[rfc-i] Who decides on the contracts
Glenn at RiverOnce.com
Tue Jan 4 16:25:51 PST 2011
On Jan 4, 2011, at 6:52 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On 1/4/11 12:35 PM, Glenn Kowack wrote:
>> If the RSE and IAOC cannot agree, they can and should take the issue to the IAB, who will have final authority.
> This design seems like a poor use of the IAB's time. They IAB has the final authority anyway: why not design the system to minimize the chance that an appeal comes to them?
That's exactly the point: the IAB has the final authority, but its delegates should be able to do their job
without the IAB - except of course when it is genuinely necessary. So, net, no time should be wasted.
>> In some cases, it will be legitimate that the IAB's input and authority will be required. In other cases, the IAB will, however, tell the RSE and the IAOC: "OK -Go do X. However, you didn't need to bother us with this issue. Next time, you should figure it out together. Please don't waste our time."
> That is quite a believable outcome.
>> The REOC (oversight committee) will also in the loop and should reinforce cooperation at all times, and consultation with the IAB as necessary.
> You just put a third party into the "who decides on the contracts" decision process. I don't see that in model-v2-overview-00; did you mean to put it there?
Not at all: "advise and consent" provided by the REOC includes issues like this at some level - largely w/r/t
ensuring effective, community-oriented practices.
>> This is resoundingly analogous to the sort of structure found in a large proportion of organizations, large and small, profit and non-profit: line managers (VPs, Directors, etc) work in tandem with financial experts (CFOs (Chief Financial Officers), Departmental Finance Managers, etc) to agree on all plans.
> "works in tandem with" doesn't mean "must agree with them on contracts".
But that's what I meant by this 'tandem' in this example; that is how these pairs work.
> If the proposed model is changed to have either the RSE or IAOC decide on contracts, *of course* that body would consult with the other.
>> It is time-tested, effective, and efficient.
> Our views of "efficient" differ.
Let's recall: accepting certain costs and efforts as inevitable, and structuring systems to manage those
efficiently, net reduces overheads. I believe that's what's going on here.
>> It also *demands* cooperation.
> ...that comes after conflict that, in the current model, takes time from a third body, the IAB.
But, again, only when legitimately necessary. And if not, the RSE/IAOC should get the word (from the IAB)
and do better the next time.
>> I see no reason why this should not be optimal in the context of the I*, the RFC Editor, the RSE, and the IAOC.
> Noted. I propose that it is more optimal to have a single body, with a single set of motivations, that can make important contract decisions.
That flies in the face of there being many different areas of expertise within the community, and of what
organizations have learned about management over many years: complex organizations are best served
by multiple experts, each with different areas of responsibility, coming together to ensure that all
requirements are served well.
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