Cite this BCP: TXTBCP 84 contains the following RFCs:
|RFC 3704, BCP 84||ASCII, PDF||Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks||F. Baker, P. Savola||March 2004||Updates RFC 2827, Updated by RFC 8704||Best Current Practice|
|RFC 8704, BCP 84||ASCII, PDF||Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding||K. Sriram, D. Montgomery, J. Haas||February 2020||Updates RFC 3704||Best Current Practice|
Abstract of RFC 3704
BCP 38, RFC 2827, is designed to limit the impact of distributed denial of service attacks, by denying traffic with spoofed addresses access to the network, and to help ensure that traffic is traceable to its correct source network. As a side effect of protecting the Internet against such attacks, the network implementing the solution also protects itself from this and other attacks, such as spoofed management access to networking equipment. There are cases when this may create problems, e.g., with multihoming. This document describes the current ingress filtering operational mechanisms, examines generic issues related to ingress filtering, and delves into the effects on multihoming in particular. This memo updates RFC 2827. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Abstract of RFC 8704
This document identifies a need for and proposes improvement of the unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) techniques (see RFC 3704) for detection and mitigation of source address spoofing (see BCP 38). Strict uRPF is inflexible about directionality, the loose uRPF is oblivious to directionality, and the current feasible-path uRPF attempts to strike a balance between the two (see RFC 3704). However, as shown in this document, the existing feasible-path uRPF still has shortcomings. This document describes enhanced feasible-path uRPF (EFP-uRPF) techniques that are more flexible (in a meaningful way) about directionality than the feasible-path uRPF (RFC 3704). The proposed EFP-uRPF methods aim to significantly reduce false positives regarding invalid detection in source address validation (SAV). Hence, they can potentially alleviate ISPs' concerns about the possibility of disrupting service for their customers and encourage greater deployment of uRPF techniques. This document updates RFC 3704.
For the definition of Status, see RFC 2026.
For the definition of Stream, see RFC 4844.