RFC Errata


Errata Search

 
Source of RFC  
Summary Table Full Records

Found 3 records.

Status: Verified (1)

RFC 6960, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", June 2013

Source of RFC: pkix (sec)

Errata ID: 5891
Status: Verified
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT

Reported By: Russ Housley
Date Reported: 2019-11-02
Verifier Name: Benjamin Kaduk
Date Verified: 2019-11-06

Section Appendix B.2 says:

AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

It should say:

AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

Notes:

The CRLReason is not defined in the ASN.1 module, and it should have been imported from the one that is defined in RFC 5212. The ASN.1 compiler will generate an error without this correction.

Status: Reported (1)

RFC 6960, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", June 2013

Source of RFC: pkix (sec)

Errata ID: 5730
Status: Reported
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT

Reported By: Jaime Hablutzel
Date Reported: 2019-05-22

Section 4.1.1 says:

optionalSignature contains the algorithm identifier and any
associated algorithm parameters in signatureAlgorithm; the
signature value in signature; and, optionally, certificates the
server needs to verify the signed response (normally up to but not
including the client’s root certificate).

It should say:

optionalSignature contains the algorithm identifier and any
associated algorithm parameters in signatureAlgorithm; the
signature value in signature; and, optionally, certificates the
server needs to verify the signed request (normally up to but not
including the client’s root certificate).

Notes:

The paragraph refers to the signed "response" where it should refer to the signed "request".

Status: Rejected (1)

RFC 6960, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", June 2013

Source of RFC: pkix (sec)

Errata ID: 5929
Status: Rejected
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT

Reported By: Mohit Sahni
Date Reported: 2019-12-06
Rejected by: Benjamin Kaduk
Date Rejected: 2019-12-10

Section 4.4.1 says:

   The nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
   replay attacks.  The nonce is included as one of the
   requestExtensions in requests, while in responses it would be
   included as one of the responseExtensions.  In both the request and
   the response, the nonce will be identified by the object identifier
   id-pkix-ocsp-nonce, while the extnValue is the value of the nonce.

     id-pkix-ocsp           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
     id-pkix-ocsp-nonce     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }

     Nonce ::= OCTET STRING

Notes:

In section 4.1.1, the standard MUST define a maximum length for Nonce or the Nonce MUST be of a defined fixed length. The current implementations that follow this standard are vulnerable to denial of service attacks since they will try to accept even the large size OCSP requests with very big nonce value and eventually will consume more memory.
--VERIFIER NOTES--
Rejected per submitter after discussion.
This is an enhancement request and will be discussed on the lamps@ietf.org mailing list.

Report New Errata