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC 5869: HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
Informational- H. Krawczyk
- P. Eronen
- May 2010
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
Abstract
This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC 5709: OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication
Proposed Standard- M. Bhatia
- V. Manral
- M. Fanto
- R. White
- M. Barnes
- T. Li
- R. Atkinson
- October 2009
- IETF publication
- Routing Area
Abstract
This document describes how the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Secure Hash Standard family of algorithms can be used with OSPF version 2's built-in, cryptographic authentication mechanism. This updates, but does not supercede, the cryptographic authentication mechanism specified in RFC 2328. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document describes how the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Secure Hash Standard family of algorithms can be used with OSPF version 2's built-in, cryptographic authentication mechanism. This updates, but does not supercede, the cryptographic authentication mechanism specified in RFC 2328. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 5310: IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication
Proposed Standard- M. Bhatia
- V. Manral
- T. Li
- R. Atkinson
- R. White
- M. Fanto
- February 2009
- IETF publication
- Routing Area
Abstract
This document proposes an extension to Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) to allow the use of any cryptographic authentication algorithm in addition to the already-documented authentication schemes, described in the base specification and RFC 5304. IS-IS is specified in International Standards Organization (ISO) 10589, with extensions to support Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) described in RFC 1195.
Although this document has been written specifically for using the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) construct along with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family of cryptographic hash functions, the method described in this document is generic and can be used to extend IS-IS to support any cryptographic hash function in the future. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document proposes an extension to Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) to allow the use of any cryptographic authentication algorithm in addition to the already-documented authentication schemes, described in the base specification and RFC 5304. IS-IS is specified in International Standards Organization (ISO) 10589, with extensions to support Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) described in RFC 1195.
Although this document has been written specifically for using the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) construct along with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family of cryptographic hash functions, the method described in this document is generic and can be used to extend IS-IS to support any cryptographic hash function in the future. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 5304: IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication
Proposed Standard- T. Li
- R. Atkinson
- October 2008
- IETF publication
- Routing Area
Abstract
This document describes the authentication of Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) Protocol Data Units (PDUs) using the Hashed Message Authentication Codes - Message Digest 5 (HMAC-MD5) algorithm as found in RFC 2104. IS-IS is specified in International Standards Organization (ISO) 10589, with extensions to support Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) described in RFC 1195. The base specification includes an authentication mechanism that allows for multiple authentication algorithms. The base specification only specifies the algorithm for cleartext passwords. This document replaces RFC 3567.
This document proposes an extension to that specification that allows the use of the HMAC-MD5 authentication algorithm to be used in conjunction with the existing authentication mechanisms. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document describes the authentication of Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) Protocol Data Units (PDUs) using the Hashed Message Authentication Codes - Message Digest 5 (HMAC-MD5) algorithm as found in RFC 2104. IS-IS is specified in International Standards Organization (ISO) 10589, with extensions to support Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) described in RFC 1195. The base specification includes an authentication mechanism that allows for multiple authentication algorithms. The base specification only specifies the algorithm for cleartext passwords. This document replaces RFC 3567.
This document proposes an extension to that specification that allows the use of the HMAC-MD5 authentication algorithm to be used in conjunction with the existing authentication mechanisms. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 4895: Authenticated Chunks for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
Proposed Standard- M. Tuexen
- R. Stewart
- P. Lei
- E. Rescorla
- August 2007
- IETF publication
- Web and Internet Transport
Abstract
This document describes a new chunk type, several parameters, and procedures for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). This new chunk type can be used to authenticate SCTP chunks by using shared keys between the sender and receiver. The new parameters are used to establish the shared keys. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document describes a new chunk type, several parameters, and procedures for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). This new chunk type can be used to authenticate SCTP chunks by using shared keys between the sender and receiver. The new parameters are used to establish the shared keys. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 4868: Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec
Proposed Standard- S. Kelly
- S. Frankel
- May 2007
- IETF publication
Abstract
This specification describes the use of Hashed Message Authentication Mode (HMAC) in conjunction with the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms in IPsec. These algorithms may be used as the basis for data origin authentication and integrity verification mechanisms for the Authentication Header (AH), Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE), and IKEv2 protocols, and also as Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) for IKE and IKEv2. Truncated output lengths are specified for the authentication-related variants, with the corresponding algorithms designated as HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256. The PRF variants are not truncated, and are called PRF-HMAC-SHA-256, PRF-HMAC-SHA-384, and PRF-HMAC-SHA-512. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This specification describes the use of Hashed Message Authentication Mode (HMAC) in conjunction with the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms in IPsec. These algorithms may be used as the basis for data origin authentication and integrity verification mechanisms for the Authentication Header (AH), Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE), and IKEv2 protocols, and also as Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) for IKE and IKEv2. Truncated output lengths are specified for the authentication-related variants, with the corresponding algorithms designated as HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256. The PRF variants are not truncated, and are called PRF-HMAC-SHA-256, PRF-HMAC-SHA-384, and PRF-HMAC-SHA-512. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 4757: The RC4-HMAC Kerberos Encryption Types Used by Microsoft Windows
Historic- K. Jaganathan
- L. Zhu
- J. Brezak
- December 2006
- IETF publication
Abstract
The Microsoft Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using the existing DES-based encryption types.
The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing Windows NT environments, provide strong cryptography (128-bit key lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government export restriction requirements) encryption. This document describes the implementation of those encryption types. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Abstract
The Microsoft Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using the existing DES-based encryption types.
The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing Windows NT environments, provide strong cryptography (128-bit key lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government export restriction requirements) encryption. This document describes the implementation of those encryption types. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
RFC 4650: HMAC-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman for Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)
Proposed Standard- M. Euchner
- September 2006
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This document describes a lightweight point-to-point key management protocol variant for the multimedia Internet keying (MIKEY) protocol MIKEY, as defined in RFC 3830. In particular, this variant deploys the classic Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol for key establishment featuring perfect forward secrecy in conjunction with a keyed hash message authentication code for achieving mutual authentication and message integrity of the key management messages exchanged. This protocol addresses the security and performance constraints of multimedia key management in MIKEY. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document describes a lightweight point-to-point key management protocol variant for the multimedia Internet keying (MIKEY) protocol MIKEY, as defined in RFC 3830. In particular, this variant deploys the classic Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol for key establishment featuring perfect forward secrecy in conjunction with a keyed hash message authentication code for achieving mutual authentication and message integrity of the key management messages exchanged. This protocol addresses the security and performance constraints of multimedia key management in MIKEY. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 4635: HMAC SHA (Hashed Message Authentication Code, Secure Hash Algorithm) TSIG Algorithm Identifiers
Proposed Standard- D. Eastlake 3rd
- August 2006
- IETF publication
- Internet Area
Abstract
Use of the Domain Name System TSIG resource record requires specification of a cryptographic message authentication code. Currently, identifiers have been specified only for HMAC MD5 (Hashed Message Authentication Code, Message Digest 5) and GSS (Generic Security Service) TSIG algorithms. This document standardizes identifiers and implementation requirements for additional HMAC SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) TSIG algorithms and standardizes how to specify and handle the truncation of HMAC values in TSIG. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
- Obsoleted by RFC 8945
Abstract
Use of the Domain Name System TSIG resource record requires specification of a cryptographic message authentication code. Currently, identifiers have been specified only for HMAC MD5 (Hashed Message Authentication Code, Message Digest 5) and GSS (Generic Security Service) TSIG algorithms. This document standardizes identifiers and implementation requirements for additional HMAC SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) TSIG algorithms and standardizes how to specify and handle the truncation of HMAC values in TSIG. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 4634: US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and HMAC-SHA)
Informational- D. Eastlake 3rd
- T. Hansen
- August 2006
- IETF publication
Abstract
The United States of America has adopted a suite of Secure Hash Algorithms (SHAs), including four beyond SHA-1, as part of a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), specifically SHA-224 (RFC 3874), SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The purpose of this document is to make source code performing these hash functions conveniently available to the Internet community. The sample code supports input strings of arbitrary bit length. SHA-1's sample code from RFC 3174 has also been updated to handle input strings of arbitrary bit length. Most of the text herein was adapted by the authors from FIPS 180-2.
Code to perform SHA-based HMACs, with arbitrary bit length text, is also included. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
- Obsoleted by RFC 6234
Abstract
The United States of America has adopted a suite of Secure Hash Algorithms (SHAs), including four beyond SHA-1, as part of a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), specifically SHA-224 (RFC 3874), SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The purpose of this document is to make source code performing these hash functions conveniently available to the Internet community. The sample code supports input strings of arbitrary bit length. SHA-1's sample code from RFC 3174 has also been updated to handle input strings of arbitrary bit length. Most of the text herein was adapted by the authors from FIPS 180-2.
Code to perform SHA-based HMACs, with arbitrary bit length text, is also included. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
RFC 4490: Using the GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Proposed Standard- S. Leontiev
- G. Chudov
- May 2006
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the cryptographic algorithms GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The CMS is used for digital signature, digest, authentication, and encryption of arbitrary message contents. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the cryptographic algorithms GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The CMS is used for digital signature, digest, authentication, and encryption of arbitrary message contents. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 4357: Additional Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 Algorithms
Informational- V. Popov
- I. Kurepkin
- S. Leontiev
- January 2006
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document describes the cryptographic algorithms and parameters supplementary to the original GOST specifications, GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94, for use in Internet applications. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Abstract
This document describes the cryptographic algorithms and parameters supplementary to the original GOST specifications, GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94, for use in Internet applications. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
RFC 4226: HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm
Informational- D. M'Raihi
- M. Bellare
- F. Hoornaert
- D. Naccache
- O. Ranen
- December 2005
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document describes an algorithm to generate one-time password values, based on Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC). A security analysis of the algorithm is presented, and important parameters related to the secure deployment of the algorithm are discussed. The proposed algorithm can be used across a wide range of network applications ranging from remote Virtual Private Network (VPN) access, Wi-Fi network logon to transaction-oriented Web applications.
This work is a joint effort by the OATH (Open AuTHentication) membership to specify an algorithm that can be freely distributed to the technical community. The authors believe that a common and shared algorithm will facilitate adoption of two-factor authentication on the Internet by enabling interoperability across commercial and open-source implementations. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Abstract
This document describes an algorithm to generate one-time password values, based on Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC). A security analysis of the algorithm is presented, and important parameters related to the secure deployment of the algorithm are discussed. The proposed algorithm can be used across a wide range of network applications ranging from remote Virtual Private Network (VPN) access, Wi-Fi network logon to transaction-oriented Web applications.
This work is a joint effort by the OATH (Open AuTHentication) membership to specify an algorithm that can be freely distributed to the technical community. The authors believe that a common and shared algorithm will facilitate adoption of two-factor authentication on the Internet by enabling interoperability across commercial and open-source implementations. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
RFC 4231: Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512
Proposed Standard- M. Nystrom
- December 2005
- IETF publication
Abstract
This document provides test vectors for the HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 message authentication schemes. It also provides ASN.1 object identifiers and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to identify use of these schemes in protocols. The test vectors provided in this document may be used for conformance testing. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document provides test vectors for the HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 message authentication schemes. It also provides ASN.1 object identifiers and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to identify use of these schemes in protocols. The test vectors provided in this document may be used for conformance testing. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 3537: Wrapping a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) key with a Triple-Data Encryption Standard (DES) Key or an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key
Proposed Standard- J. Schaad
- R. Housley
- May 2003
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This document defines two methods for wrapping an HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code) key. The first method defined uses a Triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) key to encrypt the HMAC key. The second method defined uses an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) key to encrypt the HMAC key. One place that such an algorithm is used is for the Authenticated Data type in CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax). [PROPOSED STANDARD]
Abstract
This document defines two methods for wrapping an HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code) key. The first method defined uses a Triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) key to encrypt the HMAC key. The second method defined uses an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) key to encrypt the HMAC key. One place that such an algorithm is used is for the Authenticated Data type in CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax). [PROPOSED STANDARD]
RFC 2857: The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH
Proposed Standard- A. Keromytis
- N. Provos
- June 2000
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm in conjunction with the RIPEMD-160 algorithm as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header (AH). [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm in conjunction with the RIPEMD-160 algorithm as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header (AH). [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 2403: The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH
Proposed Standard- C. Madson
- R. Glenn
- November 1998
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm in conjunction with the MD5 algorithm as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm in conjunction with the MD5 algorithm as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 2404: The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH
Proposed Standard- C. Madson
- R. Glenn
- November 1998
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm in conjunction with the SHA-1 algorithm as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm in conjunction with the SHA-1 algorithm as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 2286: Test Cases for HMAC-RIPEMD160 and HMAC-RIPEMD128
Informational- J. Kapp
- February 1998
- Legacy publication
Abstract
This document provides two sets of test cases for HMAC-RIPEMD160 and HMAC-RIPEMD128. This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Abstract
This document provides two sets of test cases for HMAC-RIPEMD160 and HMAC-RIPEMD128. This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
RFC 2202: Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1
Informational- P. Cheng
- R. Glenn
- September 1997
- Legacy publication
Abstract
This document provides two sets of test cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC- SHA-1, respectively. HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 are two constructs of the HMAC [HMAC] message authentication function using the MD5 [MD5] hash function and the SHA-1 [SHA] hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Abstract
This document provides two sets of test cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC- SHA-1, respectively. HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 are two constructs of the HMAC [HMAC] message authentication function using the MD5 [MD5] hash function and the SHA-1 [SHA] hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
RFC 2085: HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention
Proposed Standard- M. Oehler
- R. Glenn
- February 1997
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This document describes a keyed-MD5 transform to be used in conjunction with the IP Authentication Header [RFC-1826]. The particular transform is based on [HMAC-MD5]. An option is also specified to guard against replay attacks. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Abstract
This document describes a keyed-MD5 transform to be used in conjunction with the IP Authentication Header [RFC-1826]. The particular transform is based on [HMAC-MD5]. An option is also specified to guard against replay attacks. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC 2104: HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Informational- H. Krawczyk
- M. Bellare
- R. Canetti
- February 1997
- IETF publication
- Security Area
Abstract
This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind
Abstract
This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind
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