Abstract

This document specifies additions and amendments to RFC 4462. It defines a new key exchange method that uses SHA-2 for integrity and deprecates weak Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups. The purpose of this specification is to modernize the cryptographic primitives used by Generic Security Service (GSS) key exchanges.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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1. Introduction

Secure Shell (SSH) Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) methods [RFC4462] allow the use of GSS-API [RFC2743] for authentication and key exchange in SSH. [RFC4462] defines three exchange methods all based on DH groups and SHA-1. This document updates [RFC4462] with new methods intended to support environments that desire to use the SHA-2 cryptographic hash functions.
2. **Rationale**

Due to security concerns with SHA-1 [RFC6194] and with modular exponentiation (MODP) groups with less than 2048 bits [NIST-SP-800-131Ar2], we propose the use of hashes based on SHA-2 [RFC6234] with DH group14, group15, group16, group17, and group18 [RFC3526]. Additionally, we add support for key exchange based on Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with the NIST P-256, P-384, and P-521 [SEC2v2], as well as the X25519 and X448 [RFC7748] curves. Following the practice of [RFC8268], only SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes are used for DH groups. For NIST curves, the same curve-to-hashing algorithm pairing used in [RFC5656] is adopted for consistency.

3. **Document Conventions**

The key words "**MUST**", "**MUST NOT**", "**REQUIRED**", "**SHALL**", "**SHALL NOT**", "**SHOULD**", "**SHOULD NOT**", "**RECOMMENDED**", "**NOT RECOMMENDED**", "**MAY**", and "**OPTIONAL**" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

4. **New Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Methods**

This document adopts the same naming convention defined in [RFC4462] to define families of methods that cover any GSS-API mechanism used with a specific Diffie-Hellman group and SHA-2 hash combination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Exchange Method Name</th>
<th>Implementation Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-group14-sha256-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group15-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group16-sha512-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group17-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group18-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: New Key Exchange Algorithms*

Each key exchange method prefix is registered by this document. The IESG is the change controller of all these key exchange methods; this does NOT imply that the IESG is considered to be in control of the corresponding GSS-API mechanism.
Each method in any family of methods (Table 2) specifies GSS-API-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchanges as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462]. The method name for each method (Table 1) is the concatenation of the family name prefix with the base64 encoding of the MD5 hash [RFC1321] of the ASN.1 DER encoding [ISO-IEC-8825-1] of the corresponding GSS-API mechanism's OID. Base64 encoding is described in Section 4 of [RFC4648].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name Prefix</th>
<th>Hash Function</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-group14-sha256-</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>2048-bit MODP</td>
<td>Section 3 of [RFC3526]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group15-sha512-</td>
<td>SHA-512</td>
<td>3072-bit MODP</td>
<td>Section 4 of [RFC3526]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group16-sha512-</td>
<td>SHA-512</td>
<td>4096-bit MODP</td>
<td>Section 5 of [RFC3526]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group17-sha512-</td>
<td>SHA-512</td>
<td>6144-bit MODP</td>
<td>Section 6 of [RFC3526]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group18-sha512-</td>
<td>SHA-512</td>
<td>8192-bit MODP</td>
<td>Section 7 of [RFC3526]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Family Method References

5. New Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Methods

In [RFC5656], new SSH key exchange algorithms based on elliptic curve cryptography are introduced. We reuse much of Section 4 of [RFC5656] to define GSS-API-authenticated Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchanges.

Additionally, we also utilize the curves defined in [RFC8731] to complement the three classic NIST-defined curves required by [RFC5656].

5.1. Generic GSS-API Key Exchange with ECDH

This section reuses much of the scheme defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] and combines it with the scheme defined in Section 4 of [RFC5656]; in particular, all checks and verification steps prescribed in Section 4 of [RFC5656] apply here as well.

The key-agreement schemes "ECDHE-Curve25519" and "ECDHE-Curve448" perform the Diffie-Hellman protocol using the functions X25519 and X448, respectively. Implementations MUST compute these functions using the algorithms described in [RFC7748]. When they do so, implementations MUST check whether the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret is the all-zero value and abort if so, as described in Section 6 of [RFC7748]. Alternative implementations of these functions SHOULD abort when either the client or the server input forces the shared secret to one of a small set of values, as described in Sections 6 and 7 of [RFC7748].

This section defers to [RFC7546] as the source of information on GSS-API context establishment operations, Section 3 being the most relevant. All security considerations described in [RFC7546] apply here, too.
The parties each generate an ephemeral key pair, according to Section 3.2.1 of [SEC1v2]. Keys are verified upon receipt by the parties according to Section 3.2.3.1 of [SEC1v2].

For NIST curves, the keys use the uncompressed point representation and MUST be converted using the algorithm in Section 2.3.4 of [SEC1v2]. If the conversion fails or the point is transmitted using the compressed representation, the key exchange MUST fail.

A GSS context is established according to Section 4 of [RFC5656]; the client initiates the establishment using GSS_Init_sec_context(), and the server responds to it using GSS_Accept_sec_context(). For the negotiation, the client MUST set mutual_req_flag and integ_req_flag to "true". In addition, deleg_req_flag MAY be set to "true" to request access delegation, if requested by the user. Since the key exchange process authenticates only the host, the setting of anon_req_flag is immaterial to this process. If the client does not support the "gssapi-keyex" user authentication method described in Section 4 of [RFC4462], or does not intend to use that method in conjunction with the GSS-API context established during key exchange, then anon_req_flag SHOULD be set to "true". Otherwise, this flag MAY be set to "true" if the client wishes to hide its identity. This key exchange process will exchange only a single message token once the context has been established; therefore, the replay_det_req_flag and sequence_req_flag SHOULD be set to "false".

The client MUST include its public key with the first message it sends to the server during this process; if the server receives more than one key or none at all, the key exchange MUST fail.

During GSS context establishment, multiple tokens may be exchanged by the client and the server. When the GSS context is established (major_status is GSS_S_COMPLETE), the parties check that mutual_state and integ_avail are both "true". If not, the key exchange MUST fail.

Once a party receives the peer's public key, it proceeds to compute a shared secret K. For NIST curves, the computation is done according to Section 3.3.1 of [SEC1v2], and the resulting value z is converted to the octet string K using the conversion defined in Section 2.3.5 of [SEC1v2]. For curve25519 and curve448, the algorithms in Section 6 of [RFC7748] are used instead.

To verify the integrity of the handshake, peers use the hash function defined by the selected key exchange method to calculate H:

\[ H = \text{hash}(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || Q_C || Q_S || K). \]

The server uses the GSS_GetMIC() call with H as the payload to generate a Message Integrity Code (MIC). The GSS_VerifyMIC() call is used by the client to verify the MIC.

If any GSS_Init_sec_context() or GSS_Accep_t_sec_context() returns a major_status other than GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE NEEDED, or any other GSS-API call returns a major_status other than GSS_S_COMPLETE, the key exchange MUST fail. The same recommendations expressed in Section 2.1 of [RFC4462] are followed with regard to error reporting.

The following is an overview of the key exchange process:
This is implemented with the following messages:

**The client sends:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>byte</th>
<th>SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>string</td>
<td>output_token (from GSS_Init_sec_context())</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>string</td>
<td>Q_C, client's ephemeral public key octet string</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The server may respond with:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>byte</th>
<th>SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>string</td>
<td>server public host key and certificates (K_S)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The server sends:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>byte</th>
<th>SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>string</td>
<td>output_token (from GSS_Accept_sec_context())</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each time the client receives the message described above, it makes another call to GSS_Init_sec_context().

**The client sends:**

Generates ephemeral key pair.
Calls GSS_Init_sec_context().

Verifies received key.

(Optional) Verifies received key.
	Calls GSS_Accept_sec_context().
	calls GSS_Init_sec_context().
	SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE ------------>

Verifies received key.

(Loop)

| Calls GSS_Accept_sec_context(). |
| Calls GSS_Init_sec_context(). |
| SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE --------> |

Generates ephemeral key pair.
Computes shared secret.
Computes hash H.
Calls GSS_GetMIC( H ) = MIC.

Verifies received key.
Computes shared secret.
Computes hash H.
Calls GSS_VerifyMIC( MIC, H ).

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As the final message, the server sends the following if an output_token is produced:

- **byte**: `SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE`
- **string**: `output_token (from GSS_Init_sec_context())`

If no output_token is produced, the server sends:

- **byte**: `SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE`
- **string**: `Q_S, server's ephemeral public key octet string`
- **string**: `mic_token (MIC of H)`
- **boolean**: `TRUE`
- **string**: `output_token (from GSS_Accept_sec_context())`

The hash H is computed as the HASH hash of the concatenation of the following:

- **string**: `V_C, the client's version string (CR, NL excluded)`
- **string**: `V_S, server's version string (CR, NL excluded)`
- **string**: `I_C, payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT`
- **string**: `I_S, payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT`
- **string**: `K_S, server's public host key`
- **string**: `Q_C, client's ephemeral public key octet string`
- **string**: `Q_S, server's ephemeral public key octet string`
- **mpint**: `K, shared secret`

This value is called the "exchange hash", and it is used to authenticate the key exchange. The exchange hash **SHOULD** be kept secret. If no SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message has been sent by the server or received by the client, then the empty string is used in place of K_S when computing the exchange hash.

Since this key exchange method does not require the host key to be used for any encryption operations, the SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message is **OPTIONAL**. If the "null" host key algorithm described in **Section 5** of [RFC4462] is used, this message **MUST NOT** be sent.

If the client receives an SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE message after a call to `GSS_Init_sec_context()` has returned a major_status code of `GSS_S_COMPLETE`, a protocol error has occurred, and the key exchange **MUST** fail.

If the client receives an SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE message and a call to `GSS_Init_sec_context()` does not result in a major_status code of `GSS_S_COMPLETE`, a protocol error has occurred, and the key exchange **MUST** fail.
## 5.2. ECDH Key Exchange Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Exchange Method Name</th>
<th>Implementation Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp256-sha256-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp384-sha384-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp521-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-curve25519-sha256-*</td>
<td>SHOULD/RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-curve448-sha512-*</td>
<td>MAY/OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: New Key Exchange Methods*

Each key exchange method prefix is registered by this document. The IESG is the change controller of all these key exchange methods; this does NOT imply that the IESG is considered to be in control of the corresponding GSS-API mechanism.

Each method in any family of methods (Table 4) specifies GSS-API-authenticated Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchanges as described in Section 5.1. The method name for each method (Table 3) is the concatenation of the family method name with the base64 encoding of the MD5 hash [RFC1321] of the ASN.1 DER encoding [ISO-IEC-8825-1] of the corresponding GSS-API mechanism's OID. Base64 encoding is described in Section 4 of [RFC4648].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name Prefix</th>
<th>Hash Function</th>
<th>Parameters / Function Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp256-sha256-</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>secp256r1</td>
<td>Section 2.4.2 of [SEC2v2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp384-sha384-</td>
<td>SHA-384</td>
<td>secp384r1</td>
<td>Section 2.5.1 of [SEC2v2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp521-sha512-</td>
<td>SHA-512</td>
<td>secp521r1</td>
<td>Section 2.6.1 of [SEC2v2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-curve25519-sha256-</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>X22519</td>
<td>Section 5 of [RFC7748]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-curve448-sha512-</td>
<td>SHA-512</td>
<td>X448</td>
<td>Section 5 of [RFC7748]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Family Method References*
### 6. Deprecated Algorithms

Because they have small key lengths and are no longer strong in the face of brute-force attacks, the algorithms in the following table are considered deprecated and **SHOULD NOT** be used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Exchange Method Name</th>
<th>Implementation Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-group1-sha1-*</td>
<td>SHOULD NOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group14-sha1-*</td>
<td>SHOULD NOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-gex-sha1-*</td>
<td>SHOULD NOT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5: Deprecated Algorithms*

### 7. IANA Considerations

This document augments the SSH key exchange message names that were defined in [RFC4462] (see and Section 6); IANA has listed this document as reference for those entries in the “SSH Protocol Parameters” [IANA-KEX-NAMES] registry.

In addition, IANA has updated the registry to include the SSH key exchange message names described in Sections 4 and 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Exchange Method Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gss-group1-sha1-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group14-sha1-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-gex-sha1-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group14-sha256-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group15-sha512-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group16-sha512-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group17-sha512-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-group18-sha512-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp256-sha256-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp384-sha384-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gss-nistp521-sha512-*</td>
<td>RFC 8732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Security Considerations

8.1. New Finite Field DH Mechanisms

Except for the use of a different secure hash function and larger DH groups, no significant changes have been made to the protocol described by [RFC4462]; therefore, all the original security considerations apply.

8.2. New Elliptic Curve DH Mechanisms

Although a new cryptographic primitive is used with these methods, the actual key exchange closely follows the key exchange defined in [RFC5656]; therefore, all the original security considerations, as well as those expressed in [RFC5656], apply.

8.3. GSS-API Delegation

Some GSS-API mechanisms can act on a request to delegate credentials to the target host when the deleg_req_flag is set. In this case, extra care must be taken to ensure that the acceptor being authenticated matches the target the user intended. Some mechanism implementations (such as commonly used krb5 libraries) may use insecure DNS resolution to canonicalize the target name; in these cases, spoofing a DNS response that points to an attacker-controlled machine may result in the user silently delegating credentials to the attacker, who can then impersonate the user at will.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


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