RFC Errata
Found 7 records.
Status: Verified (1)
RFC 6090, "Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", February 2011
Source of RFC: IETF - NON WORKING GROUPArea Assignment: sec
Errata ID: 3920
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Watson Ladd
Date Reported: 2014-03-15
Verifier Name: Kathleen Moriarty
Date Verified: 2014-07-01
Section Appendix F says:
Then, the product P3=(X3,Y3,Z3) = P1 * P2 is given by:
if P1 is the point at infinity,
P3 = P2
else if P2 is the point at infinity,
P3 = P1
else if u is not equal to 0 but v is equal to 0,
P3 = (0,1,0)
else if both u and v are not equal to 0,
X3 = v * (Z2 * (Z1 * u^2 - 2 * X1 * v^2) - v^3)
Y3 = Z2 * (3 * X1 * u * v^2 - Y1 * v^3 - Z1 * u^3) + u * v^3
Z3 = v^3 * Z1 * Z2
else // P2 equals P1, P3 = P1 * P1
w = 3 * X1^2 + a * Z1^2
X3 = 2 * Y1 * Z1 * (w^2 - 8 * X1 * Y1^2 * Z1)
Y3 = 4 * Y1^2 * Z1 * (3 * w * X1 - 2 * Y1^2 * Z1) - w^3
Z3 = 8 * (Y1 * Z1)^3
It should say:
Then, the product P3=(X3,Y3,Z3) = P1 * P2 is given by:
if P1 is the point at infinity,
P3 = P2
else if P2 is the point at infinity,
P3 = P1
else if P1=-P2 as projective points
P3 = (0,1,0)
else if P1 does not equal P2
X3 = v * (Z2 * (Z1 * u^2 - 2 * X1 * v^2) - v^3)
Y3 = Z2 * (3 * X1 * u * v^2 - Y1 * v^3 - Z1 * u^3) + u * v^3
Z3 = v^3 * Z1 * Z2
else // P2 equals P1, P3 = P1 * P1
w = 3 * X1^2 + a * Z1^2
X3 = 2 * Y1 * Z1 * (w^2 - 8 * X1 * Y1^2 * Z1)
Y3 = 4 * Y1^2 * Z1 * (3 * w * X1 - 2 * Y1^2 * Z1) - w^3
Z3 = 8 * (Y1 * Z1)^3
Notes:
The original algorithm was wrong and produces incorrect answers. There are several fixes that could take place.
Status: Reported (1)
RFC 6090, "Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", February 2011
Source of RFC: IETF - NON WORKING GROUPArea Assignment: sec
Errata ID: 6329
Status: Reported
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Yannik Klubertanz
Date Reported: 2020-11-06
Section F.1. says:
if P is (@,@),
R = Q
else if Q is (@,@),
R = P
else if P is not equal to Q and x1 is equal to x2,
R = (@,@)
else if P is not equal to Q and x1 is not equal to x2,
x3 = ((y2-y1)/(x2-x1))^2 - x1 - x2 mod p and
y3 = (x1-x3)*(y2-y1)/(x2-x1) - y1 mod p
else if P is equal to Q and y1 is equal to 0,
R = (@,@)
else // P is equal to Q and y1 is not equal to 0
x3 = ((3*x1^2 + a)/(2*y1))^2 - 2*x1 mod p and
y3 = (x1-x3)*(3*x1^2 + a)/(2*y1) - y mod p.
It should say:
if P is (@,@),
R = Q
else if Q is (@,@),
R = P
else if P is not equal to Q and x1 is equal to x2,
R = (@,@)
else if P is not equal to Q and x1 is not equal to x2,
x3 = ((y2-y1)/(x2-x1))^2 - x1 - x2 mod p and
y3 = (x1-x3)*(y2-y1)/(x2-x1) - y1 mod p
else if P is equal to Q and y1 is equal to 0,
R = (@,@)
else // P is equal to Q and y1 is not equal to 0
x3 = ((3*x1^2 + a)/(2*y1))^2 - 2*x1 mod p and
y3 = (x1-x3)*(3*x1^2 + a)/(2*y1) - y1 mod p.
Notes:
In the last case in the pseudocode, there's a typo. It should be "y1" mod p instead of "y mod p".
Status: Held for Document Update (5)
RFC 6090, "Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", February 2011
Source of RFC: IETF - NON WORKING GROUPArea Assignment: sec
Errata ID: 2777
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Annie Yousar
Date Reported: 2011-04-11
Held for Document Update by: Sean Turner
Section 7.2 says:
KT-I is mathematically and functionally equivalent to ECDSA, and can interoperate with the IEEE [P1363] and ANSI [X9.62] standards for Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) based on fields of characteristic greater than three. KT-I signatures can be verified using the ECDSA verification algorithm, and ECDSA signatures can be verified using the KT-I verification algorithm.
It should say:
For many hash functions KT-I is mathematically and functionally equivalent to ECDSA, and can interoperate with the IEEE [P1363] and ANSI [X9.62] standards for Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) based on fields of characteristic greater than three. KT-I signatures can be verified using the ECDSA verification algorithm, and ECDSA signatures can be verified using the KT-I verification algorithm (refer to Section 10.4).
Notes:
If the hash function h generates a bit string that has a bit length greater than the bit length of the elliptic curve group order, ECDSA as specified in P1363 uses a truncation of the hash value to the left-most bits. The KT-I algorithm does not use this truncation but reduces modulo q. Therefore ECDSA and KT-I with SHA-384 on the P-256 curve result in different signature values. Add a corresponding note in 10.4: The output of the hash used in KT signatures should truncated to the left-most bits if its bit-length is longer than the bit-length of the group order.
Errata ID: 2773
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Annie Yousar
Date Reported: 2011-04-11
Held for Document Update by: Sean Turner
Section 2.2 says:
Sometimes an alternative called additive notation is used, in which a * b is denoted as a + b, and a^N is denoted as N * a.
It should say:
Sometimes an alternative called additive notation is used, in which a * b is denoted as a + b, and a^N is denoted as Na.
Notes:
The original text refers to Appendix E some sentences later:
"Appendix E elucidates the correspondence between the two notations."
In the Appendix E the notation "Na" is used, whereas the original text uses the notation "N*a".
Errata ID: 2774
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Annie Yousar
Date Reported: 2011-04-11
Held for Document Update by: Sean Turner
Section 2.2 says:
By convention, a^0 is equal to the identity element for any a in G.
It should say:
By convention, a^0 is equal to the identity element and a^1 is equal to a itself for any a in G.
Notes:
Without this convention the explanation on the next page: "... for any integers X and Y: a^(X+Y) = (a^X)*(a^Y) ..." would be incomplete, as being undefined for the integers X=1 and/or Y=1.
Errata ID: 2775
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Annie Yousar
Date Reported: 2011-04-11
Held for Document Update by: Sean Turner
Section 2.2 says:
Note that a^M is equal to g^(M modulo R) for any non-negative integer M.
It should say:
Note that a^M is equal to a^(M mod R) for any non-negative integer M.
Notes:
g is a typo. The result of the modulo operation is always denoted in the text by "mod". The notation "modulo" identifies the operation and not the result.
Errata ID: 2776
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Annie Yousar
Date Reported: 2011-04-11
Held for Document Update by: Sean Turner
Section 6.2 says:
The integer x shall be converted to an octet string S of length k as follows. The string S shall satisfy
k
y = SUM 2^(8(k-i)) Si .
i = 1
It should say:
The integer y shall be converted to an octet string S of length k as follows. The string S shall satisfy
k
y = SUM 2^(8(k-i)) Si .
i = 1
Note that the conversion fails if y >= 2^(8*k).
Notes:
Typo corrected. The integer y can not be converted, if the octet string is to short.