RFC 9295: Clarifications for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 Algorithm Identifiers
- S. Turner,
- S. Josefsson,
- D. McCarney,
- T. Ito
Abstract
This document updates RFC 8410 to clarify existing semantics, and specify missing semantics, for key usage bits when used in certificates that support the Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 Elliptic Curve Cryptography algorithms.¶
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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1. Introduction
[RFC8410] specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public
Key Information field in certificates that support Ed25519, Ed448,
X25519, and X448 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithms. As part
of these semantics, it defines what combinations are permissible for the
values of the keyUsage extension [RFC5280]. [RFC8410] did not
define what values are not permissible, nor did it refer to
keyEncipherment or data
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
3. New Section 5 for RFC 8410
The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage certificate extension.¶
If the keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that indicates
id-X25519 or id-X448 in Subject
One of the following MAY also be present:¶
and any of the following MUST NOT be present:¶
If the keyUsage extension is present in an end-entity
certificate that indicates id-Ed25519 or id-Ed448 in
Subject
and any of the following MUST NOT be present:¶
If the keyUsage extension is present in a CRL issuer certificate that
indicates id-Ed25519 or id-Ed448 in Subject
and zero or more of the following:¶
and any of the following MUST NOT be present:¶
and if the CRL issuer is also a certification authority, then the keyUsage extension MUST also contain:¶
If the keyUsage extension is present in a certification authority
certificate that indicates id-Ed25519 or id-Ed448 in
Subject
and zero or more of the following:¶
and any of the following MUST NOT be present:¶
4. Security Considerations
This document introduces no new security considerations beyond those found in [RFC8410].¶
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.¶
6. References
6.1. Normative References
- [RFC2119]
-
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC2119 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc2119 - [RFC5280]
-
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC5280 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc5280 - [RFC8174]
-
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8174 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8174 - [RFC8410]
-
Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 8410, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8410 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8410
6.2. Informative References
- [Err5696]
-
RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5696, RFC 8410, <https://
www >..rfc -editor .org /errata /eid5696
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Russ Housley, Mike Jenkins, and Corey Bonnell for their comments.¶