RFC 8708, "Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", February 2020

Note: This RFC has been obsoleted by RFC 9708

Errata ID: 7960
Status: Verified
Type: Technical
Publication Format(s) : TEXT, PDF, HTML
Reported By: Russ Housley
Date Reported: 2024-05-28
Verifier Name: Deb Cooley
Date Verified: 2024-05-28

Section Appendix A says:

   pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
       KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey
       PARAMS ARE absent
       CERT-KEY-USAGE
           { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }

It should say:

   pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
       -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
       PARAMS ARE absent
       CERT-KEY-USAGE
           { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }

Notes:

At the time RFC 8708 was published, we did not think anyone would put an HSS/LMS public key in a certificate. We thought the public key would always be distributed by some other means. We now know that some people plan to put an HSS/LMS public key in a certificate. This part of the ASN.1 module does not come into play when using HSS/LMS in the CMS, but we want it to be consistent with the yet-to-be-published document that describes the conventions for an HSS/LMS public key in a certificate. IETF Hackathon experience shows that no ASN.1 wrapping for the public key is the way forward.

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