RFC 8812: CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) and JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) Registrations for Web Authentication (WebAuthn) Algorithms
- M. Jones
Abstract
The W3C Web Authentication (WebAuthn) specification and the FIDO
Alliance FIDO2 Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) specification use
CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) algorithm identifiers. This
specification registers the following algorithms (which are used by
WebAuthn and CTAP implementations
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://
1. Introduction
This specification defines how to use several algorithms with
CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152]
that are used by implementations of the
W3C Web Authentication (WebAuthn) [WebAuthn]
and FIDO Alliance FIDO2 Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) [CTAP] specifications.
This specification registers these algorithms in
the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry [IANA
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
2. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 Signature Algorithm
The RSASSA
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. Implementations need to check that the key type is 'RSA' when creating or verifying a signature.¶
The RSASSA
Security considerations for use of the first three algorithms are in Section 5.2. Security considerations for use of the last algorithm are in Section 5.3.¶
Note that these algorithms are already present in the
IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry [IANA
3. Using secp256k1 with JOSE and COSE
This section defines algorithm encodings and representations enabling the Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) elliptic curve secp256k1 [SEC2] to be used for JOSE [RFC7515] and COSE [RFC8152] messages.¶
3.1. JOSE and COSE secp256k1 Curve Key Representations
The SECG elliptic curve secp256k1 [SEC2] is represented in a JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7517] using these values:¶
plus the values needed to represent the curve point, as defined in
Section 6.2.1 of [RFC7518]. As a
compressed point encoding representation is not defined for JWK
elliptic curve points, the uncompressed point encoding defined there
MUST be used. The x and y values
represented MUST both be exactly 256 bits, with any
leading zeros preserved. Other optional values such as alg
MAY also be present.¶
It is represented in a COSE_Key [RFC8152] using these values:¶
plus the values needed to represent the curve point, as defined in
Section 13.1.1 of [RFC8152].
Either the uncompressed or compressed point encoding representations
defined there can be used. The x value represented
MUST be exactly 256 bits, with any leading zeros
preserved. If the uncompressed representation is used, the
y value represented MUST likewise be exactly
256 bits, with any leading zeros preserved; if the compressed
representation is used, the y value is a boolean value, as
specified in Section 13.1.1 of [RFC8152]. Other optional values such as alg
(3) MAY also be present.¶
3.2. ECDSA Signature with secp256k1 Curve
The ECDSA signature algorithm is defined in [DSS]. This specification defines the ES256K
algorithm identifier, which is used to specify the use of ECDSA with
the secp256k1 curve and the SHA-256 [DSS] cryptographic hash function. Implementations
need to check that the key type is EC for JOSE or
EC2 (2) for COSE and that the curve of the key is secp256k1
when creating or verifying a signature.¶
The ECDSA secp256k1 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:¶
Implementations SHOULD use a deterministic algorithm
to generate the ECDSA nonce, k, such as the algorithm defined in
[RFC6979]. However, in situations
where devices are vulnerable to physical attacks, deterministic
ECDSA has been shown to be susceptible to fault injection attacks
[KUDELSKI17] [EURO-SP18]. Where this is a possibility,
implementations SHOULD implement appropriate
countermeasures
The ECDSA secp256k1 SHA-256 algorithm specified in this document uses these identifiers:¶
When using a JWK or COSE_Key for this algorithm, the following checks are made:¶
3.3. Other Uses of the secp256k1 Elliptic Curve
This specification defines how to use the secp256k1 curve for ECDSA
signatures for both JOSE and COSE implementations
When used for ECDSA, the secp256k1 curve MUST be used
only with the ES256K algorithm identifier and not any
others, including not with the COSE ES256 identifier. Note
that the ES256K algorithm identifier needed to be
introduced for JOSE to sign with the secp256k1 curve because the
JOSE ES256 algorithm is defined to be used only with the
P-256 curve. The COSE treatment of how to sign with secp256k1 is
intentionally parallel to that for JOSE, where the secp256k1 curve
MUST be used with the ES256K algorithm
identifier.¶
4. IANA Considerations
4.1. COSE Algorithms Registrations
IANA has registered the following values in the
"COSE Algorithms" registry [IANA
- Name:
- RS256¶
- Value:
- -257¶
- Description:
- RSASSA
-PKCS1 -v1 _5 using SHA-256¶ - Change Controller:
- IESG¶
- Reference:
- Section 2 of RFC 8812¶
- Recommended:
- No¶
- Name:
- RS384¶
- Value:
- -258¶
- Description:
- RSASSA
-PKCS1 -v1 _5 using SHA-384¶ - Change Controller:
- IESG¶
- Reference:
- Section 2 of RFC 8812¶
- Recommended:
- No¶
- Name:
- RS512¶
- Value:
- -259¶
- Description:
- RSASSA
-PKCS1 -v1 _5 using SHA-512¶ - Change Controller:
- IESG¶
- Reference:
- Section 2 of RFC 8812¶
- Recommended:
- No¶
4.2. COSE Elliptic Curves Registrations
IANA has registered the following value in the "COSE Elliptic Curves" registry [IANA.COSE.Curves].¶
4.3. JOSE Algorithms Registrations
IANA has registered the following value in the
"JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry [IANA
4.4. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curves Registrations
IANA has registered the following value in the "JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve" registry [IANA.JOSE.Curves].¶
5. Security Considerations
5.1. RSA Key Size Security Considerations
The security considerations on key sizes for RSA algorithms from Section 6.1 of [RFC8230] also apply to the RSA algorithms in this specification.¶
5.2. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-2 Security Considerations
The security considerations on the use of RSASSA
5.3. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-1 Security Considerations
The security considerations on the use of the SHA-1 hash function from [RFC6194] apply in this specification. For that reason, the "RS1" algorithm is registered as "Deprecated". Likewise, the exponent restrictions described in Section 8.3 of [RFC7518] also apply.¶
A COSE algorithm identifier for this algorithm is nonetheless being registered because deployed Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) continue to use it; therefore, WebAuthn implementations need a COSE algorithm identifier for "RS1" when TPM attestations using this algorithm are being represented. New COSE applications and protocols MUST NOT use this algorithm.¶
5.4. secp256k1 Security Considerations
Care should be taken that a secp256k1 key is not mistaken for a P-256 [RFC7518] key,
given that their representations are the same
except for the crv value.
As described in Section 8.1.1 of [RFC8152],
we currently do not have any way to deal with this
attack except to restrict the set of curves that can be used.¶
The procedures and security considerations described in the [SEC1], [SEC2], and [DSS] specifications apply to implementations of this specification.¶
Timing side-channel attacks are possible if the implementation of scalar multiplication over the curve does not execute in constant time.¶
There are theoretical weaknesses with this curve that could result in future attacks. While these potential weaknesses are not unique to this curve, they are the reason that this curve is registered as "Recommended: No".¶
6. References
6.1. Normative References
- [DSS]
-
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, DOI 10
.6028 , , <https:///NIST .FIPS .186 -4 doi >..org /10 .6028 /NIST .FIPS .186 -4 - [RFC2119]
-
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC2119 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc2119 - [RFC6194]
-
Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC6194 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc6194 - [RFC7515]
-
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC7515 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc7515 - [RFC7517]
-
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC7517 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc7517 - [RFC7518]
-
Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC7518 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc7518 - [RFC8017]
-
Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", RFC 8017, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8017 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8017 - [RFC8152]
-
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 8152, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8152 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8152 - [RFC8174]
-
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8174 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8174 - [RFC8230]
-
Jones, M., "Using RSA Algorithms with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Messages", RFC 8230, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8230 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8230 - [SEC1]
-
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, , <https://
www >..secg .org /sec1 -v2 .pdf - [SEC2]
-
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", Version 2.0, , <https://
www >..secg .org /sec2 -v2 .pdf
6.2. Informative References
- [CTAP]
-
Brand, C., Czeskis, A., Ehrensvärd, J., Jones, M., Kumar, A., Lindemann, R., Powers, A., and J. Verrept, "Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)", FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard, , <https://
fidoalliance >..org /specs /fido -v2 .0 -ps -20190130 /fido -client -to -authenticator -protocol -v2 .0 -ps -20190130 .html - [EURO-SP18]
-
Poddebniak, D., Somorovsky, J., Schinzel, S., Lochter, M., and P. Rösler, "Attacking Deterministic Signature Schemes using Fault Attacks", 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
, DOI 10
.1109 , , <https:///Euro SP .2018 .00031 ieeexplore >..ieee .org /document /8406609 - [IANA
.COSE .Algorithms] -
IANA, "COSE Algorithms", <https://
www >..iana .org /assignments /cose - [IANA
.COSE .Curves] -
IANA, "COSE Elliptic Curves", <https://
www >..iana .org /assignments /cose - [IANA
.JOSE .Algorithms] -
IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms", <https://
www >..iana .org /assignments /jose - [IANA
.JOSE .Curves] -
IANA, "JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve", <https://
www >..iana .org /assignments /jose - [KUDELSKI17]
-
Romailler, Y., "How to Defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA Using Faults", Kudelski Security Research, , <https://
research >..kudelskisecurit y .com /2017 /10 /04 /defeating -eddsa -with -faults / - [RFC6979]
-
Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC6979 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc6979 - [WebAuthn]
-
Balfanz, D., Czeskis, A., Hodges, J., Jones, J.C., Jones, M., Kumar, A., Liao, A., Lindemann, R., and E. Lundberg, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 1", W3C Recommendation, , <https://
www >..w3 .org /TR /2019 /REC -webauthn -1 -20190304 /
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Roman Danyliw, Linda Dunbar, Stephen Farrell, John Fontana, Jeff Hodges, Kevin Jacobs, J.C. Jones, Benjamin Kaduk, Murray Kucherawy, Neil Madden, John Mattsson, Matthew Miller, Tony Nadalin, Matt Palmer, Eric Rescorla, Rich Salz, Jim Schaad, Goeran Selander, Wendy Seltzer, Sean Turner, and Samuel Weiler for their roles in registering these algorithm identifiers.¶