[rfc-i] Who decides on the contracts

[Paul Hoffman]

On 1/4/11 12:35 PM, Glenn Kowack wrote:
> If the RSE and IAOC cannot agree, they can and should take the issue to the IAB, who will have final authority.

This design seems like a poor use of the IAB's time. They IAB has the 
final authority anyway: why not design the system to minimize the chance 
that an appeal comes to them?

> In some cases, it will be legitimate that the IAB's input and authority will be required.  In other cases, the IAB will, however, tell the RSE and the IAOC: "OK -Go do X.  However, you didn't need to bother us with this issue. Next time, you should figure it out together.  Please don't waste our time."

That is quite a believable outcome.

>The REOC (oversight committee) will also in the loop and should reinforce cooperation at all times, and consultation with the IAB as necessary.

You just put a third party into the "who decides on the contracts" 
decision process. I don't see that in model-v2-overview-00; did you mean 
to put it there?

> This is resoundingly analogous to the sort of structure found in a large proportion of organizations, large and small, profit and non-profit: line managers (VPs, Directors, etc) work in tandem with financial experts (CFOs (Chief Financial Officers), Departmental Finance Managers, etc) to agree on all plans.

"works in tandem with" doesn't mean "must agree with them on contracts". 
If the proposed model is changed to have either the RSE or IAOC decide 
on contracts, *of course* that body would consult with the other.

> It is time-tested, effective, and efficient.

Our views of "efficient" differ.

> It also *demands* cooperation.

...that comes after conflict that, in the current model, takes time from 
a third body, the IAB.

> I see no reason why this should not be optimal in the context of the I*, the RFC Editor, the RSE, and the IAOC.

Noted. I propose that it is more optimal to have a single body, with a 
single set of motivations, that can make important contract decisions.