<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" category="std" docName="draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker-06" number="10097" ipr="trust200902" xml:lang="en" sortRefs="true" submissionType="IETF" consensus="true" updates="8630" obsoletes="" symRefs="true" tocInclude="true" prepTime="2026-11-18T22:24:06" indexInclude="true" scripts="Common,Latin" tocDepth="3">
  <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker-06" rel="prev"/>
  <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc10097" rel="alternate"/>
  <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate"/>
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Tiebreaking RPKI Trust Anchors">Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="10097" stream="IETF"/>
    <author fullname="Job Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders">
      <organization abbrev="BSD" showOnFrontPage="true">BSD Software Development</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <postalLine>Amsterdam</postalLine>
          <postalLine>The Netherlands</postalLine>
        </postal>
        <email>job@bsd.nl</email>
        <uri>https://www.bsd.nl</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Theo Buehler" initials="T." surname="Buehler">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">OpenBSD</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Switzerland</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tb@openbsd.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ties de Kock" initials="T." surname="de Kock">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RIPE NCC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <postalLine>Amsterdam</postalLine>
          <postalLine>The Netherlands</postalLine>
        </postal>
        <email>tdekock@ripe.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date month="11" year="2026"/>
    <area>OPS</area>
    <workgroup>sidrops</workgroup>
    <keyword>RPKI</keyword>
    <keyword>Routing Security</keyword>
    <keyword>BGP</keyword>
    <keyword>X.509</keyword>
    <abstract pn="section-abstract">
      <t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-1">
        A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate.
        Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same TA operator.
        This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path validation.
        This document updates RFC 8630.
      </t>
    </abstract>
    <boilerplate>
      <section anchor="status-of-memo" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-status-of-this-memo">Status of This Memo</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-1">
            This is an Internet Standards Track document.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-2">
            This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
            (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
            received public review and has been approved for publication by
            the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further
            information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of 
            RFC 7841.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-3">
            Information about the current status of this document, any
            errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
            <eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10097" brackets="none"/>.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="copyright" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-copyright-notice">Copyright Notice</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-1">
            Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
            document authors. All rights reserved.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-2">
            This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
            Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
            (<eref target="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info" brackets="none"/>) in effect on the date of
            publication of this document. Please review these documents
            carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
            respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
            document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
            Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
            warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
        </t>
      </section>
    </boilerplate>
    <toc>
      <section anchor="toc" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-toc.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-table-of-contents">Table of Contents</name>
        <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1">
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-introduction">Introduction</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1">
                <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2">
                <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="1.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-related-work">Related Work</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.2">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><xref derivedContent="2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-updates-to-rfc-8630">Updates to RFC 8630</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><xref derivedContent="4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><xref derivedContent="5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-normative-references">Normative References</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.b"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</xref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </toc>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="intro" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1">
      <name slugifiedName="name-introduction">Introduction</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-1">
        In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) hierarchical structure, a Trust Anchor (TA) is an authority for which trust is assumed and not derived.
        TA operators periodically reissue TA certificates to update the validity period (<xref target="RFC5280" section="4.1.2.5" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.5" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>), the Subject Information Access (SIA) extension (<xref target="RFC5280" section="4.2.2.2" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.2.2" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>), the Certificate Policies extension (<xref target="RFC5280" section="4.2.1.4" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.4" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>), and the Internet Number Resources (INRs) (<xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>).
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-2">
        Relying Parties (RPs) periodically fetch TA certificates from online locations and verify that the key of the self-signed certificate matches the key embedded in its associated Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) <xref target="RFC8630" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8630"/>.
        This transfer may happen via an unauthenticated channel, and the certificate is verified by checking that it is signed by the public key in the TAL.
        After retrieving a TA certificate, RPs have a choice between using a previously retrieved locally cached copy of the TA certificate and the newly retrieved instance of the TA certificate, provided that both certificates are valid.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-3">
        Periodic reissuance of TA certificates is a way of ensuring that the RPKI remains healthy at its root by avoiding ossification and retaining agility; consequently, RPs refetch the certificates to adopt changes in the TA's INR <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/> and SIA <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> extensions.
        In the past, some TA certificates were issued with unreasonably long validity periods: in some cases, up to a century.
        Since TA certificates are the root and, thus, have no Certificate Revocation List (CRL) <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> covering their own scope, TA operators cannot revoke previously issued TA certificates.
        This means that an on-path adversary or a caching network element could present RPs with an older instance of the TA certificate than the TA operator intends RPs to use.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-4">
        This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme for RPs, preferring:
      </t>
      <ol type="(%d)" spacing="normal" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-1-5">
        <li pn="section-1-5.1" derivedCounter="(1)">the "more recently" issued TA certificate,</li>
        <li pn="section-1-5.2" derivedCounter="(2)">the TA certificate with the shortest validity period among certificates with equal notBefore (<xref target="RFC6487" section="4.6.1" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6487#section-4.6.1" derivedContent="RFC6487"/>), and</li>
        <li pn="section-1-5.3" derivedCounter="(3)">the "most recently fetched" instance of the TA certificate among certificates with equal notBefore and equal notAfter (<xref target="RFC6487" section="4.6.2" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6487#section-4.6.2" derivedContent="RFC6487"/>).</li>
      </ol>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-6">
        This establishes a preorder over TA certificates issued by the same TA, permitting the issuance of a certificate that is preferred over any previous certificate.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-7">
       This document updates <xref target="RFC8630" section="3" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8630#section-3" derivedContent="RFC8630"/>.
      </t>
      <section anchor="reqs-lang" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-1">
          The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="Related" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-related-work">Related Work</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-1.2-1">
          It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "<xref target="RFC5280" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"/>" <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> and "<xref target="RFC6481" format="title" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure"/>" <xref target="RFC6481" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6481"/>.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="updates" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-2">
      <name slugifiedName="name-updates-to-rfc-8630">Updates to RFC 8630</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-1">The following text in <xref target="RFC8630" section="3" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8630#section-3" derivedContent="RFC8630"/> is replaced as follows:</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-2">OLD:</t>
      <blockquote pn="section-2-3">
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2-3.1">
          In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) TA, an RP <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>:
        </t>
        <ol indent="adaptive" spacing="normal" start="1" type="1" pn="section-2-3.2">
          <li pn="section-2-3.2.1" derivedCounter="1.">
            Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the TA URI(s) contained in the TAL.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-3.2.2" derivedCounter="2.">
            Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in <xref target="RFC6487" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6487"/>.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-3.2.3" derivedCounter="3.">
            Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in the retrieved object.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-3.2.4" derivedCounter="4.">
            Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self-signed CA certificate to be a TA.
            These tests apply to the validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI relating to all resources described in the INR extension(s) of this certificate.
          </li>
        </ol>
      </blockquote>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-4">NEW:</t>
      <blockquote pn="section-2-5">
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2-5.1">
          In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) TA, an RP <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:
        </t>
        <ol indent="adaptive" spacing="normal" start="1" type="1" pn="section-2-5.2">
          <li pn="section-2-5.2.1" derivedCounter="1.">
            Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the TA URI(s) contained in the TAL.
            If this step fails, use the locally cached copy of the TA referenced by the TAL previously retrieved.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-5.2.2" derivedCounter="2.">
            Confirm that the newly retrieved object is a current, validly self-signed RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in <xref target="RFC6487" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6487"/>.
            If this step fails, use the locally cached TA.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-5.2.3" derivedCounter="3.">
            Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in the newly retrieved putative TA.
            If the keys do not match, use the locally cached TA.
            If the keys match and there is no locally cached TA, use the newly retrieved TA.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-5.2.4" derivedCounter="4.">
            Check whether the newly retrieved TA has a more recent <tt>notBefore</tt> than the locally cached TA.
            If the <tt>notBefore</tt> of the newly retrieved TA is less recent, use the locally cached TA.
            If the <tt>notBefore</tt> of the newly retrieved TA is more recent, use the newly retrieved TA.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-5.2.5" derivedCounter="5.">
            If the <tt>notBefore</tt> dates are equal, check whether the newly retrieved TA has a shorter validity period than the locally cached TA.
            If the validity period of the newly retrieved TA is longer, use the locally cached TA.
            If the validity period of the newly retrieved TA is shorter, use the newly retrieved TA.
          </li>
          <li pn="section-2-5.2.6" derivedCounter="6.">
            If the validity periods are equal and the newly retrieved TA differs from the locally cached TA, use the newly retrieved TA.
            In the unlikely event that this step is reached, it seems most likely that the TA operator intended for RPs to use the TA that is currently published.
          </li>
        </ol>
      </blockquote>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-3">
      <name slugifiedName="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-1">
        When RPs inadvertently use a different instance of the TA certificate than that which the TA operator intended for RPs to use, the certification path validation process will yield an unexpected outcome.
        Some examples of unexpected outcomes are validation failures or replay attacks.
        Standardization of a tiebreaking scheme helps both RP and TA operators arrive at deterministic outcomes.
        The specified tiebreaking scheme prevents RPs from accepting a previous certificate presented by an on-path adversary in the presence of other TA certificate material.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4">
      <name slugifiedName="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-1">
        This document has no IANA actions.
      </t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references pn="section-5">
      <name slugifiedName="name-normative-references">Normative References</name>
      <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2119">
        <front>
          <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
          <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
          <date month="March" year="1997"/>
          <abstract>
            <t indent="0">In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC3779" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3779">
        <front>
          <title>X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers</title>
          <author fullname="C. Lynn" initials="C." surname="Lynn"/>
          <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
          <author fullname="K. Seo" initials="K." surname="Seo"/>
          <date month="June" year="2004"/>
          <abstract>
            <t indent="0">This document defines two X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of autonomous system identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and autonomous system identifiers contained in the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3779"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3779"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5280">
        <front>
          <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
          <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
          <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
          <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
          <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
          <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
          <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
          <date month="May" year="2008"/>
          <abstract>
            <t indent="0">This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6481" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6481">
        <front>
          <title>A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure</title>
          <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
          <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
          <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
          <date month="February" year="2012"/>
          <abstract>
            <t indent="0">This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6481"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6481"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6487" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6487">
        <front>
          <title>A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates</title>
          <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
          <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
          <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
          <date month="February" year="2012"/>
          <abstract>
            <t indent="0">This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6487"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6487"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8174">
        <front>
          <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
          <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
          <date month="May" year="2017"/>
          <abstract>
            <t indent="0">RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8630" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8630" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8630">
        <front>
          <title>Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator</title>
          <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
          <author fullname="S. Weiler" initials="S." surname="Weiler"/>
          <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
          <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
          <author fullname="T. Bruijnzeels" initials="T." surname="Bruijnzeels"/>
          <date month="August" year="2019"/>
          <abstract>
            <t indent="0">This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The TAL allows Relying Parties in the RPKI to download the current Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) certificate from one or more locations and verify that the key of this self-signed certificate matches the key on the TAL. Thus, Relying Parties can be configured with TA keys but can allow these TAs to change the content of their CA certificate. In particular, it allows TAs to change the set of IP Address Delegations and/or Autonomous System Identifier Delegations included in the extension(s) (RFC 3779) of their certificate.</t>
            <t indent="0">This document obsoletes the previous definition of the TAL as provided in RFC 7730 by adding support for Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) (RFC 3986) that use HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) (RFC 7230) as the scheme.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8630"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8630"/>
      </reference>
    </references>
    <section anchor="acknowledgements" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.a">
      <name slugifiedName="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-1">
        The authors wish to thank <contact fullname="Tim Bruijnzeels"/>,
        <contact fullname="George Michaelson"/>,
        <contact fullname="Tom Harrison"/>,
        <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/>,
        <contact fullname="Mohamed Boucadair"/>,
        <contact fullname="Christer Holmberg"/>,
        and
        <contact fullname="Mahesh Jethanandani"/>
        for their review and feedback.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="authors-addresses" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.b">
      <name slugifiedName="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</name>
      <author fullname="Job Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders">
        <organization abbrev="BSD" showOnFrontPage="true">BSD Software Development</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <postalLine>Amsterdam</postalLine>
            <postalLine>The Netherlands</postalLine>
          </postal>
          <email>job@bsd.nl</email>
          <uri>https://www.bsd.nl</uri>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Theo Buehler" initials="T." surname="Buehler">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">OpenBSD</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <country>Switzerland</country>
          </postal>
          <email>tb@openbsd.org</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Ties de Kock" initials="T." surname="de Kock">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RIPE NCC</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <postalLine>Amsterdam</postalLine>
            <postalLine>The Netherlands</postalLine>
          </postal>
          <email>tdekock@ripe.net</email>
        </address>
      </author>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
