RFC 9468: Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Sessionless Applications
- E. Chen,
- N. Shen,
- R. Raszuk,
- R. Rahman
Abstract
For operational simplification of "sessionless" applications using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), in this document, we present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that allow a BFD session to be initiated by only one side and established without explicit per-session configuration or registration by the other side (subject to certain per-interface or global policies).¶
We also introduce a new YANG module to configure and manage "unsolicited BFD". The YANG module in this document is based on YANG 1.1, as defined in RFC 7950, and conforms to the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA), as described in RFC 8342. This document augments RFC 9314.¶
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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1. Introduction
The current implementation and deployment practice for BFD ([RFC5880] and [RFC5881]) usually requires that BFD sessions be explicitly configured or registered on both sides. This requirement is not an issue when an application like BGP [RFC4271] has the concept of a "session" that involves both sides for its establishment. However, this requirement can be operationally challenging when the prerequisite "session" does not naturally exist between two endpoints in an application. Simultaneous configuration and coordination may be required on both sides for BFD to take effect. For example:¶
Clearly, it is beneficial and desirable to reduce or eliminate unnecessary configurations and coordination in these "sessionless" applications using BFD.¶
In this document, we present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that allow a BFD session to be initiated by only one side and established without explicit per-session configuration or registration by the other side (subject to certain per-interface or global policies).¶
Unsolicited BFD impacts only the initiation of BFD sessions. There is no change to all the other procedures specified in [RFC5880], such as, but not limited to, the Echo function and Demand mode.¶
With "unsolicited BFD", there is potential risk for excessive resource usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate such risks, several mechanisms are recommended in the Security Considerations section.¶
The procedure described in this document could be applied to BFD for multihop paths [RFC5883]. However, because of security risks, this document applies only to BFD for single IP hops [RFC5881].¶
Compared to the "Seamless BFD" [RFC7880], this proposal involves only minor procedural enhancements to the widely deployed BFD itself. Thus, we believe that this proposal is inherently simpler in the protocol itself and deployment. As an example, it does not require the exchange of BFD discriminators over an out-of-band channel before BFD session bring-up.¶
When BGP ADD-PATH [RFC7911] is deployed at an IXP using a Route Server, multiple BGP paths (when they exist) can be made available to the clients of the Route Server, as described in [RFC7947]. Unsolicited BFD can be used by BGP route selection's route resolvability condition (Section 9.1.2.1 of [RFC4271]) to exclude routes where the NEXT_HOP is not reachable using the procedures specified in this document.¶
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
2. Procedures for Unsolicited BFD
With "unsolicited BFD", one side takes the "Active role" and the other side takes the "Passive role", as described in [RFC5880], Section 6.1.¶
Passive unsolicited BFD support MUST be disabled by default and MUST require explicit configuration to be enabled. On the passive side, the following BFD parameters, from [RFC5880], Section 6.8.1, SHOULD be configurable:¶
The passive side MAY also choose to use the values of the parameters listed above that the active side uses in its BFD Control packets. However, the bfd.LocalDiscr value MUST be selected by the passive side to allow multiple unsolicited BFD sessions.¶
The active side starts sending the BFD Control packets, as specified in [RFC5880]. The passive side does not send BFD Control packets initially; it sends BFD Control packets only after it has received BFD Control packets from the active side.¶
When the passive side receives a BFD Control packet from the active side with 0 as "Your Discriminator" and does not find an existing BFD session, the passive side SHOULD create a matching BFD session toward the active side, unless not permitted by local configuration or policy.¶
When the passive side receives an incoming BFD Control packet on a numbered interface, the source address of that packet MUST belong to the subnet of the interface on which the BFD packet is received, else the BFD Control packet MUST NOT be processed.¶
The passive side MUST then start sending BFD Control packets and perform the necessary procedure for bringing up, maintaining, and tearing down the BFD session. If the BFD session fails to get established within a certain amount of time (which is implementation specific but has to be at least equal to the local failure detection time) or if an established BFD session goes down, the passive side MUST stop sending BFD Control packets and SHOULD delete the BFD session created until BFD Control packets are initiated by the active side again.¶
When an unsolicited BFD session goes down, an implementation may retain the session state for a period of time. Retaining this state can be useful for operational purposes.¶
3. State Variables
This document defines a new state variable called Role:¶
bfd.Role¶
This is the role of the local system during BFD session initialization, as per [RFC5880], Section 6.1. Possible values are Active or Passive.¶
4. YANG Data Model
This section extends the YANG data model for BFD [RFC9314]
to cover unsolicited BFD.
The new module imports the YANG modules described in [RFC8349]
since the "bfd" container in [RFC9314] is under
"control
4.1. Unsolicited BFD Hierarchy
Configuration for unsolicited BFD parameters for IP single-hop sessions can be done at 2 levels:¶
If configuration exists at both levels, per-interface configuration takes precedence over global configuration.¶
For operational data, a new "role" leaf node has been added for BFD IP single-hop sessions.¶
The tree diagram below uses the graphical representation of data models, as defined in [RFC8340].¶
4.2. Unsolicited BFD Module
4.3. Data Model Example
This section shows an example on how to configure the passive end of unsolicited BFD:¶
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered the following namespace URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:¶
- URI:
- urn
:ietf :params :xml :ns :yang :ietf -bfd -unsolicited¶ - Registrant Contact:
- The IESG.¶
- XML:
- N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.¶
IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020]:¶
6. Security Considerations
6.1. BFD Protocol Security Considerations
The same security considerations and protection measures as those described in [RFC5880] and [RFC5881] apply to this document. In addition, with "unsolicited BFD", there is potential risk for excessive resource usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate such risks, implementations of unsolicited BFD MUST:¶
6.2. BFD Protocol Authentication Considerations
Implementations of unsolicited BFD are RECOMMENDED to use BFD authentication; see [RFC5880]. If BFD authentication is used, the strongest BFD authentication mechanism that is supported MUST be used.¶
In some environments, such as IXPs, BFD authentication cannot be used because of the lack of coordination for the operation of the two endpoints of the BFD session.¶
In other environments, such as when BFD is used to track the next hop of static routes, it is possible to use BFD authentication. This comes with the extra cost of configuring matching key chains between the two endpoints.¶
6.3. YANG Module Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data
that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as
NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040].
The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the
mandatory
The Network Configuration Access Control Mode (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.¶
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable
- /routing
/control -plane -protocols /control -plane -protocol /bfd /ip -sh /unsolicited: -
- /routing
/control -plane -protocols /control -plane -protocol /bfd /ip -sh /interfaces /interface /unsolicited : -
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity
- /routing
/control -plane -protocols /control -plane -protocol /bfd /ip -sh /sessions /session /role : - Access to this information discloses the role of the local system in the creation of the unsolicited BFD session.¶
7. References
7.1. Normative References
- [RFC2119]
-
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC2119 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc2119 - [RFC3688]
-
Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC3688 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc3688 - [RFC5082]
-
Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C. Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC5082 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc5082 - [RFC5880]
-
Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC5880 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc5880 - [RFC5881]
-
Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC5881 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc5881 - [RFC6020]
-
Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC6020 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc6020 - [RFC6241]
-
Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC6241 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc6241 - [RFC6242]
-
Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC6242 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc6242 - [RFC8040]
-
Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8040 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8040 - [RFC8174]
-
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8174 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8174 - [RFC8340]
-
Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8340 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8340 - [RFC8341]
-
Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8341 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8341 - [RFC8349]
-
Lhotka, L., Lindem, A., and Y. Qu, "A YANG Data Model for Routing Management (NMDA Version)", RFC 8349, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8349 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8349 - [RFC8446]
-
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8446 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8446 - [RFC9314]
-
Jethanandani, M., Ed., Rahman, R., Ed., Zheng, L., Ed., Pallagatti, S., and G. Mirsky, "YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 9314, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC9314 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc9314
7.2. Informative References
- [RFC4271]
-
Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC4271 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc4271 - [RFC5883]
-
Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Multihop Paths", RFC 5883, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC5883 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc5883 - [RFC7880]
-
Pignataro, C., Ward, D., Akiya, N., Bhatia, M., and S. Pallagatti, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD)", RFC 7880, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC7880 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc7880 - [RFC7911]
-
Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder, "Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", RFC 7911, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC7911 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc7911 - [RFC7947]
-
Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC7947 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc7947 - [RFC8342]
-
Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8342 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8342
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Acee Lindem, Alvaro Retana, Dan Romascanu, Derek Atkins, Greg Mirsky, Gyan Mishra, Henning Rogge, Jeffrey Haas, John Scudder, Lars Eggert, Magnus Westerlund, Mahesh Jethanandani, Murray Kucherawy, Raj Chetan, Robert Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Tom Petch, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker for their reviews and valuable input.¶