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RFC 5905, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", June 2010

Note: This RFC has been updated by RFC 7822, RFC 8573, RFC 9109

Source of RFC: ntp (int)

Errata ID: 4505
Status: Rejected
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT

Reported By: Miroslav Lichvar
Date Reported: 2015-10-15
Rejected by: Brian Haberman
Date Rejected: 2015-12-14

Section A.5.1 says:

        /*
         * Update the origin and destination timestamps.  If
         * unsynchronized or bogus, abandon ship.
         */
        p->org = r->xmt;
        p->rec = r->dst;
        if (!synch)
                return;                 /* unsynch */

        /*
         * The timestamps are valid and the receive packet matches the
         * last one sent.  If the packet is a crypto-NAK, the server
         * might have just changed keys.  We demobilize the association
         * and wait for better times.
         */
        if (auth == A_CRYPTO) {
                clear(p, X_CRYPTO);
                return;                 /* crypto-NAK */
        }

        /*
         * If the association is authenticated, the key ID is nonzero
         * and received packets must be authenticated.  This is designed
         * to avoid a bait-and-switch attack, which was possible in past
         * versions.
         */
        if (!AUTH(p->keyid || (p->flags & P_NOTRUST), auth))
                return;                 /* bad auth */

It should say:

        /*
         * If the packet is a valid crypto-NAK, the server might have
         * just changed keys.  We demobilize the association and wait
         * for better times.
         */
        if (synch && auth == A_CRYPTO) {
                clear(p, X_CRYPTO);
                return;                 /* crypto-NAK */
        }

        /*
         * If the association is authenticated, the key ID is nonzero
         * and received packets must be authenticated.  This is designed
         * to avoid a bait-and-switch attack, which was possible in past
         * versions.
         */
        if (!AUTH(p->keyid || (p->flags & P_NOTRUST), auth))
                return;                 /* bad auth */

        /*
         * Update the origin and destination timestamps.  If
         * unsynchronized or bogus, abandon ship.
         */
        p->org = r->xmt;
        p->rec = r->dst;
        if (!synch)
                return;                 /* unsynch */

Notes:

The state variables must be updated after the authentication is checked in order to prevent DoS attacks on authenticated symmetric associations (CVE-2015-1799).
--VERIFIER NOTES--
The appendix is not the normative description of the protocol behavior. A change such as this needs consensus within the working group. To do that, a draft should be submitted with the proposed changes.

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