Abstract

The Ed25519 signature algorithm has been implemented in OpenSSH. This document updates the IANA "SSHFP RR Types for public key algorithms" registry by adding an algorithm number for Ed25519.

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1. Introduction

The Ed25519 [Ed25519] signature algorithm, specifically Ed25519-SHA-512, has been implemented in OpenSSH. RFC 4255 [RFC4255] defines a DNS resource record, "SSHFP", which can be used to publish a fingerprint of the SSH server public key in the DNS. This document updates the IANA "SSHFP RR Types for public key algorithms" registry by adding an algorithm number for Ed25519 [Ed25519].

2. Ed25519 Public Key with SHA-256 Fingerprint

The encoding of Ed25519 public keys is described in [Ed25519]. In brief, an Ed25519 public key is a 32-octet value representing a 255-bit y-coordinate of an elliptic curve point, and a sign bit indicating the corresponding x-coordinate.

The SSHFP Resource Record for the Ed25519 public key with SHA-256 fingerprint [FIPS180-4] would, for example, be:

```
ssh.example.com IN SSHFP 4 2 ( a87f1b687ac0e57d2a081a2f2826723
34d90ed316d2b818ca9580ea384d924
01 )
```

The following body of the public key file was used as input to generate the above fingerprint:

```
ssh-ed25519
AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIGPKSUTyz1HwHReFVvD5obVslALAgJRNaH4TRpNePnAS
```

The opaque octet string output produced is placed as is in the RDATA fingerprint field.
3. Security Considerations

The overall security of using SSHFP for SSH host key verification is dependent on the security policies of the SSH host administrator and DNS zone administrator (in transferring the fingerprint), detailed aspects of how verification is done in the SSH implementation, and in the client’s diligence in accessing the DNS in a secure manner. Please refer to RFC 4255 [RFC4255] for a discussion of the security considerations.

4. IANA Considerations

IANA has added the following entry to the "SSHFP RR Types for public key algorithms" registry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ed25519</td>
<td>[RFC7479]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. References

5.1. Normative References


5.2. Informative References

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