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Status: Verified (1)

RFC 5288, "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", August 2008

Note: This RFC has been updated by RFC 9325

Errata ID: 4694
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Aaron Zauner
Date Reported: 2016-05-14
Verifier Name: Stephen Farrell
Date Verified: 2016-11-24

Section 6.1 says:

   AES-GCM security requires that the counter is never reused.  The IV
   construction in Section 3 is designed to prevent counter reuse.

   Implementers should also understand the practical considerations of
   IV handling outlined in Section 9 of [GCM].

It should say:

   Security of AES-GCM requires that the "nonce" (number used once) is
   never reused.  The IV construction in Section 3 does not prevent 
   implementers from reusing the nonce by mistake.  It is paramount that 
   the implementer be aware of the security implications when a nonce 
   is reused even once. 

   Nonce reuse in AES-GCM allows for the recovery of the authentication key 
   resulting in complete failure of the mode's authenticity.  Hence, TLS 
   sessions can be effectively attacked through forgery by an adversary.
   This enables an attacker to inject data into the TLS allowing for XSS and 
   other attack vectors.

Notes:

Obviously the original wording is so ambiguous that implementers got it wrong in the real world. Related to: https://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#nonce-disrespecting-adversaries-practical-forgery-attacks-on-gcm-in-tls

It may be worth adding a reference to [JOUX] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/...38.../GCM/Joux_comments.pdf and maybe the paper we're intending to release on the actual HTTPS forgery/injection attack.

I'd actually like to change the nonce construction to that of the ChaCha20/Poly1305 document, but I figure this will cause massive breakage for already deployed implementations. TLS 1.3 fixes this issue per design.

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