[RFC Home] [TEXT|PDF|HTML] [Tracker] [IPR] [Errata] [Info page]

PROPOSED STANDARD
Updated by: 5035 Errata Exist
Network Working Group                                P. Hoffman, Editor
Request for Comments: 2634                     Internet Mail Consortium
Category: Standards Track                                     June 1999


                 Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999).  All Rights Reserved.

1. Introduction

   This document describes four optional security service extensions for
   S/MIME. The services are:

    - signed receipts
    - security labels
    - secure mailing lists
    - signing certificates

   The first three of these services provide functionality that is
   similar to the Message Security Protocol [MSP4], but are useful in
   many other environments, particularly business and finance. Signing
   certificates are useful in any environment where certificates might
   be transmitted with signed messages.

   The services described here are extensions to S/MIME version 3 ([MSG]
   and [CERT]), and some of them can also be added to S/MIME version 2
   [SMIME2]. The extensions described here will not cause an S/MIME
   version 3 recipient to be unable to read messages from an S/MIME
   version 2 sender. However, some of the extensions will cause messages
   created by an S/MIME version 3 sender to be unreadable by an S/MIME
   version 2 recipient.

   This document describes both the procedures and the attributes needed
   for the four services. Note that some of the attributes described in
   this document are quite useful in other contexts and should be
   considered when extending S/MIME or other CMS applications.




Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 1]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   The format of the messages are described in ASN.1:1988 [ASN1-1988].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [MUSTSHOULD].

1.1 Triple Wrapping

   Some of the features of each service use the concept of a "triple
   wrapped" message. A triple wrapped message is one that has been
   signed, then encrypted, then signed again. The signers of the inner
   and outer signatures may be different entities or the same entity.
   Note that the S/MIME specification does not limit the number of
   nested encapsulations, so there may be more than three wrappings.

1.1.1 Purpose of Triple Wrapping

   Not all messages need to be triple wrapped. Triple wrapping is used
   when a message must be signed, then encrypted, and then have signed
   attributes bound to the encrypted body. Outer attributes may be added
   or removed by the message originator or intermediate agents, and may
   be signed by intermediate agents or the final recipient.

   The inside signature is used for content integrity, non-repudiation
   with proof of origin, and binding attributes (such as a security
   label) to the original content. These attributes go from the
   originator to the recipient, regardless of the number of intermediate
   entities such as mail list agents that process the message. The
   signed attributes can be used for access control to the inner body.
   Requests for signed receipts by the originator are carried in the
   inside signature as well.

   The encrypted body provides confidentiality, including
   confidentiality of the attributes that are carried in the inside
   signature.

   The outside signature provides authentication and integrity for
   information that is processed hop-by-hop, where each hop is an
   intermediate entity such as a mail list agent. The outer signature
   binds attributes (such as a security label) to the encrypted body.
   These attributes can be used for access control and routing
   decisions.









Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 2]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


1.1.2 Steps for Triple Wrapping

   The steps to create a triple wrapped message are:

   1. Start with a message body, called the "original content".

   2. Encapsulate the original content with the appropriate MIME
      Content-type headers, such as "Content-type: text/plain". An
      exception to this MIME encapsulation rule is that a signed receipt
      is not put in MIME headers.

   3. Sign the result of step 2 (the inner MIME headers and the original
      content). The SignedData encapContentInfo eContentType object
      identifier MUST be id-data. If the structure you create in step 4
      is multipart/signed, then the SignedData encapContentInfo eContent
      MUST be absent. If the structure you create in step 4 is
      application/pkcs7-mime, then the SignedData encapContentInfo
      eContent MUST contain the result of step 2 above. The SignedData
      structure is encapsulated by a ContentInfo SEQUENCE with a
      contentType of id-signedData.

   4. Add an appropriate MIME construct to the signed message from step
      3 as defined in [MSG]. The resulting message is called the "inside
      signature".

    - If you are signing using multipart/signed, the MIME construct
      added consists of a Content-type of multipart/signed with
      parameters, the boundary, the result of step 2 above, the
      boundary, a Content-type of application/pkcs7-signature,
      optional MIME headers (such asContent-transfer-encoding and
      Content-disposition), and a body part that is the result of
      step 3 above.

    - If you are instead signing using application/pkcs7-mime, the MIME
      construct added consists of a Content-type of
      application/pkcs7-mime with parameters, optional MIME headers
      (such as Content-transfer-encoding and Content-disposition), and
      the result of step 3 above.

   5. Encrypt the result of step 4 as a single block, turning it into an
      application/pkcs7-mime object. The EnvelopedData
      encryptedContentInfo contentType MUST be id-data.
      The EnvelopedData structure is encapsulated by a ContentInfo
      SEQUENCE with a contentType of id-envelopedData. This is called
      the "encrypted body".






Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 3]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   6. Add the appropriate MIME headers: a Content-type of
      application/pkcs7-mime with parameters, and optional MIME headers
      such as Content-transfer-encoding and Content-disposition.

   7. Using the same logic as in step 3 above, sign the result of step 6
      (the MIME headers and the encrypted body) as a single block

   8. Using the same logic as in step 4 above, add an appropriate MIME
      construct to the signed message from step 7. The resulting message
      is called the "outside signature", and is also the triple wrapped
      message.

1.2 Format of a Triple Wrapped Message

   A triple wrapped message has many layers of encapsulation. The
   structure differs based on the choice of format for the signed
   portions of the message. Because of the way that MIME encapsulates
   data, the layers do not appear in order, and the notion of "layers"
   becomes vague.

   There is no need to use the multipart/signed format in an inner
   signature because it is known that the recipient is able to process
   S/MIME messages (because they decrypted the middle wrapper). A
   sending agent might choose to use the multipart/signed format in the
   outer layer so that a non-S/MIME agent could see that the next inner
   layer is encrypted; however, this is not of great value, since all it
   shows the recipient is that the rest of the message is unreadable.
   Because many sending agents always use multipart/signed structures,
   all receiving agents MUST be able to interpret either
   multipart/signed or application/pkcs7-mime signature structures.

   The format of a triple wrapped message that uses multipart/signed for
   both signatures is:

   [step 8] Content-type: multipart/signed;
   [step 8]    protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
   [step 8]    boundary=outerboundary
   [step 8]
   [step 8] --outerboundary
   [step 6] Content-type: application/pkcs7-mime;             )
   [step 6]    smime-type=enveloped-data                      )
   [step 6]                                                   )
   [step 4] Content-type: multipart/signed;                 | )
   [step 4]    protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";      | )
   [step 4]    boundary=innerboundary                       | )
   [step 4]                                                 | )
   [step 4] --innerboundary                                 | )
   [step 2] Content-type: text/plain                      % | )



Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 4]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   [step 2]                                               % | )
   [step 1] Original content                              % | )
   [step 4]                                                 | )
   [step 4] --innerboundary                                 | )
   [step 4] Content-type: application/pkcs7-signature       | )
   [step 4]                                                 | )
   [step 3] inner SignedData block (eContent is missing)    | )
   [step 4]                                                 | )
   [step 4] --innerboundary--                               | )
   [step 8]
   [step 8] --outerboundary
   [step 8] Content-type: application/pkcs7-signature
   [step 8]
   [step 7] outer SignedData block (eContent is missing)
   [step 8]
   [step 8] --outerboundary--

   % = These lines are what the inner signature is computed over.
   | = These lines are what is encrypted in step 5. This encrypted result
       is opaque and is a part of an EnvelopedData block.
   ) = These lines are what the outer signature is computed over.

   The format of a triple wrapped message that uses application/pkcs7-
   mime for the both signatures is:

   [step 8] Content-type: application/pkcs7-mime;
   [step 8]    smime-type=signed-data
   [step 8]
   [step 7] outer SignedData block (eContent is present)        O
   [step 6] Content-type: application/pkcs7-mime;             ) O
   [step 6]    smime-type=enveloped-data;                     ) O
   [step 6]                                                   ) O
   [step 4] Content-type: application/pkcs7-mime;           | ) O
   [step 4]    smime-type=signed-data                       | ) O
   [step 4]                                                 | ) O
   [step 3] inner SignedData block (eContent is present)  I | ) O
   [step 2] Content-type: text/plain                      I | ) O
   [step 2]                                               I | ) O
   [step 1] Original content                              I | ) O

   I = These lines are the inner SignedData block, which is opaque and
       contains the ASN.1 encoded result of step 2 as well as control
       information.
   | = These lines are what is encrypted in step 5. This encrypted result
       is opaque and is a part of an EnvelopedData block.
   ) = These lines are what the outer signature is computed over.





Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 5]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   O = These lines are the outer SignedData block, which is opaque and
       contains the ASN.1 encoded result of step 6 as well as control
       information.

1.3 Security Services and Triple Wrapping

   The first three security services described in this document are used
   with triple wrapped messages in different ways. This section briefly
   describes the relationship of each service with triple wrapping; the
   other sections of the document go into greater detail.

1.3.1 Signed Receipts and Triple Wrapping

   A signed receipt may be requested in any SignedData object. However,
   if a signed receipt is requested for a triple wrapped message, the
   receipt request MUST be in the inside signature, not in the outside
   signature.  A secure mailing list agent may change the receipt policy
   in the outside signature of a triple wrapped message when that
   message is processed by the mailing list.

   Note: the signed receipts and receipt requests described in this memo
   differ from those described in the work done by the IETF Receipt
   Notification Working Group. The output of that Working Group, when
   finished, is not expected to work well with triple wrapped messages
   as described in this document.

1.3.2 Security Labels and Triple Wrapping

   A security label may be included in the signed attributes of any
   SignedData object. A security label attribute may be included in
   either the inner signature, outer signature, or both.

   The inner security label is used for access control decisions related
   to the plaintext original content. The inner signature provides
   authentication and cryptographically protects the integrity of the
   original signer's security label that is in the inside body. This
   strategy facilitates the forwarding of messages because the original
   signer's security label is included in the SignedData block which can
   be forwarded to a third party that can verify the inner signature
   which will cover the inner security label. The confidentiality
   security service can be applied to the inner security label by
   encrypting the entire inner SignedData block within an EnvelopedData
   block.

   A security label may also be included in the signed attributes of the
   outer SignedData block which will include the sensitivities of the
   encrypted message. The outer security label is used for access
   control and routing decisions related to the encrypted message. Note



Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 6]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   that a security label attribute can only be used in a
   signedAttributes block.  An eSSSecurityLabel attribute MUST NOT be
   used in an EnvelopedData or unsigned attributes.

1.3.3 Secure Mailing Lists and Triple Wrapping

   Secure mail list message processing depends on the structure of
   S/MIME layers present in the message sent to the mail list agent. The
   mail list agent never changes the data that was hashed to form the
   inner signature, if such a signature is present. If an outer
   signature is present, then the agent will modify the data that was
   hashed to form that outer signature. In all cases, the agent adds or
   updates an mlExpansionHistory attribute to document the agent's
   processing, and ultimately adds or replaces the outer signature on
   the message to be distributed.

1.3.4 Placement of Attributes

   Certain attributes should be placed in the inner or outer SignedData
   message; some attributes can be in either. Further, some attributes
   must be signed, while signing is optional for others, and some
   attributes must not be signed. ESS defines several types of
   attributes.  ContentHints and ContentIdentifier MAY appear in any
   list of attributes. contentReference, equivalentLabel,
   eSSSecurityLabel and mlExpansionHistory MUST be carried in a
   SignedAttributes or AuthAttributes type, and MUST NOT be carried in a
   UnsignedAttributes, UnauthAttributes or UnprotectedAttributes type.
   msgSigDigest, receiptRequest and signingCertificate MUST be carried
   in a SignedAttributes, and MUST NOT be carried in a AuthAttributes,
   UnsignedAttributes, UnauthAttributes or UnprotectedAttributes type.





















Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 7]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   The following table summarizes the recommendation of this profile. In
   the OID column, [ESS] indicates that the attribute is defined in this
   document.

                     |                              |Inner or  |
   Attribute         |OID                           |outer     |Signed
   ------------------|----------------------------- |----------|--------
   contentHints      |id-aa-contentHint [ESS]       |either    |MAY
   contentIdentifier |id-aa-contentIdentifier [ESS] |either    |MAY
   contentReference  |id-aa-contentReference [ESS]  |either    |MUST
   contentType       |id-contentType [CMS]          |either    |MUST
   counterSignature  |id-countersignature [CMS]     |either    |MUST NOT
   equivalentLabel   |id-aa-equivalentLabels [ESS]  |either    |MUST
   eSSSecurityLabel  |id-aa-securityLabel [ESS]     |either    |MUST
   messageDigest     |id-messageDigest [CMS]        |either    |MUST
   msgSigDigest      |id-aa-msgSigDigest [ESS]      |inner only|MUST
   mlExpansionHistory|id-aa-mlExpandHistory [ESS]   |outer only|MUST
   receiptRequest    |id-aa-receiptRequest [ESS]    |inner only|MUST
   signingCertificate|id-aa-signingCertificate [ESS]|either    |MUST
   signingTime       |id-signingTime [CMS]          |either    |MUST
   smimeCapabilities |sMIMECapabilities [MSG]       |either    |MUST
   sMIMEEncryption-
     KeyPreference   |id-aa-encrypKeyPref [MSG]     |either    |MUST

   CMS defines signedAttrs as a SET OF Attribute and defines
   unsignedAttrs as a SET OF Attribute. ESS defines the contentHints,
   contentIdentifier, eSSecurityLabel, msgSigDigest, mlExpansionHistory,
   receiptRequest, contentReference, equivalentLabels and
   signingCertificate attribute types. A signerInfo MUST NOT include
   multiple instances of any of the attribute types defined in ESS.
   Later sections of ESS specify further restrictions that apply to the
   receiptRequest, mlExpansionHistory and eSSecurityLabel attribute
   types.

   CMS defines the syntax for the signed and unsigned attributes as
   "attrValues SET OF AttributeValue". For all of the attribute types
   defined in ESS, if the attribute type is present in a signerInfo,
   then it MUST only include a single instance of AttributeValue. In
   other words, there MUST NOT be zero, or multiple, instances of
   AttributeValue present in the attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.

   If a counterSignature attribute is present, then it MUST be included
   in the unsigned attributes. It MUST NOT be included in the signed
   attributes. The only attributes that are allowed in a
   counterSignature attribute are counterSignature, messageDigest,
   signingTime, and signingCertificate.





Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 8]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   Note that the inner and outer signatures are usually those of
   different senders. Because of this, the same attribute in the two
   signatures could lead to very different consequences.

   ContentIdentifier is an attribute (OCTET STRING) used to carry a
   unique identifier assigned to the message.

1.4 Required and Optional Attributes

   Some security gateways sign messages that pass through them. If the
   message is any type other than a signedData type, the gateway has
   only one way to sign the message: by wrapping it with a signedData
   block and MIME headers. If the message to be signed by the gateway is
   a signedData message already, the gateway can sign the message by
   inserting a signerInfo into the signedData block.

   The main advantage of a gateway adding a signerInfo instead of
   wrapping the message in a new signature is that the message doesn't
   grow as much as if the gateway wrapped the message. The main
   disadvantage is that the gateway must check for the presence of
   certain attributes in the other signerInfos and either omit or copy
   those attributes.

   If a gateway or other processor adds a signerInfo to an existing
   signedData block, it MUST copy the mlExpansionHistory and
   eSSSecurityLabel attributes from other signerInfos. This helps ensure
   that the recipient will process those attributes in a signerInfo that
   it can verify.

   Note that someone may in the future define an attribute that must be
   present in each signerInfo of a signedData block in order for the
   signature to be processed. If that happens, a gateway that inserts
   signerInfos and doesn't copy that attribute will cause every message
   with that attribute to fail when processed by the recipient. For this
   reason, it is safer to wrap messages with new signatures than to
   insert signerInfos.

1.5 Object Identifiers

   The object identifiers for many of the objects described in this memo
   are found in [CMS], [MSG], and [CERT]. Other object identifiers used
   in S/MIME can be found in the registry kept at
   <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/oids.html>. When this memo moves to
   standards track within the IETF, it is intended that the IANA will
   maintain this registry.






Hoffman                     Standards Track                     [Page 9]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


2. Signed Receipts

   Returning a signed receipt provides to the originator proof of
   delivery of a message, and allows the originator to demonstrate to a
   third party that the recipient was able to verify the signature of
   the original message. This receipt is bound to the original message
   through the signature; consequently, this service may be requested
   only if a message is signed. The receipt sender may optionally also
   encrypt a receipt to provide confidentiality between the receipt
   sender and the receipt recipient.

2.1 Signed Receipt Concepts

   The originator of a message may request a signed receipt from the
   message's recipients. The request is indicated by adding a
   receiptRequest attribute to the signedAttributes field of the
   SignerInfo object for which the receipt is requested. The receiving
   user agent software SHOULD automatically create a signed receipt when
   requested to do so, and return the receipt in accordance with mailing
   list expansion options, local security policies, and configuration
   options.

   Because receipts involve the interaction of two parties, the
   terminology can sometimes be confusing. In this section, the "sender"
   is the agent that sent the original message that included a request
   for a receipt. The "receiver" is the party that received that message
   and generated the receipt.

   The steps in a typical transaction are:

   1. Sender creates a signed message including a receipt request
      attribute (Section 2.2).

   2. Sender transmits the resulting message to the recipient or
      recipients.

   3. Recipient receives message and determines if there is a valid
      signature and receipt request in the message (Section 2.3).

   4. Recipient creates a signed receipt (Section 2.4).

   5. Recipient transmits the resulting signed receipt message to the
      sender (Section 2.5).








Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 10]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   6. Sender receives the message and validates that it contains a
      signed receipt for the original message (Section 2.6). This
      validation relies on the sender having retained either a copy of
      the original message or information extracted from the original
      message.

   The ASN.1 syntax for the receipt request is given in Section 2.7; the
   ASN.1 syntax for the receipt is given in Section 2.8.

   Note that a sending agent SHOULD remember when it has sent a receipt
   so that it can avoid re-sending a receipt each time it processes the
   message.

   A receipt request can indicate that receipts be sent to many places,
   not just to the sender (in fact, the receipt request might indicate
   that the receipts should not even go to the sender). In order to
   verify a receipt, the recipient of the receipt must be the originator
   or a recipient of the original message. Thus, the sender SHOULD NOT
   request that receipts be sent to anyone who does not have an exact
   copy of the message.

2.2 Receipt Request Creation

   Multi-layer S/MIME messages may contain multiple SignedData layers.
   However, receipts may be requested only for the innermost SignedData
   layer in a multi-layer S/MIME message, such as a triple wrapped
   message. Only one receiptRequest attribute can be included in the
   signedAttributes of a SignerInfo.

   A ReceiptRequest attribute MUST NOT be included in the attributes of
   a SignerInfo in a SignedData object that encapsulates a Receipt
   content.  In other words, the receiving agent MUST NOT request a
   signed receipt for a signed receipt.

   A sender requests receipts by placing a receiptRequest attribute in
   the signed attributes of a signerInfo as follows:

   1. A receiptRequest data structure is created.

   2. A signed content identifier for the message is created and assigned
      to the signedContentIdentifier field. The signedContentIdentifier
      is used to associate the signed receipt with the message requesting
      the signed receipt.

   3. The entities requested to return a signed receipt are noted in the
      receiptsFrom field.





Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 11]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   4. The message originator MUST populate the receiptsTo field with a
      GeneralNames for each entity to whom the recipient should send the
      signed receipt. If the message originator wants the recipient to
      send the signed receipt to the originator, then the originator MUST
      include a GeneralNames for itself in the receiptsTo field.
      GeneralNames is a SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. receiptsTo is a
      SEQUENCE OF GeneralNames in which each GeneralNames represents an
      entity.  There may be multiple GeneralName instances in each
      GeneralNames.  At a minimum, the message originator MUST populate
      each entity's GeneralNames with the address to which the signed
      receipt should be sent. Optionally, the message originator MAY
      also populate each entity's GeneralNames with other GeneralName
      instances (such as directoryName).

   5. The completed receiptRequest attribute is placed in the
      signedAttributes field of the SignerInfo object.

2.2.1 Multiple Receipt Requests

   There can be multiple SignerInfos within a SignedData object, and
   each SignerInfo may include signedAttributes. Therefore, a single
   SignedData object may include multiple SignerInfos, each SignerInfo
   having a receiptRequest attribute. For example, an originator can
   send a signed message with two SignerInfos, one containing a DSS
   signature, the other containing an RSA signature.

   Each recipient SHOULD return only one signed receipt.

   Not all of the SignerInfos need to include receipt requests, but in
   all of the SignerInfos that do contain receipt requests, the receipt
   requests MUST be identical.

2.2.2 Information Needed to Validate Signed Receipts

   The sending agent MUST retain one or both of the following items to
   support the validation of signed receipts returned by the recipients.

    - the original signedData object requesting the signed receipt

    - the message signature digest value used to generate the original
      signedData signerInfo signature value and the digest value of the
      Receipt content containing values included in the original
      signedData object. If signed receipts are requested from multiple
      recipients, then retaining these digest values is a performance
      enhancement because the sending agent can reuse the saved values
      when verifying each returned signed receipt.





Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 12]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


2.3 Receipt Request Processing

   A receiptRequest is associated only with the SignerInfo object to
   which the receipt request attribute is directly attached. Receiving
   software SHOULD examine the signedAttributes field of each of the
   SignerInfos for which it verifies a signature in the innermost
   signedData object to determine if a receipt is requested. This may
   result in the receiving agent processing multiple receiptRequest
   attributes included in a single SignedData object, such as requests
   made from different people who signed the object in parallel.

   Before processing a receiptRequest signedAttribute, the receiving
   agent MUST verify the signature of the SignerInfo which covers the
   receiptRequest attribute. A recipient MUST NOT process a
   receiptRequest attribute that has not been verified. Because all
   receiptRequest attributes in a SignedData object must be identical,
   the receiving application fully processes (as described in the
   following paragraphs) the first receiptRequest attribute that it
   encounters in a SignerInfo that it verifies, and it then ensures that
   all other receiptRequest attributes in signerInfos that it verifies
   are identical to the first one encountered. If there are verified
   ReceiptRequest attributes which are not the same, then the processing
   software MUST NOT return any signed receipt. A signed receipt SHOULD
   be returned if any signerInfo containing a receiptRequest attribute
   can be validated, even if other signerInfos containing the same
   receiptRequest attribute cannot be validated because they are signed
   using an algorithm not supported by the receiving agent.

   If a receiptRequest attribute is absent from the signed attributes,
   then a signed receipt has not been requested from any of the message
   recipients and MUST NOT be created. If a receiptRequest attribute is
   present in the signed attributes, then a signed receipt has been
   requested from some or all of the message recipients. Note that in
   some cases, a receiving agent might receive two almost-identical
   messages, one with a receipt request and the other without one. In
   this case, the receiving agent SHOULD send a signed receipt for the
   message that requests a signed receipt.

   If a receiptRequest attribute is present in the signed attributes,
   the following process SHOULD be used to determine if a message
   recipient has been requested to return a signed receipt.










Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 13]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   1. If an mlExpansionHistory attribute is present in the outermost
      signedData block, do one of the following two steps, based on the
      absence or presence of mlReceiptPolicy:

       1.1. If an mlReceiptPolicy value is absent from the last MLData
            element, a Mail List receipt policy has not been specified
            and the processing software SHOULD examine the
            receiptRequest attribute value to determine if a receipt
            should be created and returned.

       1.2. If an mlReceiptPolicy value is present in the last MLData
            element, do one of the following two steps, based on the
            value of mlReceiptPolicy:

           1.2.1. If the mlReceiptPolicy value is none, then the receipt
                  policy of the Mail List supersedes the originator's
                  request for a signed receipt and a signed receipt MUST
                  NOT be created.

           1.2.2. If the mlReceiptPolicy value is insteadOf or
                  inAdditionTo, the processing software SHOULD examine
                  the receiptsFrom value from the receiptRequest
                  attribute to determine if a receipt should be created
                  and returned. If a receipt is created, the insteadOf
                  and inAdditionTo fields identify entities that SHOULD
                  be sent the receipt instead of or in addition to the
                  originator.

   2. If the receiptsFrom value of the receiptRequest attribute
      allOrFirstTier, do one of the following two steps based on the
      value of allOrFirstTier.

       2.1. If the value of allOrFirstTier is allReceipts, then a signed
            receipt SHOULD be created.

       2.2. If the value of allOrFirstTier is firstTierRecipients, do
            one of the following two steps based on the presence of an
            mlExpansionHistory attribute in an outer signedData block:

           2.2.1. If an mlExpansionHistory attribute is present, then
                  this recipient is not a first tier recipient and a
                  signed receipt MUST NOT be created.

           2.2.2. If an mlExpansionHistory attribute is not present,
                  then a signed receipt SHOULD be created.

   3. If the receiptsFrom value of the receiptRequest attribute is a
      receiptList:



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 14]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999



       3.1. If receiptList contains one of the GeneralNames of the
            recipient, then a signed receipt SHOULD be created.

       3.2. If receiptList does not contain one of the GeneralNames of
            the recipient, then a signed receipt MUST NOT be created.

   A flow chart for the above steps to be executed for each signerInfo
   for which the receiving agent verifies the signature would be:

   0. Receipt Request attribute present?
          YES -> 1.
          NO  -> STOP
   1. Has mlExpansionHistory in outer signedData?
          YES -> 1.1.
          NO  -> 2.
   1.1. mlReceiptPolicy absent?
          YES -> 2.
          NO  -> 1.2.
   1.2. Pick based on value of mlReceiptPolicy.
          none -> 1.2.1.
          insteadOf or inAdditionTo -> 1.2.2.
   1.2.1. STOP.
   1.2.2. Examine receiptsFrom to determine if a receipt should be
       created, create it if required, send it to recipients designated
       by mlReceiptPolicy, then -> STOP.
   2. Is value of receiptsFrom allOrFirstTier?
          YES -> Pick based on value of allOrFirstTier.
                allReceipts -> 2.1.
                firstTierRecipients -> 2.2.
          NO  -> 3.
   2.1. Create a receipt, then -> STOP.
   2.2. Has mlExpansionHistory in the outer signedData block?
          YES -> 2.2.1.
          NO  -> 2.2.2.
   2.2.1. STOP.
   2.2.2. Create a receipt, then -> STOP.
   3. Is receiptsFrom value of receiptRequest a receiptList?
          YES -> 3.1.
          NO  -> STOP.
   3.1. Does receiptList contain the recipient?
          YES -> Create a receipt, then -> STOP.
          NO  -> 3.2.
   3.2. STOP.







Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 15]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


2.4 Signed Receipt Creation

   A signed receipt is a signedData object encapsulating a Receipt
   content (also called a "signedData/Receipt"). Signed receipts are
   created as follows:

   1. The signature of the original signedData signerInfo that includes
      the receiptRequest signed attribute MUST be successfully verified
      before creating the signedData/Receipt.

       1.1. The content of the original signedData object is digested as
            described in [CMS]. The resulting digest value is then
            compared with the value of the messageDigest attribute
            included in the signedAttributes of the original signedData
            signerInfo. If these digest values are different, then the
            signature verification process fails and the
            signedData/Receipt MUST NOT be created.

       1.2. The ASN.1 DER encoded signedAttributes (including
            messageDigest, receiptRequest and, possibly, other signed
            attributes) in the original signedData signerInfo are
            digested as described in [CMS]. The resulting digest
            value, called msgSigDigest, is then used to verify the
            signature of the original signedData signerInfo. If the
            signature verification fails, then the signedData/Receipt
            MUST NOT be created.

   2. A Receipt structure is created.

       2.1. The value of the Receipt version field is set to 1.

       2.2. The object identifier from the contentType attribute
            included in the original signedData signerInfo that
            includes the receiptRequest attribute is copied into
            the Receipt contentType.

       2.3. The original signedData signerInfo receiptRequest
            signedContentIdentifier is copied into the Receipt
            signedContentIdentifier.

       2.4. The signature value from the original signedData signerInfo
            that includes the receiptRequest attribute is copied into
            the Receipt originatorSignatureValue.

   3. The Receipt structure is ASN.1 DER encoded to produce a data
      stream, D1.





Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 16]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   4. D1 is digested. The resulting digest value is included as the
      messageDigest attribute in the signedAttributes of the signerInfo
      which will eventually contain the signedData/Receipt signature
      value.

   5. The digest value (msgSigDigest) calculated in Step 1 to verify the
      signature of the original signedData signerInfo is included as the
      msgSigDigest attribute in the signedAttributes of the signerInfo
      which will eventually contain the signedData/Receipt signature
      value.

   6. A contentType attribute including the id-ct-receipt object
      identifier MUST be created and added to the signed attributes of
      the signerInfo which will eventually contain the
      signedData/Receipt signature value.

   7. A signingTime attribute indicating the time that the
      signedData/Receipt is signed SHOULD be created and added to the
      signed attributes of the signerInfo which will eventually contain
      the signedData/Receipt signature value. Other attributes (except
      receiptRequest) may be added to the signedAttributes of the
      signerInfo.

   8. The signedAttributes (messageDigest, msgSigDigest, contentType and,
      possibly, others) of the signerInfo are ASN.1 DER encoded and
      digested as described in [CMS]. The resulting digest value is used
      to calculate the signature value which is then included in the
      signedData/Receipt signerInfo.

   9. The ASN.1 DER encoded Receipt content MUST be directly encoded
      within the signedData encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING
      defined in [CMS]. The id-ct-receipt object identifier MUST be
      included in the signedData encapContentInfo eContentType. This
      results in a single ASN.1 encoded object composed of a signedData
      including the Receipt content. The Data content type MUST NOT be
      used.  The Receipt content MUST NOT be encapsulated in a MIME
      header or any other header prior to being encoded as part of the
      signedData object.

   10. The signedData/Receipt is then put in an application/pkcs7-mime
       MIME wrapper with the smime-type parameter set to
       "signed-receipt".  This will allow for identification of signed
       receipts without having to crack the ASN.1 body. The smime-type
       parameter would still be set as normal in any layer wrapped
       around this message.






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 17]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   11. If the signedData/Receipt is to be encrypted within an
       envelopedData object, then an outer signedData object MUST be
       created that encapsulates the envelopedData object, and a
       contentHints attribute with contentType set to the id-ct-receipt
       object identifier MUST be included in the outer signedData
       SignerInfo signedAttributes.  When a receiving agent processes the
       outer signedData object, the presence of the id-ct-receipt OID in
       the contentHints contentType indicates that a signedData/Receipt
       is encrypted within the envelopedData object encapsulated by the
       outer signedData.

   All sending agents that support the generation of ESS signed receipts
   MUST provide the ability to send encrypted signed receipts (that is,
   a signedData/Receipt encapsulated within an envelopedData). The
   sending agent MAY send an encrypted signed receipt in response to an
   envelopedData-encapsulated signedData requesting a signed receipt. It
   is a matter of local policy regarding whether or not the signed
   receipt should be encrypted.  The ESS signed receipt includes the
   message digest value calculated for the original signedData object
   that requested the signed receipt. If the original signedData object
   was sent encrypted within an envelopedData object and the ESS signed
   receipt is sent unencrypted, then the message digest value calculated
   for the original encrypted signedData object is sent unencrypted. The
   responder should consider this when deciding whether or not to
   encrypt the ESS signed receipt.

2.4.1 MLExpansionHistory Attributes and Receipts

   An MLExpansionHistory attribute MUST NOT be included in the
   attributes of a SignerInfo in a SignedData object that encapsulates a
   Receipt content. This is true because when a SignedData/Receipt is
   sent to an MLA for distribution, then the MLA must always encapsulate
   the received SignedData/Receipt in an outer SignedData in which the
   MLA will include the MLExpansionHistory attribute. The MLA cannot
   change the signedAttributes of the received SignedData/Receipt
   object, so it can't add the MLExpansionHistory to the
   SignedData/Receipt.

2.5 Determining the Recipients of the Signed Receipt

   If a signed receipt was created by the process described in the
   sections above, then the software MUST use the following process to
   determine to whom the signed receipt should be sent.

   1. The receiptsTo field must be present in the receiptRequest
      attribute. The software initiates the sequence of recipients with
      the value(s) of receiptsTo.




Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 18]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   2. If the MlExpansionHistory attribute is present in the outer
      SignedData block, and the last MLData contains an MLReceiptPolicy
      value of insteadOf, then the software replaces the sequence of
      recipients with the value(s) of insteadOf.

   3. If the MlExpansionHistory attribute is present in the outer
      SignedData block and the last MLData contains an MLReceiptPolicy
      value of inAdditionTo, then the software adds the value(s) of
      inAdditionTo to the sequence of recipients.

2.6. Signed Receipt Validation

   A signed receipt is communicated as a single ASN.1 encoded object
   composed of a signedData object directly including a Receipt content.
   It is identified by the presence of the id-ct-receipt object
   identifier in the encapContentInfo eContentType value of the
   signedData object including the Receipt content.

   Although recipients are not supposed to send more than one signed
   receipt, receiving agents SHOULD be able to accept multiple signed
   receipts from a recipient.

   A signedData/Receipt is validated as follows:

   1. ASN.1 decode the signedData object including the Receipt content.

   2. Extract the contentType, signedContentIdentifier, and
      originatorSignatureValue from the decoded Receipt structure to
      identify the original signedData signerInfo that requested the
      signedData/Receipt.

   3. Acquire the message signature digest value calculated by the sender
      to generate the signature value included in the original signedData
      signerInfo that requested the signedData/Receipt.

       3.1. If the sender-calculated message signature digest value has
            been saved locally by the sender, it must be located and
            retrieved.

       3.2. If it has not been saved, then it must be re-calculated based
            on the original signedData content and signedAttributes as
            described in [CMS].

   4. The message signature digest value calculated by the sender is then
      compared with the value of the msgSigDigest signedAttribute
      included in the signedData/Receipt signerInfo. If these digest
      values are identical, then that proves that the message signature
      digest value calculated by the recipient based on the received



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 19]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


      original signedData object is the same as that calculated by the
      sender. This proves that the recipient received exactly the same
      original signedData content and signedAttributes as sent by the
      sender because that is the only way that the recipient could have
      calculated the same message signature digest value as calculated by
      the sender.  If the digest values are different, then the
      signedData/Receipt signature verification process fails.

   5. Acquire the digest value calculated by the sender for the Receipt
      content constructed by the sender (including the contentType,
      signedContentIdentifier, and signature value that were included in
      the original signedData signerInfo that requested the
      signedData/Receipt).

       5.1. If the sender-calculated Receipt content digest value has
            been  saved locally by the sender, it must be located and
            retrieved.

       5.2. If it has not been saved, then it must be re-calculated. As
            described in section above, step 2, create a Receipt
            structure including the contentType, signedContentIdentifier
            and signature value that were included in the original
            signedData signerInfo that requested the signed receipt. The
            Receipt structure is then ASN.1 DER encoded to produce a data
            stream which is then digested to produce the Receipt content
            digest value.

   6. The Receipt content digest value calculated by the sender is then
      compared with the value of the messageDigest signedAttribute
      included in the signedData/Receipt signerInfo. If these digest
      values are identical, then that proves that the values included in
      the Receipt content by the recipient are identical to those that
      were included in the original signedData signerInfo that requested
      the signedData/Receipt. This proves that the recipient received the
      original signedData signed by the sender, because that is the only
      way that the recipient could have obtained the original signedData
      signerInfo signature value for inclusion in the Receipt content. If
      the digest values are different, then the signedData/Receipt
      signature verification process fails.

   7. The ASN.1 DER encoded signedAttributes of the signedData/Receipt
      signerInfo are digested as described in [CMS].

   8. The resulting digest value is then used to verify the signature
      value included in the signedData/Receipt signerInfo. If the
      signature verification is successful, then that proves the
      integrity of the signedData/receipt signerInfo signedAttributes and
      authenticates the identity of the signer of the signedData/Receipt



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 20]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


      signerInfo. Note that the signedAttributes include the
      recipient-calculated Receipt content digest value (messageDigest
      attribute) and recipient-calculated message signature digest value
      (msgSigDigest attribute). Therefore, the aforementioned comparison
      of the sender-generated and recipient-generated digest values
      combined with the successful signedData/Receipt signature
      verification proves that the recipient received the exact original
      signedData content and signedAttributes (proven by msgSigDigest
      attribute) that were signed by the sender of the original
      signedData object (proven by messageDigest attribute). If the
      signature verification fails, then the signedData/Receipt signature
      verification process fails.

   The signature verification process for each signature algorithm that
   is used in conjunction with the CMS protocol is specific to the
   algorithm.  These processes are described in documents specific to
   the algorithms.

2. 7 Receipt Request Syntax

   A receiptRequest attribute value has ASN.1 type ReceiptRequest. Use
   the receiptRequest attribute only within the signed attributes
   associated with a signed message.

ReceiptRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  receiptsFrom ReceiptsFrom,
  receiptsTo SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-receiptsTo)) OF GeneralNames }

ub-receiptsTo INTEGER ::= 16

id-aa-receiptRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 1}

ContentIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING

id-aa-contentIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 7}

   A signedContentIdentifier MUST be created by the message originator
   when creating a receipt request. To ensure global uniqueness, the
   minimal signedContentIdentifier SHOULD contain a concatenation of
   user-specific identification information (such as a user name or
   public keying material identification information), a GeneralizedTime
   string, and a random number.






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 21]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   The receiptsFrom field is used by the originator to specify the
   recipients requested to return a signed receipt. A CHOICE is provided
   to allow specification of:

    - receipts from all recipients are requested
    - receipts from first tier (recipients that did not receive the
      message as members of a mailing list) recipients are requested
    - receipts from a specific list of recipients are requested

   ReceiptsFrom ::= CHOICE {
     allOrFirstTier [0] AllOrFirstTier,
     -- formerly "allOrNone [0]AllOrNone"
     receiptList [1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralNames }

   AllOrFirstTier ::= INTEGER { -- Formerly AllOrNone
     allReceipts (0),
     firstTierRecipients (1) }

   The receiptsTo field is used by the originator to identify the
   user(s) to whom the identified recipient should send signed receipts.
   The message originator MUST populate the receiptsTo field with a
   GeneralNames for each entity to whom the recipient should send the
   signed receipt. If the message originator wants the recipient to send
   the signed receipt to the originator, then the originator MUST
   include a GeneralNames for itself in the receiptsTo field.

2.8 Receipt Syntax

   Receipts are represented using a new content type, Receipt. The
   Receipt content type shall have ASN.1 type Receipt. Receipts must be
   encapsulated within a SignedData message.

Receipt ::= SEQUENCE {
  version ESSVersion,
  contentType ContentType,
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }

id-ct-receipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
   rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-ct(1) 1}

ESSVersion ::= INTEGER  { v1(1) }

   The version field defines the syntax version number, which is 1 for
   this version of the standard.






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 22]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


2.9 Content Hints

   Many applications find it useful to have information that describes
   the innermost signed content of a multi-layer message available on
   the outermost signature layer. The contentHints attribute provides
   such information.

Content-hints attribute values have ASN.1 type contentHints.

ContentHints ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentDescription UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) OPTIONAL,
  contentType ContentType }

id-aa-contentHint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
    rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 4}

   The contentDescription field may be used to provide information that
   the recipient may use to select protected messages for processing,
   such as a message subject. If this field is set, then the attribute
   is expected to appear on the signedData object enclosing an
   envelopedData object and not on the inner signedData object. The
   (SIZE (1..MAX)) construct constrains the sequence to have at least
   one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified.
   Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their
   environment.

   Messages which contain a signedData object wrapped around an
   envelopedData object, thus masking the inner content type of the
   message, SHOULD include a contentHints attribute, except for the case
   of the data content type. Specific message content types may either
   force or preclude the inclusion of the contentHints attribute. For
   example, when a signedData/Receipt is encrypted within an
   envelopedData object, an outer signedData object MUST be created that
   encapsulates the envelopedData object and a contentHints attribute
   with contentType set to the id-ct-receipt object identifier MUST be
   included in the outer signedData SignerInfo signedAttributes.















Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 23]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


2.10  Message Signature Digest Attribute

   The msgSigDigest attribute can only be used in the signed attributes
   of a signed receipt. It contains the digest of the ASN.1 DER encoded
   signedAttributes included in the original signedData that requested
   the signed receipt. Only one msgSigDigest attribute can appear in a
   signed attributes set. It is defined as follows:

msgSigDigest ::= OCTET STRING

id-aa-msgSigDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 5}

2.11 Signed Content Reference Attribute

   The contentReference attribute is a link from one SignedData to
   another. It may be used to link a reply to the original message to
   which it refers, or to incorporate by reference one SignedData into
   another. The first SignedData MUST include a contentIdentifier signed
   attribute, which SHOULD be constructed as specified in section 2.7.
   The second SignedData links to the first by including a
   ContentReference signed attribute containing the content type,
   content identifier, and signature value from the first SignedData.

ContentReference ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentType ContentType,
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }

id-aa-contentReference   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 10 }

3. Security Labels

   This section describes the syntax to be used for security labels that
   can optionally be associated with S/MIME encapsulated data. A
   security label is a set of security information regarding the
   sensitivity of the content that is protected by S/MIME encapsulation.

   "Authorization" is the act of granting rights and/or privileges to
   users permitting them access to an object. "Access control" is a
   means of enforcing these authorizations. The sensitivity information
   in a security label can be compared with a user's authorizations to
   determine if the user is allowed to access the content that is
   protected by S/MIME encapsulation.






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 24]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   Security labels may be used for other purposes such as a source of
   routing information. The labels often describe ranked levels
   ("secret", "confidential", "restricted", and so on) or are role-
   based, describing which kind of people can see the information
   ("patient's health-care team", "medical billing agents",
   "unrestricted", and so on).

3.1 Security Label Processing Rules

   A sending agent may include a security label attribute in the signed
   attributes of a signedData object. A receiving agent examines the
   security label on a received message and determines whether or not
   the recipient is allowed to see the contents of the message.

3.1.1 Adding Security Labels

   A sending agent that is using security labels MUST put the security
   label attribute in the signedAttributes field of a SignerInfo block.
   The security label attribute MUST NOT be included in the unsigned
   attributes. Integrity and authentication security services MUST be
   applied to the security label, therefore it MUST be included as a
   signed attribute, if used. This causes the security label attribute
   to be part of the data that is hashed to form the SignerInfo
   signature value. A SignerInfo block MUST NOT have more than one
   security label signed attribute.

   When there are multiple SignedData blocks applied to a message, a
   security label attribute may be included in either the inner
   signature, outer signature, or both. A security label signed
   attribute may be included in a signedAttributes field within the
   inner SignedData block.  The inner security label will include the
   sensitivities of the original content and will be used for access
   control decisions related to the plaintext encapsulated content. The
   inner signature provides authentication of the inner security label
   and cryptographically protects the original signer's inner security
   label of the original content.

   When the originator signs the plaintext content and signed
   attributes, the inner security label is bound to the plaintext
   content. An intermediate entity cannot change the inner security
   label without invalidating the inner signature. The confidentiality
   security service can be applied to the inner security label by
   encrypting the entire inner signedData object within an EnvelopedData
   block.

   A security label signed attribute may also be included in a
   signedAttributes field within the outer SignedData block. The outer
   security label will include the sensitivities of the encrypted



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 25]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   message and will be used for access control decisions related to the
   encrypted message and for routing decisions. The outer signature
   provides authentication of the outer security label (as well as for
   the encapsulated content which may include nested S/MIME messages).

   There can be multiple SignerInfos within a SignedData object, and
   each SignerInfo may include signedAttributes. Therefore, a single
   SignedData object may include multiple eSSSecurityLabels, each
   SignerInfo having an eSSSecurityLabel attribute. For example, an
   originator can send a signed message with two SignerInfos, one
   containing a DSS signature, the other containing an RSA signature. If
   any of the SignerInfos included in a SignedData object include an
   eSSSecurityLabel attribute, then all of the SignerInfos in that
   SignedData object MUST include an eSSSecurityLabel attribute and the
   value of each MUST be identical.

3.1.2 Processing Security Labels

   Before processing an eSSSecurityLabel signedAttribute, the receiving
   agent MUST verify the signature of the SignerInfo which covers the
   eSSSecurityLabel attribute. A recipient MUST NOT process an
   eSSSecurityLabel attribute that has not been verified.

   A receiving agent MUST process the eSSSecurityLabel attribute, if
   present, in each SignerInfo in the SignedData object for which it
   verifies the signature. This may result in the receiving agent
   processing multiple eSSSecurityLabels included in a single SignedData
   object. Because all eSSSecurityLabels in a SignedData object must be
   identical, the receiving agent processes (such as performing access
   control) on the first eSSSecurityLabel that it encounters in a
   SignerInfo that it verifies, and then ensures that all other
   eSSSecurityLabels in signerInfos that it verifies are identical to
   the first one encountered. If the eSSSecurityLabels in the
   signerInfos that it verifies are not all identical, then the
   receiving agent MUST warn the user of this condition.

   Receiving agents SHOULD have a local policy regarding whether or not
   to show the inner content of a signedData object that includes an
   eSSSecurityLabel security-policy-identifier that the processing
   software does not recognize. If the receiving agent does not
   recognize the eSSSecurityLabel security-policy-identifier value, then
   it SHOULD stop processing the message and indicate an error.









Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 26]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


3.2 Syntax of eSSSecurityLabel

   The eSSSecurityLabel syntax is derived directly from [MTSABS] ASN.1
   module. (The MTSAbstractService module begins with "DEFINITIONS
   IMPLICIT TAGS ::=".) Further, the eSSSecurityLabel syntax is
   compatible with that used in [MSP4].

ESSSecurityLabel ::= SET {
  security-policy-identifier SecurityPolicyIdentifier,
  security-classification SecurityClassification OPTIONAL,
  privacy-mark ESSPrivacyMark OPTIONAL,
  security-categories SecurityCategories OPTIONAL }

id-aa-securityLabel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 2}

SecurityPolicyIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

SecurityClassification ::= INTEGER {
  unmarked (0),
  unclassified (1),
  restricted (2),
  confidential (3),
  secret (4),
  top-secret (5) } (0..ub-integer-options)

ub-integer-options INTEGER ::= 256

ESSPrivacyMark ::= CHOICE {
    pString      PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-privacy-mark-length)),
    utf8String   UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))
}

ub-privacy-mark-length INTEGER ::= 128

SecurityCategories ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-security-categories) OF
        SecurityCategory

ub-security-categories INTEGER ::= 64

SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
  type  [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type -- defined by type
}

--Note: The aforementioned SecurityCategory syntax produces identical
--hex encodings as the following SecurityCategory syntax that is
--documented in the X.411 specification:



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 27]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


--
--SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
--     type  [0]  SECURITY-CATEGORY,
--     value [1]  ANY DEFINED BY type }
--
--SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::=
--BEGIN
--TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty
--VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER)
--END

3.3  Security Label Components

   This section gives more detail on the the various components of the
   eSSSecurityLabel syntax.

3.3.1 Security Policy Identifier

   A security policy is a set of criteria for the provision of security
   services. The eSSSecurityLabel security-policy-identifier is used to
   identify the security policy in force to which the security label
   relates. It indicates the semantics of the other security label
   components.

3.3.2 Security Classification

   This specification defines the use of the Security Classification
   field exactly as is specified in the X.411 Recommendation, which
   states in part:

      If present, a security-classification may have one of a
      hierarchical list of values. The basic security-classification
      hierarchy is defined in this Recommendation, but the use of these
      values is defined by the security-policy in force. Additional
      values of security-classification, and their position in the
      hierarchy, may also be defined by a security-policy as a local
      matter or by bilateral agreement. The basic security-
      classification hierarchy is, in ascending order: unmarked,
      unclassified, restricted, confidential, secret, top-secret.

   This means that the security policy in force (identified by the
   eSSSecurityLabel security-policy-identifier) defines the
   SecurityClassification integer values and their meanings.

   An organization can develop its own security policy that defines the
   SecurityClassification INTEGER values and their meanings. However,
   the general interpretation of the X.411 specification is that the
   values of 0 through 5 are reserved for the "basic hierarchy" values



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 28]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   of unmarked, unclassified, restricted, confidential, secret, and
   top-secret. Note that X.411 does not provide the rules for how these
   values are used to label data and how access control is performed
   using these values.

   There is no universal definition of the rules for using these "basic
   hierarchy" values. Each organization (or group of organizations) will
   define a security policy which documents how the "basic hierarchy"
   values are used (if at all) and how access control is enforced (if at
   all) within their domain.

   Therefore, the security-classification value MUST be accompanied by a
   security-policy-identifier value to define the rules for its use. For
   example, a company's "secret" classification may convey a different
   meaning than the US Government "secret" classification. In summary, a
   security policy SHOULD NOT use integers 0 through 5 for other than
   their X.411 meanings, and SHOULD instead use other values in a
   hierarchical fashion.

   Note that the set of valid security-classification values MUST be
   hierarchical, but these values do not necessarily need to be in
   ascending numerical order. Further, the values do not need to be
   contiguous.

   For example, in the Defense Message System 1.0 security policy, the
   security-classification value of 11 indicates Sensitive-But-
   Unclassified and 5 indicates top-secret. The hierarchy of sensitivity
   ranks top-secret as more sensitive than Sensitive-But-Unclassified
   even though the numerical value of top-secret is less than
   Sensitive-But-Unclassified.

   (Of course, if security-classification values are both hierarchical
   and in ascending order, a casual reader of the security policy is
   more likely to understand it.)

   An example of a security policy that does not use any of the X.411
   values might be:

   10 -- anyone
   15 -- Morgan Corporation and its contractors
   20 -- Morgan Corporation employees
   25 -- Morgan Corporation board of directors

   An example of a security policy that uses part of the X.411 hierarchy
   might be:

   0 -- unmarked
   1 -- unclassified, can be read by everyone



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 29]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   2 -- restricted to Timberwolf Productions staff
   6 -- can only be read to Timberwolf Productions executives

3.3.3 Privacy Mark

   If present, the eSSSecurityLabel privacy-mark is not used for access
   control. The content of the eSSSecurityLabel privacy-mark may be
   defined by the security policy in force (identified by the
   eSSSecurityLabel security-policy-identifier) which may define a list
   of values to be used. Alternately, the value may be determined by the
   originator of the security-label.

3.3.4 Security Categories

   If present, the eSSSecurityLabel security-categories provide further
   granularity for the sensitivity of the message. The security policy
   in force (identified by the eSSSecurityLabel security-policy-
   identifier) is used to indicate the syntaxes that are allowed to be
   present in the eSSSecurityLabel security-categories. Alternately, the
   security-categories and their values may be defined by bilateral
   agreement.

3.4  Equivalent Security Labels

   Because organizations are allowed to define their own security
   policies, many different security policies will exist. Some
   organizations may wish to create equivalencies between their security
   policies with the security policies of other organizations. For
   example, the Acme Company and the Widget Corporation may reach a
   bilateral agreement that the "Acme private" security-classification
   value is equivalent to the "Widget sensitive" security-classification
   value.

   Receiving agents MUST NOT process an equivalentLabels attribute in a
   message if the agent does not trust the signer of that attribute to
   translate the original eSSSecurityLabel values to the security policy
   included in the equivalentLabels attribute. Receiving agents have the
   option to process equivalentLabels attributes but do not have to. It
   is acceptable for a receiving agent to only process
   eSSSecurityLabels. All receiving agents SHOULD recognize
   equivalentLabels attributes even if they do not process them.

3.4.1 Creating Equivalent Labels

   The EquivalentLabels signed attribute is defined as:






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 30]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


EquivalentLabels ::= SEQUENCE OF ESSSecurityLabel

id-aa-equivalentLabels OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
        us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 9}

   As stated earlier, the ESSSecurityLabel contains the sensitivity
   values selected by the original signer of the signedData. If an
   ESSSecurityLabel is present in a signerInfo, all signerInfos in the
   signedData MUST contain an ESSSecurityLabel and they MUST all be
   identical. In addition to an ESSSecurityLabel, a signerInfo MAY also
   include an equivalentLabels signed attribute. If present, the
   equivalentLabels attribute MUST include one or more security labels
   that are believed by the signer to be semantically equivalent to the
   ESSSecurityLabel attribute included in the same signerInfo.

   All security-policy object identifiers MUST be unique in the set of
   ESSSecurityLabel and EquivalentLabels security labels. Before using
   an EquivalentLabels attribute, a receiving agent MUST ensure that all
   security-policy OIDs are unique in the security label or labels
   included in the EquivalentLabels. Once the receiving agent selects
   the security label (within the EquivalentLabels) to be used for
   processing, then the security-policy OID of the selected
   EquivalentLabels security label MUST be compared with the
   ESSSecurityLabel security-policy OID to ensure that they are unique.

   In the case that an ESSSecurityLabel attribute is not included in a
   signerInfo, then an EquivalentLabels attribute may still be included.
   For example, in the Acme security policy, the absence of an
   ESSSecurityLabel could be defined to equate to a security label
   composed of the Acme security-policy OID and the "unmarked"
   security-classification.

   Note that equivalentLabels MUST NOT be used to convey security labels
   that are semantically different from the ESSSecurityLabel included in
   the signerInfos in the signedData. If an entity needs to apply a
   security label that is semantically different from the
   ESSSecurityLabel, then it MUST include the sematically different
   security label in an outer signedData object that encapsulates the
   signedData object that includes the ESSSecurityLabel.

   If present, the equivalentLabels attribute MUST be a signed
   attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. [CMS] defines
   signedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A signerInfo MUST NOT include
   multiple instances of the equivalentLabels attribute. CMS defines the
   ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include attrValues SET OF






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 31]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   AttributeValue. A equivalentLabels attribute MUST only include a
   single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST NOT be zero or multiple
   instances of AttributeValue present in the attrValues SET OF
   AttributeValue.

3.4.2 Processing Equivalent Labels

   A receiving agent SHOULD process the ESSSecurityLabel before
   processing any EquivalentLabels. If the policy in the
   ESSSecurityLabel is understood by the receiving agent, it MUST
   process that label and MUST ignore all EquivalentLabels.

   When processing an EquivalentLabels attribute, the receiving agent
   MUST validate the signature on the EquivalentLabels attribute. A
   receiving agent MUST NOT act on an equivalentLabels attribute for
   which the signature could not be validated, and MUST NOT act on an
   equivalentLabels attribute unless that attribute is signed by an
   entity trusted to translate the original eSSSecurityLabel values to
   the security policy included in the equivalentLabels attribute.
   Determining who is allowed to specify equivalence mappings is a local
   policy. If a message has more than one EquivalentLabels attribute,
   the receiving agent SHOULD process the first one that it reads and
   validates that contains the security policy of interest to the
   receiving agent.

4. Mail List Management

   Sending agents must create recipient-specific data structures for
   each recipient of an encrypted message. This process can impair
   performance for messages sent to a large number of recipients. Thus,
   Mail List Agents (MLAs) that can take a single message and perform
   the recipient-specific encryption for every recipient are often
   desired.

   An MLA appears to the message originator as a normal message
   recipient, but the MLA acts as a message expansion point for a Mail
   List (ML). The sender of a message directs the message to the MLA,
   which then redistributes the message to the members of the ML. This
   process offloads the per-recipient processing from individual user
   agents and allows for more efficient management of large MLs. MLs are
   true message recipients served by MLAs that provide cryptographic and
   expansion services for the mailing list.

   In addition to cryptographic handling of messages, secure mailing
   lists also have to prevent mail loops. A mail loop is where one
   mailing list is a member of a second mailing list, and the second





Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 32]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   mailing list is a member of the first. A message will go from one
   list to the other in a rapidly-cascading succession of mail that will
   be distributed to all other members of both lists.

   To prevent mail loops, MLAs use the mlExpansionHistory attribute of
   the outer signature of a triple wrapped message. The
   mlExpansionHistory attribute is essentially a list of every MLA that
   has processed the message. If an MLA sees its own unique entity
   identifier in the list, it knows that a loop has been formed, and
   does not send the message to the list again.

4.1 Mail List Expansion

   Mail list expansion processing is noted in the value of the
   mlExpansionHistory attribute, located in the signed attributes of the
   MLA's SignerInfo block. The MLA creates or updates the signed
   mlExpansionHistory attribute value each time the MLA expands and
   signs a message for members of a mail list.

   The MLA MUST add an MLData record containing the MLA's identification
   information, date and time of expansion, and optional receipt policy
   to the end of the mail list expansion history sequence. If the
   mlExpansionHistory attribute is absent, then the MLA MUST add the
   attribute and the current expansion becomes the first element of the
   sequence. If the mlExpansionHistory attribute is present, then the
   MLA MUST add the current expansion information to the end of the
   existing MLExpansionHistory sequence. Only one mlExpansionHistory
   attribute can be included in the signedAttributes of a SignerInfo.

   Note that if the mlExpansionHistory attribute is absent, then the
   recipient is a first tier message recipient.

   There can be multiple SignerInfos within a SignedData object, and
   each SignerInfo may include signedAttributes. Therefore, a single
   SignedData object may include multiple SignerInfos, each SignerInfo
   having a mlExpansionHistory attribute. For example, an MLA can send a
   signed message with two SignerInfos, one containing a DSS signature,
   the other containing an RSA signature.

   If an MLA creates a SignerInfo that includes an mlExpansionHistory
   attribute, then all of the SignerInfos created by the MLA for that
   SignedData object MUST include an mlExpansionHistory attribute, and
   the value of each MUST be identical. Note that other agents might
   later add SignerInfo attributes to the SignedData block, and those
   additional SignerInfos might not include mlExpansionHistory
   attributes.





Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 33]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   A recipient MUST verify the signature of the SignerInfo which covers
   the mlExpansionHistory attribute before processing the
   mlExpansionHistory, and MUST NOT process the mlExpansionHistory
   attribute unless the signature over it has been verified. If a
   SignedData object has more than one SignerInfo that has an
   mlExpansionHistory attribute, the recipient MUST compare the
   mlExpansionHistory attributes in all the SignerInfos that it has
   verified, and MUST NOT process the mlExpansionHistory attribute
   unless every verified mlExpansionHistory attribute in the SignedData
   block is identical. If the mlExpansionHistory attributes in the
   verified signerInfos are not all identical, then the receiving agent
   MUST stop processing the message and SHOULD notify the user or MLA
   administrator of this error condition. In the mlExpansionHistory
   processing, SignerInfos that do not have an mlExpansionHistory
   attribute are ignored.

4.1.1 Detecting Mail List Expansion Loops

   Prior to expanding a message, the MLA examines the value of any
   existing mail list expansion history attribute to detect an expansion
   loop. An expansion loop exists when a message expanded by a specific
   MLA for a specific mail list is redelivered to the same MLA for the
   same mail list.

   Expansion loops are detected by examining the mailListIdentifier
   field of each MLData entry found in the mail list expansion history.
   If an MLA finds its own identification information, then the MLA must
   discontinue expansion processing and should provide warning of an
   expansion loop to a human mail list administrator. The mail list
   administrator is responsible for correcting the loop condition.

4.2 Mail List Agent Processing

   The first few paragraphs of this section provide a high-level
   description of MLA processing. The rest of the section provides a
   detailed description of MLA processing.

   MLA message processing depends on the structure of the S/MIME layers
   in the message sent to the MLA for expansion. In addition to sending
   triple wrapped messages to an MLA, an entity can send other types of
   messages to an MLA, such as:

    - a single wrapped signedData or envelopedData message
    - a double wrapped message (such as signed and enveloped, enveloped
      and signed, or signed and signed, and so on)
    - a quadruple-wrapped message (such as if a well-formed triple
      wrapped message was sent through a gateway that added an outer
      SignedData layer)



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 34]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   In all cases, the MLA MUST parse all layers of the received message
   to determine if there are any signedData layers that include an
   eSSSecurityLabel signedAttribute. This may include decrypting an
   EnvelopedData layer to determine if an encapsulated SignedData layer
   includes an eSSSecurityLabel attribute. The MLA MUST fully process
   each eSSSecurityLabel attribute found in the various signedData
   layers, including performing access control checks, before
   distributing the message to the ML members. The details of the access
   control checks are beyond the scope of this document. The MLA MUST
   verify the signature of the signerInfo including the eSSSecurityLabel
   attribute before using it.

   In all cases, the MLA MUST sign the message to be sent to the ML
   members in a new "outer" signedData layer. The MLA MUST add or update
   an mlExpansionHistory attribute in the "outer" signedData that it
   creates to document MLA processing. If there was an "outer"
   signedData layer included in the original message received by the
   MLA, then the MLA-created "outer" signedData layer MUST include each
   signed attribute present in the original "outer" signedData layer,
   unless the MLA explicitly replaces an attribute (such as signingTime
   or mlExpansionHistory) with a new value.

   When an S/MIME message is received by the MLA, the MLA MUST first
   determine which received signedData layer, if any, is the "outer"
   signedData layer.  To identify the received "outer" signedData layer,
   the MLA MUST verify the signature and fully process the
   signedAttributes in each of the outer signedData layers (working from
   the outside in) to determine if any of them either include an
   mlExpansionHistory attribute or encapsulate an envelopedData object.

   The MLA's search for the "outer" signedData layer is completed when
   it finds one of the following:

    - the "outer" signedData layer that includes an mlExpansionHistory
      attribute or encapsulates an envelopedData object
    - an envelopedData layer
    - the original content (that is, a layer that is neither
      envelopedData nor signedData).

   If the MLA finds an "outer" signedData layer, then the MLA MUST
   perform the following steps:

   1. Strip off all of the signedData layers that encapsulated the
      "outer" signedData layer

   2. Strip off the "outer" signedData layer itself (after remembering
      the included signedAttributes)




Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 35]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   3. Expand the envelopedData (if present)

   4. Sign the message to be sent to the ML members in a new "outer"
      signedData layer that includes the signedAttributes (unless
      explicitly replaced) from the original, received "outer" signedData
      layer.

   If the MLA finds an "outer" signedData layer that includes an
   mlExpansionHistory attribute AND the MLA subsequently finds an
   envelopedData layer buried deeper with the layers of the received
   message, then the MLA MUST strip off all of the signedData layers
   down to the envelopedData layer (including stripping off the original
   "outer" signedData layer) and MUST sign the expanded envelopedData in
   a new "outer" signedData layer that includes the signedAttributes
   (unless explicitly replaced) from the original, received "outer"
   signedData layer.

   If the MLA does not find an "outer" signedData layer AND does not
   find an envelopedData layer, then the MLA MUST sign the original,
   received message in a new "outer" signedData layer. If the MLA does
   not find an "outer" signedData AND does find an envelopedData layer
   then it MUST expand the envelopedData layer, if present, and sign it
   in a new "outer" signedData layer.

4.2.1 Examples of Rule Processing

   The following examples help explain the rules above:

   1) A message (S1(Original Content)) (where S = SignedData) is sent to
      the MLA in which the signedData layer does not include an
      MLExpansionHistory attribute. The MLA verifies and fully processes
      the signedAttributes in S1.  The MLA decides that there is not an
      original, received "outer" signedData layer since it finds the
      original content, but never finds an envelopedData and never finds
      an mlExpansionHistory attribute. The MLA calculates a new
      signedData layer, S2, resulting in the following message sent to
      the ML recipients: (S2(S1(Original Content))). The MLA includes an
      mlExpansionHistory attribute in S2.

   2) A message (S3(S2(S1(Original Content)))) is sent to the MLA in
      which none of the signedData layers includes an MLExpansionHistory
      attribute. The MLA verifies and fully processes the
      signedAttributes in S3, S2 and S1. The MLA decides that there is
      not an original, received "outer" signedData layer since it finds
      the original content, but never finds an envelopedData and never
      finds an mlExpansionHistory attribute. The MLA calculates a new
      signedData layer, S4, resulting in the following




Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 36]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


      message sent to the ML recipients:
      (S4(S3(S2(S1(Original Content))))). The MLA includes an
      mlExpansionHistory attribute in S4.

   3) A message (E1(S1(Original Content))) (where E = envelopedData) is
      sent to the MLA in which S1 does not include an MLExpansionHistory
      attribute.  The MLA decides that there is not an original,
      received "outer" signedData layer since it finds the E1 as the
      outer layer.  The MLA expands the recipientInformation in E1. The
      MLA calculates a new signedData layer, S2, resulting in the
      following message sent to the ML recipients:
      (S2(E1(S1(Original Content)))). The MLA includes an
      mlExpansionHistory attribute in S2.

   4) A message (S2(E1(S1(Original Content)))) is sent to the MLA in
      which S2 includes an MLExpansionHistory attribute. The MLA verifies
      the signature and fully processes the signedAttributes in S2. The
      MLA finds the mlExpansionHistory attribute in S2, so it decides
      that S2 is the "outer" signedData. The MLA remembers the
      signedAttributes included in S2 for later inclusion in the new
      outer signedData that it applies to the message. The MLA strips off
      S2. The MLA then expands the recipientInformation in E1 (this
      invalidates the signature in S2 which is why it was stripped). The
      nMLA calculates a new signedData layer, S3, resulting in the
      following message sent to the ML recipients: (S3(E1(S1(Original
      Content)))). The MLA includes in S3 the attributes from S2 (unless
      it specifically replaces an attribute value) including an updated
      mlExpansionHistory attribute.

   5) A message (S3(S2(E1(S1(Original Content))))) is sent to the MLA in
      which none of the signedData layers include an MLExpansionHistory
      attribute. The MLA verifies the signature and fully processes the
      signedAttributes in S3 and S2. When the MLA encounters E1, then it
      decides that S2 is the "outer" signedData since S2 encapsulates E1.
      The MLA remembers the signedAttributes included in S2 for later
      inclusion in the new outer signedData that it applies to the
      message.  The MLA strips off S3 and S2. The MLA then expands the
      recipientInformation in E1 (this invalidates the signatures in S3
      and S2 which is why they were stripped). The MLA calculates a new
      signedData layer, S4, resulting in the following message sent to
      the ML recipients: (S4(E1(S1(Original Content)))). The MLA
      includes in S4 the attributes from S2 (unless it specifically
      replaces an attribute value) and includes a new
      mlExpansionHistory attribute.

   6) A message (S3(S2(E1(S1(Original Content))))) is sent to the MLA in
      which S3 includes an MLExpansionHistory attribute. In this case,
      the MLA verifies the signature and fully processes the



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 37]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


      signedAttributes in S3. The MLA finds the mlExpansionHistory in S3,
      so it decides that S3 is the "outer" signedData. The MLA remembers
      the signedAttributes included in S3 for later inclusion in the new
      outer signedData that it applies to the message. The MLA keeps on
      parsing encapsulated layers because it must determine if there are
      any eSSSecurityLabel attributes contained within. The MLA verifies
      the signature and fully processes the signedAttributes in S2. When
      the MLA encounters E1, then it strips off S3 and S2. The MLA then
      expands the recipientInformation in E1 (this invalidates the
      signatures in S3 and S2 which is why they were stripped). The MLA
      calculates a new signedData layer, S4, resulting in the following
      message sent to the ML recipients: (S4(E1(S1(Original Content)))).
      The MLA includes in S4 the attributes from S3 (unless it
      specifically replaces an attribute value) including an updated
      mlExpansionHistory attribute.

4.2.3 Processing Choices

   The processing used depends on the type of the outermost layer of the
   message. There are three cases for the type of the outermost data:

    - EnvelopedData
    - SignedData
    - data

4.2.3.1 Processing for EnvelopedData

   1. The MLA locates its own RecipientInfo and uses the information it
      contains to obtain the message key.

   2. The MLA removes the existing recipientInfos field and replaces it
      with a new recipientInfos value built from RecipientInfo
   structures
      created for each member of the mailing list. The MLA also removes
      the existing originatorInfo field and replaces it with a new
      originatorInfo value built from information describing the MLA.

   3. The MLA encapsulates the expanded encrypted message in a
      SignedData block, adding an mlExpansionHistory attribute as
      described in the "Mail List Expansion" section to document the
      expansion.

   4. The MLA signs the new message and delivers the updated message to
      mail list members to complete MLA processing.







Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 38]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


4.2.3.2 Processing for SignedData

   MLA processing of multi-layer messages depends on the type of data in
   each of the layers. Step 3 below specifies that different processing
   will take place depending on the type of CMS message that has been
   signed. That is, it needs to know the type of data at the next inner
   layer, which may or may not be the innermost layer.

   1. The MLA verifies the signature value found in the outermost
      SignedData layer associated with the signed data. MLA
      processing of the message terminates if the message signature
      is invalid.

   2. If the outermost SignedData layer includes a signed
      mlExpansionHistory attribute, the MLA checks for an expansion loop
      as described in the "Detecting Mail List Expansion Loops" section,
      then go to step 3. If the outermost SignedData layer does not
      include a signed mlExpansionHistory attribute, the MLA signs the
      whole message (including this outermost SignedData layer that
      doesn't have an mlExpansionHistory attribute), and delivers the
      updated message to mail list members to complete MLA processing.

   3. Determine the type of the data that has been signed. That is, look
      at the type of data on the layer just below the SignedData, which
      may or may not be the "innermost" layer. Based on the type of data,
      perform either step 3.1 (EnvelopedData), step 3.2 (SignedData), or
      step 3.3 (all other types).

       3.1. If the signed data is EnvelopedData, the MLA performs
            expansion processing of the encrypted message as
            described previously. Note that this process invalidates the
            signature value in the outermost SignedData layer associated
            with the original encrypted message.  Proceed to section 3.2
            with the result of the expansion.

       3.2. If the signed data is SignedData, or is the result of
            expanding an EnvelopedData block in step 3.1:

           3.2.1. The MLA strips the existing outermost SignedData layer
                  after remembering the value of the mlExpansionHistory
                  and all other signed attributes in that layer, if
                  present.

           3.2.2.  If the signed data is EnvelopedData (from step 3.1),
                   the MLA encapsulates the expanded encrypted message
                   in a new outermost SignedData layer. On the other





Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 39]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


                   hand, if the signed data is SignedData (from step
                   3.2), the MLA encapsulates the signed data in a new
                   outermost SignedData layer.

           3.2.3.  The outermost signedData layer created by the MLA
                   replaces the original outermost signedData layer. The
                   MLA MUST create an signed attribute list for the new
                   outermost signedData layer which MUST include each
                   signed attribute present in the original outermost
                   signedData layer, unless the MLA explicitly replaces
                   one or more particular attributes with new value. A
                   special case is the mlExpansionHistory attribute. The
                   MLA MUST add an mlExpansionHistory signed attribute
                   to the outer signedData layer as follows:

               3.2.3.1. If the original outermost SignedData layer
                        included an mlExpansionHistory attribute, the
                        attribute's value is copied and updated with the
                        current ML expansion information as described in
                        the "Mail List Expansion" section.

               3.2.3.2. If the original outermost SignedData layer did
                        not include an mlExpansionHistory attribute, a
                        new attribute value is created with the current
                        ML expansion information as described in the
                        "Mail List Expansion" section.

       3.3. If the signed data is not EnvelopedData or SignedData:

           3.3.1.  The MLA encapsulates the received signedData object in
                   an outer SignedData object, and adds an
                   mlExpansionHistory attribute to the outer SignedData
                   object containing the current ML expansion information
                   as described in the "Mail List Expansion" section.

   4. The MLA signs the new message and delivers the updated message to
      mail list members to complete MLA processing.

   A flow chart for the above steps would be:

   1. Has a valid signature?
          YES -> 2.
          NO  -> STOP.
   2. Does outermost SignedData layer contain mlExpansionHistory?
          YES -> Check it, then -> 3.
          NO  -> Sign message (including outermost SignedData that
                 doesn't have mlExpansionHistory), deliver it, STOP.
   3. Check type of data just below outermost SignedData.



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 40]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


          EnvelopedData -> 3.1.
          SignedData -> 3.2.
          all others -> 3.3.
   3.1. Expand the encrypted message, then -> 3.2.
   3.2. -> 3.2.1.
   3.2.1. Strip outermost SignedData layer, note value of
          mlExpansionHistory and other signed attributes, then -> 3.2.2.
   3.2.2. Encapsulate in new signature, then -> 3.2.3.
   3.2.3. Create new signedData layer. Was there an old
          mlExpansionHistory?
          YES -> copy the old mlExpansionHistory values, then -> 4.
          NO  -> create new mlExpansionHistory value, then -> 4.
   3.3. Encapsulate in a SignedData layer and add an mlExpansionHistory
          attribute, then -> 4.
   4. Sign message, deliver it, STOP.

4.2.3.3 Processing for data

   1. The MLA encapsulates the message in a SignedData layer, and adds an
      mlExpansionHistory attribute containing the current ML expansion
      information as described in the "Mail List Expansion" section.

   2. The MLA signs the new message and delivers the updated message to
      mail list members to complete MLA processing.

   4.3 Mail List Agent Signed Receipt Policy Processing

   If a mailing list (B) is a member of another mailing list (A), list B
   often needs to propagate forward the mailing list receipt policy of
   A. As a general rule, a mailing list should be conservative in
   propagating forward the mailing list receipt policy because the
   ultimate recipient need only process the last item in the ML
   expansion history. The MLA builds the expansion history to meet this
   requirement.

















Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 41]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   The following table describes the outcome of the union of mailing
   list A's policy (the rows in the table) and mailing list B's policy
   (the columns in the table).

             |                    B's policy
A's policy   | none   insteadOf        inAdditionTo      missing
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
none         | none   none             none              none
insteadOf    | none   insteadOf(B)     *1                insteadOf(A)
inAdditionTo | none   insteadOf(B)     *2                inAdditionTo(A)
missing      | none   insteadOf(B)     inAdditionTo(B)   missing

*1 = insteadOf(insteadOf(A) + inAdditionTo(B))
*2 = inAdditionTo(inAdditionTo(A) + inAdditionTo(B))

4.4 Mail List Expansion History Syntax

   An mlExpansionHistory attribute value has ASN.1 type
   MLExpansionHistory. If there are more than ub-ml-expansion-history
   mailing lists in the sequence, the receiving agent should provide
   notification of the error to a human mail list administrator. The
   mail list administrator is responsible for correcting the overflow
   condition.

MLExpansionHistory ::= SEQUENCE
        SIZE (1..ub-ml-expansion-history) OF MLData

id-aa-mlExpandHistory OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 3}

ub-ml-expansion-history INTEGER ::= 64

   MLData contains the expansion history describing each MLA that has
   processed a message. As an MLA distributes a message to members of an
   ML, the MLA records its unique identifier, date and time of
   expansion, and receipt policy in an MLData structure.

MLData ::= SEQUENCE {
  mailListIdentifier EntityIdentifier,
  expansionTime GeneralizedTime,
  mlReceiptPolicy MLReceiptPolicy OPTIONAL }

EntityIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
  issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
  subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier }






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 42]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   The receipt policy of the ML can withdraw the originator's request
   for the return of a signed receipt. However, if the originator of the
   message has not requested a signed receipt, the MLA cannot request a
   signed receipt. In the event that a ML's signed receipt policy
   supersedes the originator's request for signed receipts, such that
   the originator will not receive any signed receipts, then the MLA MAY
   inform the originator of that fact.

   When present, the mlReceiptPolicy specifies a receipt policy that
   supersedes the originator's request for signed receipts. The policy
   can be one of three possibilities: receipts MUST NOT be returned
   (none); receipts should be returned to an alternate list of
   recipients, instead of to the originator (insteadOf); or receipts
   should be returned to a list of recipients in addition to the
   originator (inAdditionTo).

   MLReceiptPolicy ::= CHOICE {
     none [0] NULL,
     insteadOf [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames,
     inAdditionTo [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames }

5. Signing Certificate Attribute

   Concerns have been raised over the fact that the certificate which
   the signer of a CMS SignedData object desired to be bound into the
   verification process of the SignedData object is not
   cryptographically bound into the signature itself. This section
   addresses this issue by creating a new attribute to be placed in the
   signed attributes section of a SignerInfo object.

   This section also presents a description of a set of possible attacks
   dealing with the substitution of one certificate to verify the
   signature for the desired certificate. A set of ways for preventing
   or addressing these attacks is presented to deal with the simplest of
   the attacks.

   Authorization information can be used as part of a signature
   verification process. This information can be carried in either
   attribute certificates and other public key certificates. The signer
   needs to have the ability to restrict the set of certificates used in
   the signature verification process, and information needs to be
   encoded so that is covered by the signature on the SignedData object.
   The methods in this section allow for the set of authorization
   certificates to be listed as part of the signing certificate
   attribute.






Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 43]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   Explicit certificate policies can also be used as part of a signature
   verification process. If a signer desires to state an explicit
   certificate policy that should be used when validating the signature,
   that policy needs to be cryptographically bound into the signing
   process. The methods described in this section allows for a set of
   certificate policy statements to be listed as part of the signing
   certificate attribute.

5.1. Attack Descriptions

   At least three different attacks can be launched against a possible
   signature verification process by replacing the certificate or
   certficates used in the signature verification process.

5.1.1 Substitution Attack Description

   The first attack deals with simple substitution of one certificate
   for another certificate. In this attack, the issuer and serial number
   in the SignerInfo is modified to refer to a new certificate. This new
   certificate is used during the signature verification process.

   The first version of this attack is a simple denial of service attack
   where an invalid certificate is substituted for the valid
   certificate. This renders the message unverifiable, as the public key
   in the certificate no longer matches the private key used to sign the
   message.

   The second version is a substitution of one valid certificate for the
   original valid certificate where the public keys in the certificates
   match.  This allows the signature to be validated under potentially
   different certificate constraints than the originator of the message
   intended.

5.1.2 Reissue of Certificate Description

   The second attack deals with a certificate authority (CA) re-issuing
   the signing certificate (or potentially one of its certificates).
   This attack may start becoming more frequent as Certificate
   Authorities reissue their own root certificates, or as certificate
   authorities change policies in the certificate while reissuing their
   root certificates. This problem also occurs when cross certificates
   (with potentially different restrictions) are used in the process of
   verifying a signature.








Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 44]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


5.1.3 Rogue Duplicate CA Description

   The third attack deals with a rogue entity setting up a certificate
   authority that attempts to duplicate the structure of an existing CA.
   Specifically, the rogue entity issues a new certificate with the same
   public keys as the signer used, but signed by the rogue entity's
   private key.

5.2 Attack Responses

   This document does not attempt to solve all of the above attacks;
   however, a brief description of responses to each of the attacks is
   given in this section.

5.2.1 Substitution Attack Response

   The denial of service attack cannot be prevented. After the
   certificate identifier has been modified in transit, no verification
   of the signature is possible. There is also no way to automatically
   identify the attack because it is indistinguishable from a message
   corruption.

   The substitution of a valid certificate can be responded to in two
   different manners. The first is to make a blanket statement that the
   use of the same public key in two different certificates is bad
   practice and has to be avoided. In practice, there is no practical
   way to prevent users from getting new certificates with the same
   public keys, and it should be assumed that they will do this. Section
   5.4 provides a new attribute that can be included in the SignerInfo
   signed attributes. This binds the correct certificate identifier into
   the signature. This will convert the attack from a potentially
   successful one to simply a denial of service attack.

5.2.2 Reissue of Certificate Response

   A CA should never reissue a certificate with different attributes.
   Certificate Authorities that do so are following poor practices and
   cannot be relied on. Using the hash of the certificate as the
   reference to the certificate prevents this attack for end-entity
   certificates.

   Preventing the attack based on reissuing of CA certificates would
   require a substantial change to the usage of the signingCertificate
   attribute presented in section 5.4. It would require that ESSCertIDs
   would need to be included in the attribute to represent the issuer
   certificates in the signer's certification path. This presents
   problems when the relying party is using a cross-certificate as part
   of its authentication process, and this certificate does not appear



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 45]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   on the list of certificates. The problems outside of a closed PKI
   make the addition of this information prone to error, possibly
   causing the rejection of valid chains.

5.2.3 Rogue Duplicate CA Response

   The best method of preventing this attack is to avoid trusting the
   rogue CA. The use of the hash to identify certificates prevents the
   use of end-entity certificates from the rogue authority. However the
   only true way to prevent this attack is to never trust the rogue CA.

5.3 Related Signature Verification Context

   Some applications require that additional information be used as part
   of the signature validation process. In particular, authorization
   information from attribute certificates and other public key
   certificates or policy identifiers provide additional information
   about the abilities and intent of the signer. The signing certificate
   attribute described in Section 5.4 provides the ability to bind this
   context information as part of the signature.

5.3.1 Authorization Information

   Some applications require that authorization information found in
   attribute certificates and/or other public key certificates be
   validated. This validation requires that the application be able to
   find the correct certificates to perform the verification process;
   however there is no list of the certificates to used in a SignerInfo
   object. The sender has the ability to include a set of attribute
   certificates and public key certificates in a SignedData object. The
   receiver has the ability to retrieve attribute certificates and
   public key certificates from a directory service. There are some
   circumstances where the signer may wish to limit the set of
   certificates that may be used in verifying a signature. It is useful
   to be able to list the set of certificates the signer wants the
   recipient to use in validating the signature.

5.3.2 Policy Information

   A related aspect of the certificate binding is the issue of multiple
   certification paths. In some instances, the semantics of a
   certificate in its use with a message may depend on the Certificate
   Authorities and policies that apply. To address this issue, the
   signer may also wish to bind that context under the signature. While
   this could be done by either signing the complete certification path
   or a policy ID, only a binding for the policy ID is described here.





Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 46]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


5.4 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition

   The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
   substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
   of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature.

   The definition of SigningCertificate is

   SigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
       certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
       policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
   }

   id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
       member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 }

   The first certificate identified in the sequence of certificate
   identifiers MUST be the certificate used to verify the signature. The
   encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate SHOULD include the
   issuerSerial field. If other constraints ensure that
   issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in the SignerInfo, the
   issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The certificate identified is used
   during the signature verification process. If the hash of the
   certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the
   signature, the signature MUST be considered invalid.

   If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of
   ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of
   authorization certificates that are used during signature validation.
   Authorization certificates can be either attribute certificates or
   normal certificates. The issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertID
   structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates, unless the
   client who is validating the signature is expected to have easy
   access to all the certificates requred for validation. If only the
   signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no
   restrictions on the set of authorization certificates used in
   validating the signature.

   The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate
   policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under
   which the certificate should be relied upon. This value suggests a
   policy value to be used in the relying party's certification path
   validation.

   If present, the SigningCertificate attribute MUST be a signed
   attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines
   SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A SignerInfo MUST NOT include



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 47]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   multiple instances of the SigningCertificate attribute. CMS defines
   the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include attrValues SET
   OF AttributeValue. A SigningCertificate attribute MUST include only a
   single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST NOT be zero or multiple
   instances of AttributeValue present in the attrValues SET OF
   AttributeValue.

5.4.1 Certificate Identification

   The best way to identify certificates is an often-discussed issue.
   [CERT] has imposed a restriction for SignedData objects that the
   issuer DN must be present in all signing certificates. The
   issuer/serial number pair is therefore sufficient to identify the
   correct signing certificate. This information is already present, as
   part of the SignerInfo object, and duplication of this information
   would be unfortunate. A hash of the entire certificate serves the
   same function (allowing the receiver to verify that the same
   certificate is being used as when the message was signed), is
   smaller, and permits a detection of the simple substitution attacks.

   Attribute certificates and additional public key certificates
   containing authorization information do not have an issuer/serial
   number pair represented anywhere in a SignerInfo object. When an
   attribute certificate or an additional public key certificate is not
   included in the SignedData object, it becomes much more difficult to
   get the correct set of certificates based only on a hash of the
   certificate. For this reason, these certificates SHOULD be identified
   by the IssuerSerial object.

   This document defines a certificate identifier as:

   ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
        certHash                 Hash,
        issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
   }

   Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate

   IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
        issuer                   GeneralNames,
        serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
   }

   When creating an ESSCertID, the certHash is computed over the entire
   DER encoded certificate including the signature. The issuerSerial
   would normally be present unless the value can be inferred from other
   information.




Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 48]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   When encoding IssuerSerial, serialNumber is the serial number that
   uniquely identifies the certificate. For non-attribute certificates,
   the issuer MUST contain only the issuer name from the certificate
   encoded in the directoryName choice of GeneralNames. For attribute
   certificates, the issuer MUST contain the issuer name field from the
   attribute certificate.

6. Security Considerations

   All security considerations from [CMS] and [SMIME3] apply to
   applications that use procedures described in this document.

   As stated in Section 2.3, a recipient of a receipt request must not
   send back a reply if it cannot validate the signature. Similarly, if
   there conflicting receipt requests in a message, the recipient must
   not send back receipts, since an attacker may have inserted the
   conflicting request.  Sending a signed receipt to an unvalidated
   sender can expose information about the recipient that it may not
   want to expose to unknown senders.

   Senders of receipts should consider encrypting the receipts to
   prevent a passive attacker from gleaning information in the receipts.

   Senders must not rely on recipients' processing software to correctly
   process security labels. That is, the sender cannot assume that
   adding a security label to a message will prevent recipients from
   viewing messages the sender doesn't want them to view. It is expected
   that there will be many S/MIME clients that will not understand
   security labels but will still display a labelled message to a
   recipient.

   A receiving agent that processes security labels must handle the
   content of the messages carefully. If the agent decides not to show
   the message to the intended recipient after processing the security
   label, the agent must take care that the recipient does not
   accidentally see the content at a later time. For example, if an
   error response sent to the originator contains the content that was
   hidden from the recipient, and that error response bounces back to
   the sender due to addressing errors, the original recipient can
   possibly see the content since it is unlikely that the bounce message
   will have the proper security labels.

   A man-in-the-middle attack can cause a recipient to send receipts to
   an attacker if that attacker has a signature that can be validated by
   the recipient. The attack consists of intercepting the original
   message and adding a mLData attribute that says that a receipt should
   be sent to the attacker in addition to whoever else was going to get
   the receipt.



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 49]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   Mailing lists that encrypt their content may be targets for denial-
   of-service attacks if they do not use the mailing list management
   described in Section 4. Using simple RFC822 header spoofing, it is
   quite easy to subscribe one encrypted mailing list to another,
   thereby setting up an infinite loop.

   Mailing List Agents need to be aware that they can be used as oracles
   for the the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack described in [CMS].
   MLAs should notify an administrator if a large number of
   undecryptable messages are received.

   When verifying a signature using certificates that come with a [CMS]
   message, the recipient should only verify using certificates
   previously known to be valid, or certificates that have come from a
   signed SigningCertificate attribute. Otherwise, the attacks described
   in Section 5 can cause the receiver to possibly think a signature is
   valid when it is not.


































Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 50]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


A. ASN.1 Module

ExtendedSecurityServices
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
       pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) ess(2) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS

-- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
    ContentType, IssuerAndSerialNumber, SubjectKeyIdentifier
    FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
    rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms(1)}

-- PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Sec A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module,
--  1988 Syntax
    PolicyInformation FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7)id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}

-- X.509
    GeneralNames, CertificateSerialNumber FROM CertificateExtensions
    {joint-iso-ccitt ds(5) module(1) certificateExtensions(26) 0};


-- Extended Security Services

-- The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1
-- constructs in this module. A valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE can have zero or
-- more entries. The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the SEQUENCE to
-- have at least one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified.
-- Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their
-- environment.

UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
    -- The contents are formatted as described in [UTF8]

-- Section 2.7

ReceiptRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  receiptsFrom ReceiptsFrom,
  receiptsTo SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-receiptsTo) OF GeneralNames }

ub-receiptsTo INTEGER ::= 16




Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 51]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


id-aa-receiptRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 1}

ContentIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING

id-aa-contentIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 7}

ReceiptsFrom ::= CHOICE {
  allOrFirstTier [0] AllOrFirstTier,
  -- formerly "allOrNone [0]AllOrNone"
  receiptList [1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralNames }

AllOrFirstTier ::= INTEGER { -- Formerly AllOrNone
  allReceipts (0),
  firstTierRecipients (1) }


-- Section 2.8

Receipt ::= SEQUENCE {
  version ESSVersion,
  contentType ContentType,
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }

id-ct-receipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
   rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-ct(1) 1}

ESSVersion ::= INTEGER  { v1(1) }

-- Section 2.9

ContentHints ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentDescription UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) OPTIONAL,
  contentType ContentType }

id-aa-contentHint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
    rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 4}

-- Section 2.10

MsgSigDigest ::= OCTET STRING

id-aa-msgSigDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 5}

-- Section 2.11



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 52]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


ContentReference ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentType ContentType,
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }

id-aa-contentReference   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 10 }


-- Section 3.2

ESSSecurityLabel ::= SET {
  security-policy-identifier SecurityPolicyIdentifier,
  security-classification SecurityClassification OPTIONAL,
  privacy-mark ESSPrivacyMark OPTIONAL,
  security-categories SecurityCategories OPTIONAL }

id-aa-securityLabel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 2}

SecurityPolicyIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

SecurityClassification ::= INTEGER {
  unmarked (0),
  unclassified (1),
  restricted (2),
  confidential (3),
  secret (4),
  top-secret (5) } (0..ub-integer-options)

ub-integer-options INTEGER ::= 256

ESSPrivacyMark ::= CHOICE {
    pString      PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-privacy-mark-length)),
    utf8String   UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))
}

ub-privacy-mark-length INTEGER ::= 128

SecurityCategories ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-security-categories) OF
        SecurityCategory

ub-security-categories INTEGER ::= 64

SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
  type  [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type -- defined by type
}



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 53]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


--Note: The aforementioned SecurityCategory syntax produces identical
--hex encodings as the following SecurityCategory syntax that is
--documented in the X.411 specification:
--
--SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
--     type  [0]  SECURITY-CATEGORY,
--     value [1]  ANY DEFINED BY type }
--
--SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::=
--BEGIN
--TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty
--VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER)
--END

-- Section 3.4

EquivalentLabels ::= SEQUENCE OF ESSSecurityLabel

id-aa-equivalentLabels OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 9}


-- Section 4.4

MLExpansionHistory ::= SEQUENCE
        SIZE (1..ub-ml-expansion-history) OF MLData

id-aa-mlExpandHistory OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 3}

ub-ml-expansion-history INTEGER ::= 64

MLData ::= SEQUENCE {
  mailListIdentifier EntityIdentifier,
  expansionTime GeneralizedTime,
  mlReceiptPolicy MLReceiptPolicy OPTIONAL }

EntityIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
  issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
  subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier }

MLReceiptPolicy ::= CHOICE {
  none [0] NULL,
  insteadOf [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames,
  inAdditionTo [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames }


-- Section 5.4



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 54]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


SigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
    certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
    policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}

id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 }

ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
     certHash                 Hash,
     issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}

Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate

IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
     issuer                   GeneralNames,
     serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
}

END -- of ExtendedSecurityServices





























Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 55]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


B. References

   [ASN1-1988]  "Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract Syntax
                Notation One (ASN.1)".

   [ASN1-1994]  "Recommendation X.680: Specification of Abstract Syntax
                Notation One (ASN.1)".

   [CERT]       Ramsdell, B., Editor, "S/MIME Version 3 Certificate
                Handling", RFC 2632, June 1999.

   [CMS]        Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
                June 1999.

   [MSG]        Ramsdell, B., Editor, "S/MIME Version 3 Message
                Specification", RFC 2633, June 1999.

   [MUSTSHOULD] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [MSP4]       "Secure Data Network System (SDNS) Message Security
                Protocol (MSP) 4.0", Specification SDN.701, Revision A,
                1997-02-06.

   [MTSABS]     "1988 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Data
                Communication Networks Message Handling Systems: Message
                Transfer System:  Abstract Service Definition and
                Procedures, Volume VIII, Fascicle VIII.7, Recommendation
                X.411"; MTSAbstractService {joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6)
                mts(3) modules(0) mts-abstract-service(1)}

   [PKCS7-1.5]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax",
                RFC 2315, March 1998.

   [SMIME2]     Dusse, S., Hoffman, P., Ramsdell, B., Lundblade, L. and
                L.  Repka"S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification", RFC
                2311, March 1998, and Dusse, S., Hoffman, P. and B.
                Ramsdell,"S/MIME Version 2 Certificate Handling", RFC
                2312, March 1998.

   [UTF8]       Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
                10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.

C. Acknowledgments

   The first draft of this work was prepared by David Solo. John Pawling
   did a huge amount of very detailed revision work during the many
   phases of the document.



Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 56]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


   Many other people have contributed hard work to this memo, including:

   Andrew Farrell
   Bancroft Scott
   Bengt Ackzell
   Bill Flanigan
   Blake Ramsdell
   Carlisle Adams
   Darren Harter
   David Kemp
   Denis Pinkas
   Francois Rousseau
   Jim Schaad
   Russ Housley
   Scott Hollenbeck
   Steve Dusse

Editor's Address

   Paul Hoffman
   Internet Mail Consortium
   127 Segre Place
   Santa Cruz, CA  95060

   EMail: phoffman@imc.org


























Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 57]


RFC 2634         Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME         June 1999


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















Hoffman                     Standards Track                    [Page 58]