[rfc-i] On two committees
housley at vigilsec.com
Mon Nov 29 11:48:25 PST 2010
> In brief:
> In the model I have in mind, the RSE could choose
> to appoint an advisory committee to advise him or her,
> entirely at the RSE's discretion. Actually I reckon that
> anybody, doing any job, can do this. No need for BCP text
> about this.
> The other part of my model is to introduce community-based
> oversight in some form, just as we did when reorganising
> IETF administration, which is why I suggested an Oversight
> My not-hidden concern here is to ensure that there *is*
> oversight while offering the IAB the chance to get out
> of the details. Note, I am *not* criticising the IAB for
> stepping up to the mark over the last couple of years;
> somebody had to. But isn't it odd for a group with
> "architecture" in its name to be responsible for documents
> such as RFC 5741?
> All details TBD of course, but that is my top level concern.
I agree that there needs to be community-accountable oversight of the
RSE, and I agree that the IAB does not want to perform that role.
When I started reading this section, I imagined a relationship similar
to the IAOC oversight of the IAD. That is, policy decisions are make by
the IAOC, and then the policy is implemented by the IAD. I like this
model because the community-accountable body is making the policy decisions.
I do not think the current document has this clarity. Also, your
earlier message about the Transition Team further confused me. Maybe it
is just a matter of finding the right words. If this is your intent,
then I support it.
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