RFC Errata
Found 5 records.
Status: Verified (4)
RFC 5008, "Suite B in Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)", September 2007
Note: This RFC has been obsoleted by RFC 6318
Source of RFC: IETF - NON WORKING GROUPArea Assignment: sec
Errata ID: 1729
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Sean Turner
Date Reported: 2009-03-16
Verifier Name: Russ Housley
Date Verified: 2010-04-08
Section 4.1 says:
originator MUST be the originatorKey alternative. The
originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
object identifier (see Section 3) with NULL parameters. The
originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the message
originator's ephemeral public key, which is a DER-encoded ECPoint
(see Section 3). The ECPoint SHOULD be represented in
uncompressed form.
It should say:
originator MUST be the originatorKey alternative. The
originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
object identifier (see Section 3). The parameters associated
with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The
parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or
ECParameters, and NULL is allowed to support legacy implementations.
The originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the message
originator's ephemeral public key, which is a DER-encoded ECPoint
(see Section 3). The ECPoint SHOULD be represented in uncompressed
form.
Notes:
This change aligns RFC 5008 with the draft-ietf-smime-3278bis. The correct parameters for id-ecPublicKey is either absent or ECParameters not NULL. Retained NULL for backwards compatibility.
Errata ID: 1902
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Sean Turner
Date Reported: 2009-10-05
Verifier Name: Russ Housley
Date Verified: 2010-04-08
Section 4.3 says:
keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
algorithm that will be used to wrap the content-encryption key and
NULL parameters. In Suite B, Security Level 1, AES-128 Key Wrap
MUST be used, resulting in {id-aes128-wrap, NULL}. In Suite B,
Security Level 2, AES-256 Key Wrap MUST be used, resulting in
{id-aes256-wrap, NULL}.
It should say:
keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
algorithm that will be used to wrap the content-encryption key and
absent parameters. In Suite B, Security Level 1, AES-128 Key Wrap
MUST be used, resulting in {id-aes128-wrap}. In Suite B,
Security Level 2, AES-256 Key Wrap MUST be used, resulting in
{id-aes256-wrap}.
Notes:
Parameters for AES-* Key Wrap MUST be absent according to RFC 3565.
Errata ID: 2060
Status: Verified
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Sean Turner
Date Reported: 2010-03-03
Verifier Name: Russ Housley
Date Verified: 2010-04-08
Section 2 says:
2. SHA-256 and SHA-256
It should say:
2. SHA-256 and SHA-384
Notes:
The title should reflect SHA-384 as the other hash algorithm.
Errata ID: 4477
Status: Verified
Type: Editorial
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: poima fuimaono
Date Reported: 2015-09-19
Verifier Name: Stephen Farrell
Date Verified: 2015-09-19
Section 2 says:
SHA-256 and SHA-256
It should say:
SHA-256 and SHA-384
Notes:
SHA-384 as other has algorithm
Status: Rejected (1)
RFC 5008, "Suite B in Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)", September 2007
Note: This RFC has been obsoleted by RFC 6318
Source of RFC: IETF - NON WORKING GROUPArea Assignment: sec
Errata ID: 1023
Status: Rejected
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT
Reported By: Alfred Hoenes
Date Reported: 2007-09-18
Rejected by: Russ Housley
Date Rejected: 2007-09-18
(1) Section 3 (nit)
In the first sentence of Section 3 (on page 3), the acronym expansion
performed should better have been accompanied by the insertion of the
definite article.
The RFC says:
This section specifies the conventions employed by implementations
| that support Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The
direction set by RFC 3278 [CMSECC] is followed, but additional
message digest algorithms and additional elliptic curves are
employed. [...]
It should perhaps better say:
This section specifies the conventions employed by implementations
| that support the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
The direction set by RFC 3278 [CMSECC] is followed, but additional
message digest algorithms and additional elliptic curves are
employed. [...]
(2) Section 4.3 -- imprecise text, danger of ambiguity / confusion
In Section 4.3, near the bottom of page 9, a new paragraph has been
inserted in the part describing the [SEC1] KDF in general:
To generate a key-encryption key, one or more KM blocks are
generated, incrementing Counter appropriately, until enough material
has been generated. The KM blocks are concatenated left to right:
KEK = KM ( counter=1 ) || KM ( counter=2 ) ...
But near the end of Section 4.3, on mid-page 10, the original text
from the draft has been left unchanged:
| To generate a key-encryption key, one KM block is generated, with a
Counter value of 0x00000001:
KEK = KM ( 1 ) = Hash ( Z || Counter=1 || ECC-CMS-SharedInfo )
These two different, but very similar statements might well lead to
confusion.
As already indicated above, apparently the former text shall describe
the [SEC1] KDF in general, and the latter is intended to describe the
restricted particular use of that KDF in the context of S/MIME.
Therefore, the RFC should perhaps better have stated, in place of
the latter text:
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv
| To generate a key-encryption key for Suite B in S/MIME, one KM block
is generated, with a Counter value of 0x00000001:
KEK = KM ( 1 ) = Hash ( Z || Counter=1 || ECC-CMS-SharedInfo )
________
Note:
It might have been even more suitable to have that text be moved up,
making it part of the indented explanation of the 'Counter' element
(2nd paragraph on page 10), where it could have been kept shorter:
Counter is a 32-bit unsigned number, represented in network byte
order. Its initial value MUST be 0x00000001 for any key
derivation operation. In Suite B, Security Level 1 and Security
Level 2, exactly one iteration is needed; the Counter is not
| incremented; i.e., one KM block is generated, with a Counter value
| of 0x00000001:
|
| KEK = KM ( 1 ) = Hash ( Z || Counter=1 || ECC-CMS-SharedInfo )
________
As a minimally invasive change, I recommend posting the above
clarification (or any proper alternate text of your choice)
as an RFC Errata Note.
It should say:
-
Notes:
---VERIFIER NOTE---
Thanks for the careful review. I do not believe that these are worth the effort for an errata.