Internet-Draft
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          D. Bider
Request for Comments: 8308                               Bitvise Limited
Updates: 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 (if approved)                  Bitvise Limited
Intended status:                            February 2018
Category: Standards Track                      September 23, 2017
Expires: March 23, 2018
ISSN: 2070-1721

        Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH)
                  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-15.txt Protocol

Abstract

   This memo updates RFC RFCs 4251, 4252, RFC 4253, and RFC 4254 to define by defining a
   mechanism for SSH Secure Shell (SSH) clients and servers to exchange
   information about supported protocol extensions confidentially after
   SSH key exchange.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

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   The list Section 2 of RFC 7841.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Overview and Rationale ...........................................3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Terminology ...................................3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Wire Encoding Terminology ..................................3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Extension Negotiation Mechanism ..................................3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Signaling of Extension Negotiation in SSH_MSG_KEXINIT .......3 . .   3
     2.2.  Enabling Criteria ...........................................4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO Message ....................................4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Message Order ...............................................4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.5.  Interpretation of Extension Names and Values ................5  . . . . . .   5
   3.  Initially Defined Extensions .....................................6  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  "server-sig-algs" ...........................................6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  "delay-compression" .........................................7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.1.  Awkwardly Timed Key Re-Exchange ......................8 . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.2.  Subsequent Re-Exchange ...............................8  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.3.  Compatibility Note: OpenSSH up to Version 7.5 ................8 . . . .   9
     3.3.  "no-flow-control" ...........................................9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.3.1.  Prior "No Flow Control" Practice .....................9  . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  "elevation" ................................................10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  IANA Considerations .............................................11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Additions to existing tables ...............................11 Existing Registries  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  New table: Registry: Extension Names .................................11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.1.  Future Assignments to Extension Names ...............11 Registry  . . .  12
   5.  Security Considerations .........................................11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  References ......................................................12  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  Normative References .......................................12  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  Informative References .....................................12  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Author's Address ...................................................13
  Acknowledgments ....................................................13  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Overview and Rationale

   Secure Shell (SSH) is a common protocol for secure communication on
   the Internet.  The original design of the SSH transport layer
   [RFC4253] lacks proper extension negotiation.  Meanwhile, diverse
   implementations take steps to ensure that known message types contain
   no unrecognized information.  This makes it difficult for
   implementations to signal capabilities and negotiate extensions
   without risking disconnection.  This obstacle has been recognized in relationship with [SSH-RSA-SHA2],
   where
   the need arises for process of updating SSH to support RSA signatures using SHA-256
   and SHA-512 [SSH-RSA-SHA2].  To avoid trial and error as well as
   authentication penalties, a client must be able to discover public
   key algorithms a server accepts, to avoid authentication penalties and trial-and-error. accepts.  This extension mechanism permits
   this discovery.

   This memo updates RFC RFCs 4251, 4252, RFC 4253, and RFC 4254.

1.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Wire Encoding Terminology

   The wire encoding types in this document - -- "byte", "uint32",
   "string", "boolean", "name-list" - -- have meanings as described in
   [RFC4251].

2.  Extension Negotiation Mechanism

2.1.  Signaling of Extension Negotiation in SSH_MSG_KEXINIT

   Applications implementing this mechanism MUST add one of the
   following indicator names to the field "kex_algorithms" kex_algorithms in the
   SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message sent by the application in the first key
   exchange:

   -

   o  When acting as server: "ext-info-s"
   -

   o  When acting as client: "ext-info-c"

   The indicator name is added without quotes, quotes and MAY be added at any
   position in the name-list, subject to proper separation from other
   names as per name-list conventions.

   The names are added to the "kex_algorithms" kex_algorithms field because this is one
   of two name-list fields in SSH_MSG_KEXINIT that do not have a
   separate copy for each data direction.

   The indicator names inserted by the client and server are different
   to ensure these names will not produce a match, match and therefore not
   affect the algorithm chosen in key exchange algorithm negotiation.

   The inclusion of textual indicator names is intended to provide a
   clue for implementers to discover this mechanism.

2.2.  Enabling Criteria

   If a client or server offers "ext-info-c" or "ext-info-s"
   respectively, it MUST be prepared to accept an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO
   message from the peer.

   A server only needs to send "ext-info-s" if it intends to process
   SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO from the client.  A client only needs to send
   "ext-info-c" "ext-
   info-c" if it plans to process SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO from the server.

   If a server receives an "ext-info-c", or a client receives an
   "ext-info-s", "ext-
   info-s", it MAY send an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message, message but is not required
   to do so.

   Neither party needs to wait for the other's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT in order
   to decide whether to send the appropriate indicator in its own
   SSH_MSG_KEXINIT.

   Implementations MUST NOT send an incorrect indicator name for their
   role.  Implementations MAY disconnect if the counter-party counterparty sends an
   incorrect indicator.  If "ext-info-c" or "ext-info-s" ends up being
   negotiated as a key exchange method, the parties MUST disconnect.

2.3.  SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO Message

   A party that received the "ext-info-c" or "ext-info-s" indicator MAY
   send the following message:

     byte       SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO (value 7)
     uint32     nr-extensions
     repeat the following 2 fields "nr-extensions" times:
       string   extension-name
       string   extension-value (binary)

   Implementers'

   Implementers should pay careful attention is called to Section 2.5., 2.5, in
   particular to the requirement to tolerate any sequence of bytes - including
   (including null bytes at any position - position) in an unknown extension's
   extension-value.

2.4.  Message Order

   If a client sends SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO, it MUST send it as the next
   packet following the client's first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS message to the
   server.

   If a server sends SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO, it MAY send it at zero, one, or
   both of the following opportunities:

   -

   o  As the next packet following the server's first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.

      Where clients need information in the server's SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO to
      authenticate, it is helpful if the server sends its
      SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO not only as the next packet after
      SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, but without delay.

      Clients cannot rely on this because the server is not required to
      send the message at this time; and if sent, it may be delayed by the
      network.  However, if a timely SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO is received, a
      client can pipeline an authentication request after its
      SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, even when it needs extension information.

   -

   o  Immediately preceding the server's SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, as
      defined in [RFC4252].

      The server MAY send SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO at this second opportunity,
      whether or not it sent it at the first.  A client that sent
     "ext-info-c" "ext-
      info-c" MUST accept a server's SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO at both
     opportunities,
      opportunities but MUST NOT require it.

      This allows a server to reveal support for additional extensions
      that it was unwilling to reveal to an unauthenticated client.  If
      a server sends a second SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO, this replaces any
      initial one, and both the client and the server re-evaluate
      extensions in effect.  The server's second SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO is
      matched against the client's original.

      The timing of the second opportunity is chosen for the following
      reasons.  If the message was sent earlier, it would not allow the
      server to withhold information until the client has authenticated.
      If it was sent later, a client that needs information from the
      second SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO immediately after it authenticates would
      have no way to reliably know whether to expect the message.

2.5.  Interpretation of Extension Names and Values

   Each extension is identified by its extension-name, extension-name and defines the
   conditions under which the extension is considered to be in effect.
   Applications MUST ignore unrecognized extension-names.

   An extension MAY dictate, where

   When it is specified, that an extension MAY dictate that, in order to take
   effect, both parties must include it in their SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO; SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO or
   that it
   can be is sufficient that for only one party includes it; or to include it.  However,
   other rules MAY be specified.  The relative order in which extensions
   appear in an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message MUST be ignored.

   Extension-value fields are interpreted as defined by their respective
   extension.  This field MAY be empty if permitted by the extension.
   Applications that do not implement or recognize an extension MUST
   ignore its extension-value, regardless of its size or content.
   Applications MUST tolerate any sequence of bytes - -- including null
   bytes at any position - -- in an unknown extension's extension-value.

   The cumulative size of an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message is limited only by
   the maximum packet length that an implementation may apply in
   accordance with [RFC4253].  Implementations MUST accept well-formed
   SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO messages up to the maximum packet length they
   accept.

3.  Initially Defined Extensions

3.1.  "server-sig-algs"

   This extension is sent with the following extension name and value:

     string      "server-sig-algs"
     name-list   public-key-algorithms-accepted

   The name-list type is a strict subset of the string type, type and is thus
   permissible as an extension-value.  See [RFC4251] for more
   information.

   This extension is sent by the server, server and contains a list of public
   key algorithms that the server is able to process as part of a
   "publickey" authentication request.  If a client sends this
   extension, the server MAY ignore it, it and MAY disconnect.

   In this extension, a server MUST enumerate all public key algorithms
   it might accept during user authentication.  However, there exist early server
   implementations which that do not enumerate all accepted algorithms. algorithms do
   exist.  For this reason, a client MAY send a user authentication
   request using a public key algorithm not included in "server-sig-algs". "server-sig-
   algs".

   A client that wishes to proceed with public key authentication MAY
   wait for the server's SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so it can send a "publickey"
   authentication request with an appropriate public key algorithm,
   rather than resorting to trial and error.

   Servers that implement public key authentication SHOULD implement
   this extension.

   If a server does not send this extension, a client MUST NOT make any
   assumptions about the server's public key algorithm support, and MAY
   proceed with authentication requests using trial and error.  Note
   that implementations are known to exist that apply authentication
   penalties (*) if the client attempts to use an unexpected public key
   algorithm.

   (*)

   Authentication penalties are applied by servers to deter brute
   force brute-force
   password guessing, username enumeration, and other types of behavior
   deemed suspicious by server administrators or implementers.
   Penalties may include automatic IP address throttling or blocking,
   and they may trigger email alerts or auditing.

3.2.  "delay-compression"

   This extension MAY be sent by both parties as follows:

     string         "delay-compression"
     string:
       name-list    compression_algorithms_client_to_server
       name-list    compression_algorithms_server_to_client

   The extension-value is a string that encodes two name-lists.  The
   name-lists themselves have the encoding of strings.  For example: example, to
   indicate a preference for algorithms "foo,bar" in the client-to-server
   direction, client-to-
   server direction and "bar,baz" in the server-to-client direction, a
   sender encodes the extension-value as follows (including its length):

     00000016 00000007 666f6f2c626172 00000007 6261722c62617a

   This same encoding could be sent by either party - -- client or server.

   This extension allows the server and client to renegotiate
   compression algorithm support without having to conduct a key re-exchange, putting re-
   exchange, which puts new algorithms into effect immediately upon
   successful authentication.

   This extension takes effect only if both parties send it.  Name-lists
   MAY include any compression algorithm that could have been negotiated
   in SSH_MSG_KEXINIT, except algorithms that define their own delayed
   compression semantics.  This means "zlib,none" is a valid algorithm
   list in this context; context, but "zlib@openssh.com" is not.

   If both parties send this extension, but the name-lists do not
   contain a common algorithm in either direction, the parties MUST
   disconnect in the same way as if negotiation failed as part of
   SSH_MSG_KEXINIT.

   If this extension takes effect, the renegotiated compression
   algorithm is activated for the very next SSH message after the
   trigger message:

   -

   o  Sent by the server, the trigger message is
      SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS.
   -

   o  Sent by the client, the trigger message is SSH_MSG_NEWCOMPRESS.

   If this extension takes effect, the client MUST send the following
   message within a reasonable number of outgoing SSH messages after
   receiving SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS - SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, but not necessarily as the first
   such outgoing message:

     byte       SSH_MSG_NEWCOMPRESS (value 8)

   The purpose of SSH_MSG_NEWCOMPRESS is to avoid a race condition where
   the server cannot reliably know whether a message sent by the client
   was sent before or after receiving the server's
   SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS.  For example, clients may send keep-alive
   messages during logon processing.

   As is the case for all extensions unless otherwise noted, the server
   MAY delay including this extension until its secondary
   SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO, sent before SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS.  This allows
   the server to avoid advertising compression until the client has
   authenticated.

   If the parties re-negotiate renegotiate compression using this extension in a
   session where compression is already enabled; enabled and the re-negotiated renegotiated
   algorithm is the same in one or both directions; directions, then the internal
   compression state MUST be reset for each direction at the time the
   re-negotiated
   renegotiated algorithm takes effect.

3.2.1.  Awkwardly Timed Key Re-Exchange

   A party that has signaled, or intends to signal, support for this
   extension in an SSH session, session MUST NOT initiate key re-exchange in that
   session until either of the following occurs:

   -

   o  This extension was negotiated, and the party that's about to start
      key re-exchange already sent its trigger message for compression.

   -

   o  The party has sent (if server) or received (if client) the message
      SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and this extension was not negotiated.

   If a party violates this rule, the other party MAY disconnect.

   In general, parties SHOULD NOT start key re-exchange before
   successful user authentication, authentication but MAY tolerate it if not using this
   extension.

3.2.2.  Subsequent Re-Exchange

   In subsequent key re-exchanges that unambiguously begin after the
   compression trigger messages, the compression algorithms negotiated
   in re-exchange override the algorithms negotiated with this
   extension.

3.2.3.  Compatibility Note: OpenSSH up to Version 7.5

   This extension uses a binary extension-value encoding.  OpenSSH
   clients up to and including version 7.5 advertise support to receive
   SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO,
   SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO but disconnect on receipt of an extension-value
   containing null bytes.  This is an error fixed in OpenSSH
   version 7.6.

   Implementations that wish to interoperate with OpenSSH 7.5 and
   earlier are advised to check the remote party's SSH version string, string
   and omit this extension if an affected version is detected.  Affected
   versions do not implement this extension, so there is no harm in
   omitting it.  The extension SHOULD NOT be omitted if the detected
   OpenSSH version is 7.6 or higher.  This would make it harder for the
   OpenSSH project to implement this extension in a higher version.

3.3.  "no-flow-control"

   This extension is sent with the following extension name and value:

     string      "no-flow-control"
     string      choice of: "p" for preferred | "s" for supported

   A party SHOULD send "s" if it supports "no-flow-control", "no-flow-control" but does not
   prefer to enable it.  A party SHOULD send "p" if it prefers to enable
   the extension if the other party supports it.  Parties MAY disconnect
   if they receive a different extension value.

   To

   For this extension to take effect, this the following must occur:

   o  This extension MUST be:

   - Sent be sent by both parties.
   -

   o  At least one party MUST have sent the value "p" (preferred).

   If this extension takes effect, the "initial window size" fields in
   SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, as
   defined in [RFC4254], become meaningless.  The values of these fields
   MUST be ignored, and a channel behaves as if all window sizes are
   infinite.  Neither side is required to send any
   SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST messages, and if received, such
   messages MUST be ignored.

   This extension is intended, intended for, but not limited to, use by file
   transfer applications that are only going to use one channel, channel and for
   which the flow control provided by SSH is an impediment, rather than
   a feature.

   Implementations MUST refuse to open more than one simultaneous
   channel when this extension is in effect.  Nevertheless, server
   implementations SHOULD support clients opening more than one non-simultaneous non-
   simultaneous channel.

3.3.1.  Prior "No Flow Control" Practice

   Before this extension, some applications would simply not implement
   SSH flow control, sending an initial channel window size of 2^32 - 1.
   Applications SHOULD NOT do this for the following reasons:

   -

   o  It is plausible to transfer more than 2^32 bytes over a channel.
      Such a channel will hang if the other party implements SSH flow
      control according to [RFC4254].

   - There exist implementations which

   o  Implementations that cannot handle large channel window
     sizes, sizes
      exist, and they can exhibit non-graceful behaviors, including
      disconnect.

3.4.  "elevation"

   The terms "elevation" and "elevated" refer to an operating system
   mechanism where an administrator user's administrator's logon session is associated with
   two security contexts: one limited, limited and one with administrative
   rights.  To "elevate" such a session is to activate the security
   context with full administrative rights.  For more information about
   this mechanism on Windows, see also [WINADMIN] and [WINTOKEN].

   This extension MAY be sent by the client as follows:

     string      "elevation"
     string      choice of: "y" | "n" | "d"

   A client sends "y" to indicate its preference that the session should
   be elevated; "n" to not be elevated; and "d" for the server to use
   its default behavior.  The server MAY disconnect if it receives a
   different extension value.  If a client does not send the "elevation"
   extension, the server SHOULD act as if "d" was sent.

   If a client has included this extension, then after authentication, a
   server that supports this extension SHOULD indicate to the client
   whether elevation was done by sending the following global request:

     byte        SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
     string      "elevation"
     boolean     want reply = false
     boolean     elevation performed

   Clients that implement this extension help reduce attack surface for
   Windows servers that handle administrative logins.  Where clients do
   not support this extension, servers must elevate sessions to allow
   full access by administrative users always.  Where clients support
   this extension, sessions can be created without elevation unless
   requested.

4.  IANA Considerations

4.1.  Additions to existing tables Existing Registries

   IANA is requested to insert has added the following entries into to the table
   Message Numbers "Message Numbers"
   registry [IANA-M] under Secure the "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters Parameters"
   registry [RFC4250]:

     Value    Message ID             Reference
     -----------------------------------------
     7        SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO       [this document]       RFC 8308
     8        SSH_MSG_NEWCOMPRESS    [this document]    RFC 8308

   IANA is requested to insert has also added the following entries into to the table Key "Key Exchange Method Names
   Names" registry [IANA-KE]:

     Method Name     Reference      Note
     ------------------------------------------
     ext-info-s      [this document]      RFC 8308       Section 2.2 2
     ext-info-c      [this document]      RFC 8308       Section 2.2 2

4.2.  New table: Registry: Extension Names

   Also under Secure the "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters, Parameters" registry,
   IANA is requested
   to create has created a new table, Extension Names, "Extension Names" registry, with the following
   initial content:

     Extension Name       Reference       Note
     ------------------------------------------------
     server-sig-algs      [this document]      RFC 8308        Section 3.1
     delay-compression    [this document]    RFC 8308        Section 3.2
     no-flow-control      [this document]      RFC 8308        Section 3.3
     elevation            [this document]            RFC 8308        Section 3.4

4.2.1.  Future Assignments to Extension Names Registry

   Names in the Extension Names table "Extension Names" registry MUST follow the Conventions conventions
   for
   Names names defined in [RFC4250], Section 4.6.1.

   Requests for assignments of new non-local names in the Extension Names
   table (i.e. "Extension
   Names" registry (i.e., names not including the '@' character) MUST be
   done
   through using the IETF CONSENSUS method, Review policy, as described in [RFC8126].

5.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations are discussed throughout this document.  This
   document updates the SSH protocol as defined in [RFC4251] and related
   documents.  The security considerations of [RFC4251] apply.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4250]  Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006. 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.

   [RFC4251]   Lehtinen, S.  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
              January 2006. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.

   [RFC4252]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
              January 2006. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252>.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
              January 2006. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.

   [RFC4254]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, DOI 10.17487/RFC4254,
              January 2006. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4254>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B. B., and T. Narten, T., "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017. 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [IANA-KE]   "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/
              ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16>.  IANA, "Key Exchange Method Names",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.

   [IANA-M]    "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/
              ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-1>.   IANA, "Message Numbers",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.

   [SSH-RSA-SHA2]
              Bider, D., "Use of RSA Keys with SHA-2 256 SHA-256 and 512 SHA-512 in
              Secure Shell (SSH)", draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10.txt,
              August 2017, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10>. Work in Progress, draft-ietf-curdle-
              rsa-sha2-12, October 2017.

   [WINADMIN]
              Microsoft, "How to launch a process as a Full
              Administrator when UAC is enabled?", <https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/winsdk/
              2013/03/22/how-to-launch-a-process-as-a-full-
              administrator-when-uac-is-enabled/>. March 2013,
              <https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/winsdk/2013/03/22/how-
              to-launch-a-process-as-a-full-administrator-when-uac-is-
              enabled/>.

   [WINTOKEN]
              Microsoft, "TOKEN_ELEVATION_TYPE enumeration",
              <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/
              bb530718.aspx>.

Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Markus Friedl and Damien Miller for comments and initial
   implementation.  Thanks to Peter Gutmann, Roumen Petrov, Mark D.
   Baushke, Daniel Migault, Eric Rescorla, Matthew A. Miller, Mirja
   Kuehlewind, Adam Roach, Spencer Dawkins, Alexey Melnikov, and Ben
   Campbell for reviews and feedback.

Author's Address
   Denis Bider
   Bitvise Limited
   4105 Lombardy Court
   Colleyville, Texas TX  76034
   United States of America

   EMail:

   Email: ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com
   URI:   https://www.bitvise.com/