Found 2 records.

Status: Reported (2)

RFC 9421, "HTTP Message Signatures", February 2024

Errata ID: 8102
Status: Reported
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Takahiko Kawasaki
Date Reported: 2024-09-15

Section 7.2.8 says:

"@status": 200
"content-digest": \
  sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
"@signature-input": ("@status" "content-digest")

It should say:

"@status": 200
"content-digest": \
  sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
"@signature-params": ("@status" "content-digest")

Notes:

"@signature-input" should be changed to "@signature-params".

Errata ID: 8103
Status: Reported
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Takahiko Kawasaki
Date Reported: 2024-09-15

Section 7.5.3 says:

Several parts of this specification rely on the parsing of Structured
Field values [STRUCTURED-FIELDS] -- in particular, strict
serialization of HTTP Structured Field values (Section 2.1.1),
referencing members of a Dictionary Structured Field (Section 2.1.2),
and processing the @signature-input value when verifying a signature
(Section 3.2).  While Structured Field values are designed to be
relatively simple to parse, a naive or broken implementation of such
a parser could lead to subtle attack surfaces being exposed in the
implementation.

For example, if a buggy parser of the @signature-input value does not
enforce proper closing of quotes around string values within the list
of component identifiers, an attacker could take advantage of this
and inject additional content into the signature base through
manipulating the Signature-Input field value on a message.

It should say:

Several parts of this specification rely on the parsing of Structured
Field values [STRUCTURED-FIELDS] -- in particular, strict
serialization of HTTP Structured Field values (Section 2.1.1),
referencing members of a Dictionary Structured Field (Section 2.1.2),
and processing the @signature-params value when verifying a signature
(Section 3.2).  While Structured Field values are designed to be
relatively simple to parse, a naive or broken implementation of such
a parser could lead to subtle attack surfaces being exposed in the
implementation.

For example, if a buggy parser of the @signature-params value does not
enforce proper closing of quotes around string values within the list
of component identifiers, an attacker could take advantage of this
and inject additional content into the signature base through
manipulating the Signature-Input field value on a message.

Notes:

"@signature-input" should be changed to "@signature-params". There is one such error in both the first and second paragraphs of Section 7.5.3.

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