RFC 8833: Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) for WebRTC

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8833.¶

Copyright Notice

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1. Introduction

Web Real-Time Communication (WebRTC) [RFC8825] uses Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] to secure all peer-to-peer communications.¶

Identifying WebRTC protocol usage with Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) [RFC7301] enables an endpoint to positively identify WebRTC uses and distinguish them from other DTLS uses.¶

Different WebRTC uses can be advertised and behavior can be constrained to what is appropriate to a given use. In particular, this allows for the identification of sessions that require confidentiality protection from the application that manages the signaling for the session.¶

3. Media Confidentiality

Private communications in WebRTC depend on separating control (i.e., signaling) capabilities and access to media [RFC8827]. In this way, an application can establish a session that is end-to-end confidential, where the ends in question are user agents (or browsers) and not the signaling application. This allows an application to manage signaling for a session without having access to the media that is exchanged in the session.¶

Without some form of indication that is securely bound to the session, a WebRTC endpoint is unable to properly distinguish between a session that requires this confidentiality protection and one that does not. The ALPN identifier provides that signal.¶

A browser is required to enforce this confidentiality protection using isolation controls similar to those used in content cross-origin protections (see the "Origin" section of [HTML5]). These protections ensure that media is protected from applications, which are not able to read or modify the contents of a protected flow of media. Media that is produced from a session using the c-webrtc identifier MUST only be displayed to users.¶

The promise to apply confidentiality protections do not apply to data that is sent using data channels. Confidential data depends on having both data sources and consumers that are exclusively browser or user based. No mechanisms currently exist to take advantage of data confidentiality, though some use cases suggest that this could be useful, for example, confidential peer-to-peer file transfer. Alternative labels might be provided in the future to support these use cases.¶

This mechanism explicitly does not define a specific authentication method; a WebRTC endpoint that accepts a session with this ALPN identifier MUST respect confidentiality no matter what identity is attributed to a peer.¶

RTP middleboxes and entities that forward media or data cannot promise to maintain confidentiality. Any entity that forwards content, or records content for later access by entities other than the authenticated peer, MUST NOT offer or accept a session with the c-webrtc identifier.¶

4. Security Considerations

Confidential communications depend on more than just an agreement from browsers.¶

Information is not confidential if it is displayed to others than for whom it is intended. Peer authentication [RFC8827] is necessary to ensure that data is only sent to the intended peer.¶

This is not a digital rights management mechanism. A user is not prevented from using other mechanisms to record or forward media. This means that (for example) screen-recording devices, tape recorders, portable cameras, or a cunning arrangement of mirrors could variously be used to record or redistribute media once delivered. Similarly, if media is visible or audible (or otherwise accessible) to others in the vicinity, there are no technical measures that protect the confidentiality of that media.¶

The only guarantee provided by this mechanism and the browser that implements it is that the media was delivered to the user that was authenticated. Individual users will still need to make a judgment about how their peer intends to respect the confidentiality of any information provided.¶

On a shared computing platform like a browser, other entities with access to that platform (i.e., web applications) might be able to access information that would compromise the confidentiality of communications. Implementations MAY choose to limit concurrent access to input devices during confidential communications sessions.¶

For instance, another application that is able to access a microphone might be able to sample confidential audio that is playing through speakers. This is true even if acoustic echo cancellation, which attempts to prevent this from happening, is used. Similarly, an application with access to a video camera might be able to use reflections to obtain all or part of a confidential video stream.¶

5. IANA Considerations

The following two entries have been added to the "TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs" registry established by [RFC7301]:¶

webrtc:

The webrtc label identifies mixed media and data communications using SRTP and data channels:¶

Protocol:

WebRTC Media and Data¶

Identification Sequence:

0x77 0x65 0x62 0x72 0x74 0x63 ("webrtc")¶

Specification:

RFC 8833 (this document)¶

c-webrtc:

The c-webrtc label identifies WebRTC with a promise to protect media confidentiality:¶

Protocol:

Confidential WebRTC Media and Data¶

Identification Sequence:

0x63 0x2d 0x77 0x65 0x62 0x72 0x74 0x63 ("c-webrtc")¶

Specification:

RFC 8833 (this document)¶

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