RFC 5677, "IEEE 802.21 Mobility Services Framework Design (MSFD)", December 2009

Errata ID: 1967
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Alfred Hoenes
Date Reported: 2009-12-21
Held for Document Update by: Brian Haberman

Section 8.1 says:

a)  1st para:
  
       [...]  In such cases, the link between the DHCP client and Layer
   2 termination point may be protected, but the DHCP message source and
   its messages cannot be authenticated or the integrity of the latter
|  checked unless there exits a security binding between link layer and
   DHCP layer.

b) 2nd para:
                    v
|  In the case where DNS is used for discovering MoS, fake DNS requests
   and responses may cause denial of service (DoS) and the inability of
   the MN to perform a proper handover, respectively.  Where networks
   are exposed to such DoS, it is RECOMMENDED that DNS service providers
   use the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) as described
   in [RFC4033].  Readers may also refer to [RFC4641] to consider the
   aspects of DNSSEC operational practices.

It should say:

a)  1st para:
  
       [...]  In such cases, the link between the DHCP client and Layer
   2 termination point may be protected, but the DHCP message source and
   its messages cannot be authenticated or the integrity of the latter
|  checked unless there exists a security binding between link layer and
   DHCP layer.

b) 2nd para:
                    vvvvv
|  In the case where the DNS is used for discovering MoS, fake DNS
   requests and responses may cause denial of service (DoS) and the
   inability of the MN to perform a proper handover, respectively.
   Where networks are exposed to such DoS, it is RECOMMENDED that DNS
   service providers use the Domain Name System Security Extensions
   (DNSSEC) as described in [RFC4033].  Readers may also refer to
   [RFC4641] to consider the aspects of DNSSEC operational practices.

Notes:

Rationale:
a) typo
b) missing article

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