Found 3 records.

Status: Verified (3)

RFC 6487, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", February 2012

Note: This RFC has been updated by RFC 7318, RFC 8209

Errata ID: 3205
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: David Mandelberg
Date Reported: 2012-04-27
Verifier Name: Stewart Bryant
Date Verified: 2013-09-19

Section 5 says:

   An RPKI CA MUST include the two extensions, Authority Key Identifier
   and CRL Number, in every CRL that it issues.  RPs MUST be prepared to
   process CRLs with these extensions.  No other CRL extensions are
   allowed.

It should say:

   An RPKI CA MUST include the two extensions, Authority Key Identifier
   and CRL Number, in every CRL that it issues.  RPs MUST be prepared to
   process CRLs with these extensions.  No other CRL extensions are
   allowed. The extensions mentioned above MUST NOT appear more than 
   once each.

Notes:

The clarification:

"The extensions mentioned above MUST NOT appear more than once each."

is added.

Errata ID: 3238
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Stephen Kent
Date Reported: 2012-05-31
Verifier Name: Stewart Bryant
Date Verified: 2013-01-11

Section 6.3 says:

 ExtendedKeyUsage
         The CA MAY honor ExtendedKeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and
         cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the
         BasicConstraints SubjectType sub-field, when specified.

It should say:

 ExtendedKeyUsage
         The CA MAY honor ExtendedKeyUsage extensions in requests for EE
         certificates that are issued to routers or other devices, consistent with values
         specified in Standards Track RFCs that adopt this profile and that identify
         application-specific requirements that motivate the use of such EKUs.

Notes:

The current text appears to be the result of a "cut and paste" error. It is essentially identical to the text
for the Key Usage extension, and names two fields that appear in that extension, not in an EKU extension. The text I propose above parallels what appears in Section 4.8.5, which describes how an
EKU MAY be used in RPKI certificates.

Errata ID: 4080
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Sean Turner
Date Reported: 2014-08-12
Verifier Name: Alia Atlas
Date Verified: 2014-12-04

Section 6.1.1 says:

This field MAY be omitted.  If present, the value of this field
SHOULD be empty (i.e., NULL), in which case the CA MUST
generate a subject name that is unique in the context of
certificates issued by this CA.  This field is allowed to be
non-empty only for a re-key/reissuance request, and only if the
CA has adopted a policy (in its Certificate Practice Statement
(CPS)) that permits reuse of names in these circumstances.

It should say:

This field
SHOULD be empty (i.e., NULL), in which case the CA MUST
generate a subject name that is unique in the context of
certificates issued by this CA.  This field is allowed to be
non-empty only for a re-key/reissuance request, and only if the
CA has adopted a policy (in its Certificate Practice Statement
(CPS)) that permits reuse of names in these circumstances.

Notes:

Submitted after consultation with the responsible AD and WG chairs.

The subject field included in the PKCS#10 request can't be omitted because the ASN.1 in RFC 2986 doesn’t allow subject to be omitted - there’s no “OPTIONAL” in the ASN.1:

CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1,...),
subject Name,
subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo{{ PKInfoAlgorithms }},
attributes [0] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }}
}

In other words, four fields are included in every certificate request. If there’s no subject field it’s a NULL (see RFC5280 for omitting subjects) and if there’s no attributes it’s an empty sequence. version and subjectPKInfo (subject public key information) are always present.

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